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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF ULUS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATION-BUILDING AND 
LANGUAGE POLICIES IN TURKEY 
 
Turgut, Üveys Mücahit 
MA in Modern Turkish Studies 
Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Abdulhamit Kırmızı 
May 2017, 131 pages 
 
In this thesis, I examine the historical adventure of the concept of ulus, which came 
to be used as the counterpart of "nation" in the language reform process in Turkey in 
the 1930s, based on the theoretical approach to conceptual history pioneered by 
Reinhart Koselleck. The study examines Turkish political life and identity construction 
through conceptual history and language nationalism. In this thesis, I explain different 
types of language politics and their role in the process of nationalization in France, 
Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. I discuss the changing sense of identity during 
the Milli Mücadele period and the Republican period of Turkey, and the new Turkish 
identity that started to be produced at the end of the 1920s. I narrate the language 
reform process in parallel with the Turkish history thesis and discuss the new secular 
Turkish identity in the process of nationalization. I begin by offering a short 
conceptual history of the term millet, after which I explain the etymology of the term 
ulus, the use of the term until the 13th century, and the changing meaning of the 
term in the Ottoman world over time. In doing so, I draw from etymological 
dictionaries, epics, inscriptions, ancient Turkish works, works of the TDK (Turkish 
Language Association), and newspapers. I discuss the struggle between the use of the 
terms ulus, millet, and budun and the process whereby the former term came to 
dominate. I describe the use of the concept of ulus in different circles. I explain in 
detail and with examples that the difference between ulus and millet was the result 
of an ideological divide. I also show how the concepts have become ideological 
symbols, particularly in terms of the differences between milliyetçilik and ulusalcılık. 
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ÖZ 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’DE ULUS İNŞASI VE DİL POLİTİKALARI BAĞLAMINDA ULUS KELİMESİNİN 
KAVRAM TARİHİ 
 
Turgut, Üveys Mücahit 
Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Abdulhamit Kırmızı 
Mayıs 2017, 131 sayfa 
 
 
Bu tezde 1930larda Türkiye’deki dil reform sürecinde dilimize “nation” kelimesinin 
karşılığı olarak millet yerine getirilen ulus kavramının tarihsel macerasını inceledim. 
Bunu yaparken Reinhart Kosselleck’in öncülüğünü yaptığı kavram tarihi çalışmalarının 
teorik formatını temel aldım. Çalışma, kavram tarihi ve dil milliyetçiliği üzerinden Türk 
siyasal hayatını ve kimlik inşasını ele alıyor. Sadece bir kavram çalışması olmayan bu 
tezde öncelikle dil politikalarının çeşitlerini ve bunların uluslaşma sürecinde ne gibi 
katkılarının olduğunu teorik olarak açıkladım. Akabinde, bu sürecin Fransa, Almanya 
ve Osmanlı’da nasıl olduğunu tartıştım. Milli Mücadele döneminde ve Cumhuriyet 
dönemi Türkiye’sinde değişen kimlik algısını ve 1920li yılların sonunda üretilmeye 
başlanan yeni Türk kimliğini bu bağlamda tartıştım. Dil reformu sürecini Türk Tarih 
Tezi ile paralel bir biçimde anlattım ve uluslaşma sürecinde yeni Türk kimliğini 
tartıştım. Bu doğrultuda millet kelimesinin kısa bir kavram tarihini yazdıktan sonra 
ulus kavramının tarihini anlattım. Burada kavramın etimolojisini, 13. Yüzyıla kadarki 
kullanımını ve Osmanlı dünyasında süreç içerisinde değişen anlamını anlattım. Bunu 
yaparken etimolojik sözlüklerden, destanlardan, yazıtlardan, eski Türkçe eserlerden, 
Türk Dil Kurumu çalışmalarından ve gazetelerden yararlandım. Kavramın dile 
yerleşme sürecinde budun ve millet kelimeleri ile girdiği çekişmeden bahsettim. Ulus 
kavramının farklı mecralardaki kullanımından bahsettim. Ulus ve millet kavramları 
arasında oluşan farkın ideolojik ayrışmalar kaynaklı olduğunu detaylıca ve örneklerle 
anlattım. Burada özellikle milliyetçilik ve ulusalcılık arasındaki farkları göstererek 
kavramların nasıl ideolojik semboller haline geldiğini gösterdim. 
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“Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins” 
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
 
 
“Kamus namustur” 
Cemil Meriç 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: ON CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
 
 
Words, their abstract envisagement in our minds, and meanings, that is to say the 
field related to language is exciting. The natural development of languages 
accompanies, naturally, creation of new words and semantic enlargement or 
constriction of words over time. So what if somebody would tell us to call “sea” as 
“tree”? This would not only be a name change of an entity. This would influence social 
intelligence as well as cognition, meaning, and identification. When social and 
political effects are added, this imagination could create an inextricable situation. 
Dogtooth (Lanthimos, 2009) is an eye-opening Greek movie related to these kind of 
matters. Its story makes it possible for us to think about some issues related with 
language and politics. The father keeps his three children and wife isolated outside 
of their home, which is surrounded by a tall fence and is positioned far from the city. 
No one but the father can go out of the house with his car. Thereby, family members 
do not have any connections outside of their territory. The father and mother create 
their own laws and language in their fenced territory. A lot of words are used with 
different meanings and teaching new words is under parents’ control. For instance, 
the movie starts with a voice record, which teaches definitions of some words. The 
recording gives the definition first and then exemplifies them. Sea, for example, 
means chair in this territory. Riffle means a beautiful bird. Zombie means a yellow 
flower. It is not easy and normal for them to learn new words out of parents’ 
authority. On the other hand, there is only one way to go out of this established 
system for children, the fall of the canine tooth, which is literally impossible. 
 
Audience does not actually know why the father performs such a program for his 
family, but security concerns and domination are presumable reasons. The father, as 
an absolute leader, creates and manages language in the territory. It is possible to 
read the movie through concepts such as state, nation, and language politics. For 
example, the language politics of the Turkish Republic, which was performed due to 
some concerns as the father has in the movie, has some intersection points with the 
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Dogtooth. The Turkish Republic changed the alphabet first and then practiced new 
policies on existing language in the territory such as creation of new words, or 
cancelation of some existing words. The reason behind these policies and the 
consequences can be discussed. But it is intriguing how words and languages have 
existed, what affects usage of the words, how words cumulate their semantic 
stratum. Beside all these, is it possible to trace history of these semantic strata? 
 
There are many theories on origin of languages. Each one forms a systematic 
integrity, so discussions on how words were created differ from each other. We do 
not use words only to express our basic daily needs and feelings. Some fields such as 
literature, philosophy, or politics require new words or adding new layers to 
meanings of living words. This provides developing scopes of words, so from here on 
out, some words become concepts and concepts may contain in itself stories and 
meanings of many words. If we can catch the periods of adding and changing 
meanings of words, we can trace and contact with the social history of that period. 
This kind of work will contribute to history, philosophy, and politics alongside its 
contribution to linguistics. 
 
As mentioned above by combining with the story of Dogtooth, the possibility of 
playing with the semantic field of vocabulary, its effects on the human mind can be a 
discussion topic. It is possible to encounter this kind of experience in some countries 
such as Turkey. During the early republican era the Turkish language was exposed to 
some reforms starting with alphabet change in 1928. With an idea of not belonging 
originally Turkish a lot of Persian and Arabic oriented vocabularies were dropped out 
of use starting with early 30’s. Enquiries and scanning have been made from old 
Turkish books and new words have been brought into existence as equivalent for 
existing words. Thus, with reproduction of unused or newly coined words, the Turkish 
language underwent a rapid change. As will be described in detail further in this 
chapter, I will focus in this thesis on conceptual history of the Turkish term ulus, which 
is a living witness of the language reform process. In connection with this matter, I 
will explain as background nation building and language political experiences from 
European history and the Ottoman language reform opinions, and language politics 
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of the republican era. I will focus on the term ulus afterwards and the thesis will cover 
the line from its pre-Islamic use to contemporary use. 
 
Starting out with a similar concern of an academic circle in Germany, a branch called 
Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history) has emanated. Interest in history of concepts 
in Germany can go back to Hegel (Monk, Tilmans, & Vree, 1998). After books we can 
count as evidence works such as Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political (Der 
Begriff des Politischen, 1927), and Otto Brunner’s Land and Lordship (Land und 
Herrschaft, 1939), Reinhart Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner Conze have pursued 
works and publications on history of social and political concepts in the post-war era. 
Their project Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (The GG, basic historical concepts) 
finished with Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland 
(Historical Lexicon for Political-Social Language in Germany). 
 
Before explaining the GG, I want to mention other conceptual history projects as well. 
Archiv für Begriffgeschichte was an academic journal, which was founded by 
philosopher Erich Rothacker in 1955, published papers on concepts of history of 
philosophy and science in 49 volumes. Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (the 
HWP, Historical Dictionary of Philosophy) is a dictionary focused primarily on 
philosophy and related topics. Joachim Ritter and his workmates started publishing 
bands in 1971. Differing from other types of conceptual history works, “the HWP does 
not attempt to specify the contexts for past uses of philosophical concepts. In the 
HWP, Begriffsgeschichte is applied only to those concepts that have either changed 
little over time, or enough so that they benefit from being viewed against contrasting 
horizons in the history of philosophy” (Richter, 2003, p. 93). And the other project 
was Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820 (Handbook 
Political-Social Basic Concepts in France) was focused on political and social terms in 
France between 1680 and 1820. Rolf Reichardt and Eberhart Schmitt were its 
publishers and because of its time scape, history of words did not go further into the 
past than the French ancien régime. Each of these conceptual history studies in 
Germany have distinctive system and time period. However, the most talked  about 
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itself is the GG project, which is related so much with social history as much as 
linguistic, politics, and philosophy. 
 
The GG project, unlike others, set its sights on the period approximately between 
1750 and 1850, which was called the Sattelzeit (saddle time) by Reinhart Koselleck. 
According to Koselleck, semantic fields of some political and social vocabularies used 
in German-speaking Europe underwent changes during this period due to structural 
changes in government, economics, and society. This semantic transition was also 
deeply related with modern political and social thought (Richter, 1995). The GG 
focused and defined words long in use, neologisms, and words, which gained 
different meanings from earlier uses. The GG differed from other conceptual history 
projects as mentioned above. The GG’s editors did not explain any historical or 
political characters with their ideas. Concepts and their usages over time were 
important for them. Therefore, the GG was not a chronology, but a correlated 
analysis on words and social environment of the time. This interest includes also 
historical shifts and innovations of words. The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
Historisches Lexicon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland has been issued 
from 1972 to 1997 as 8 volumes. It consists of 120 concepts, covered in 7,000 pages. 
Average length of an article is about 50 pages. According to Melvin Richter’s 
explanation, it is possible to categorize concepts into eight parts such as (1995, p 40): 
 
1) Political concepts such as the state, sovereignty, monarchy, and politics 
2) Social concepts such as civil society, class, system, family, and vocation 
3) “–isms” or ideologies such as anarchism, liberalism, fascism, and Marxism 
4) Philosophical concepts such as natural law, liberty, rights, and nihilism 
5) Historical concepts such as history, progress, crisis, and revolution 
6) Economic concepts such as worker, need, interest, capital, and property 
7) Legal concepts such as basic law, constitution, statute, and contract 
8) Concepts used in international politics such as war, peace, and neutrality 
 
 
As it is understood, many concepts concerning social and politics were in GG’s field 
of interest. And editors evaluated these terms from the points of temporalization, 
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democratization, ideologization, and politicization. All articles have a general format 
in the Lexicon. It can be separated into three sections. In the first section there is the 
historical process of the concept from classical to early modern period. In the second 
section explains the semantic change and development in the Sattelzeit. And the last 
section gives a summary and information about present day use (Richter, 1995). 
 
These projects for German-speaking countries set similar discussions in other 
European academies. In England, for example, academicians John Pocock and 
Quentin Skinner criticized Koselleck’s method and understanding on concepts and 
this created a different perspective on conceptual history. Some Dutch historians and 
political thinkers wrote articles on how to do a similar conceptual history work for 
Dutch concepts. 
 
Why is conceptual history important? Conceptual history, which probed on the 
question how key concepts came into existence and transformed related to social, 
political, and economic structure, will definitely help us to understand and interpret 
more accurately the time we are interested in. This pursuit will help us to find sources 
of the contemporary political and social discussions as well as past events related 
with social and political life. When considered in German context, the 
Begriffsgeschichte helped tracing the transformation process from medieval to 
modern thinking and structure. This process concentratedly occurred in the Sattelzeit 
called by Koselleck. The accruing of this kind of studies in Turkish academic 
community will contribute understanding of Turkish modernization process related 
to social and political history. 
 
1750-1850 is the focus of the semantic change in German history, it can be said that, 
the century approximately between 1839 and 1938 was the Sattelzeit of the Turkish 
history. This period between the Tanzimat Edict and the Mustafa Kemal’s death 
testified to many changes attached to language alongside social, economic, and 
political alterations. Such new events like rearrangement of military system, identity 
policies, nationalism affect, constitutional monarchy, and western type schooling 
deflected classical social, religious, and political concepts into a west affected or 
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associated with a new social field. Furthermore, foundation of the Turkish Republic, 
the alphabet reform, other systematic reforms, and purification of language also 
influenced semantic field of many concepts. This story presents distinctness for every 
branch, and even for every word. Even if they are not methodologically similar with 
German conceptual history, there are some articles and books on history and 
development of concepts in Turkish language. When taken into account the numbers 
of the political events mentioned above, investigation on this wilderness is still made 
up of small academic work. Some examples I can give are following. 
 
Professor İsmail Kara has some parts in his PhD thesis about the concepts of 
constitution, party, millet, meşveret, and meclis. This PhD thesis was published as a 
book by name İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri (Kara, 1994). 
 
Behlül Özkan has a book by name From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan; The 
Making of a National Homeland in Turkey (Özkan, 2012). In his book, Özkan writes 
conceptual history of the term vatan. He traces back history of the concept from the 
time of the Tanzimat reforms in the late Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation state 
period. He explains the transformation of the semantic field of the term from its 
Islamic meaning to a nationalism-related one. In the classical era, vatan meant in 
Arabic the place of one’s birth. This can be translated as homeland. But unlike the 
English homeland and French patrie, Turkish term vatan does not refer only to the 
territory of an imagined nation state, whereas in connection with the old sense, vatan 
has a politico-religious meaning as well as there are many political and legal terms 
derived from vatan. Özkan exemplifies these derivations such as citizen (vatandaş), 
heimatlos (vatansız), and high treason (vatana ihanet) (Özkan, 2012). Starting with 
these discussions, Özkan traces the creation of national spatial consciousness in 
turkey through the term vatan. Behlül Özkan’s book helps to see apparently the 
mental change of the Turkish people related to this term. 
 
Yıldıray Oğur has a master thesis on the history of the concepts of serbestiyet, 
hürriyet, özgürlük from the Ottoman to the Republican era and this thesis was also 
published as a book by name Ey Özgürlük (Oğur, 2012). Yıldıray Oğur’s thesis with the 
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title Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet Modernleşmesinde İki Özgürlük Kavramı focuses on liberty- 
freedom concepts in Turkish language during modernization process. He examines 
the mental changes of society brought about by the modernization on a conceptual 
dimension. According to Oğur, the term Hürriyet is about political liberty, whereas 
the term özgürlük refers to a non-political one, but has more philosophical and inner 
dimensions. Oğur starts with serbestiyet, which can be seen as an antecedent concept 
of hürriyet and özgürlük, dated back to post-French revolution period. The Ottoman 
Empire accelerated structural reforms during the Tanzimat era. However, this 
created an idea of istibdat among some intellectual circles and these circles 
discovered the hürriyet against the istibdat. Oğur reads the modernization through 
the concept. As the other main body of the book, he brings the theme to the Turkish 
Republic and he explains the transformation of the term hürriyet to özgürlük with 
language politics in 1930’s. And Oğur explains his thesis related to özgürlük by 
mentioning radical özgürleşme and authoritarian politics of early republics. 
 
Aydın Taneri has a book on the development of the concept of Turk by name Türk 
Kavramının Gelişmesi; Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene (Taneri, 1983). As title, Taneri’s book 
seems very charming, because we hope to read in this book how the term Türk 
became existence and how it is used. Unfortunately, the book does not satisfy these 
expectations. Taneri’s book does not have a similar discourse as above mentioned 
works. However, the reason why I mention his book in this thesis is its way of 
explanation the history as a contribution to the sense of the term Türk. In the book, 
which was written from a nationalist perspective, whole Turkish history from Mete 
Han (Modu Chanyu) to Mustafa Kemal serves and fills bottom of the term Türk. This 
book is not important in terms of conceptual history but in context of how historical 
events retroactively affect formation of meaning layers of a concept. 
 
Based on abovementioned considerations, I will attempt to write a history of a 
concept in this master’s thesis. I sincerely hope, this study will be a contribution to 
conceptual history research in Turkey. To find a common matter regarding the late 
Ottoman and the early republican period, such as nationalism and nation state, is 
important  for  the  Turkish  Sattelzeit  in  respect  to  both  comprehensiveness  and 
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relation with other social issues. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
nationalist rhetoric began to rise among Turks. New discussions appeared among 
intellectual environments and these discussions naturally were related to social, 
political and religious scopes. As the Islamic concept meşveret acquired new 
meanings during constitutional monarchy era, the term millet was influenced by 
nationalism and added new meanings to its semantic field. Then the term ulus was 
created and used in the republican period instead of millet. 
 
The term millet is a deep-rooted word and it has many layers of meanings. The term 
Millet is a Quranic word and available in the book several times. The Holy Quran 
refers to noun phrase millet-i İbrahim in some verses. This phrase means the religion 
of the prophet Abraham or the way of life of the prophet Abraham. The millet here 
contains all groups of people belonging to the same system of beliefs. From this 
respect the millet refers to a more extensive group of people than the Muslim ümmet. 
In social structure of the Ottoman Empire the millet showed a religious category. 
Religious groups were arranged hierarchically and every group had some rights 
according to their own religious laws. There were mainly four millets in Ottoman 
political and social life and they are hierarchically Muslim millet, Rûm millet, Ermeni 
millet, and Yahudi millet. This system was related to religion directly. For example, 
Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians are different ethnic groups but in Ottoman context 
they were combined in Rum millet, this shows the non-ethnic meaning of the term 
millet. However, with the influences of the French Revolution, millet acquired the 
meaning of nation. Although Prof. İslam Kara has some fragmentary works on the 
history of this term, a full-scale book containing all ingredients has not been written 
yet. 
 
To find a well-examined article or book written about the term ulus is more difficult 
than millet. Almost whole books or articles including the term ulus are about nation 
building, nation state, and nationalism in Turkey. I could not find any source, which 
investigate the concept historically and semantically. They use the term as if it is a 
longtime used word rather than reproduced in the early republic. To find such a 
discussion in the nationalism literature is a compelling archeology. I will clarify in the 
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next subtitle the sources I will use in my thesis. Here I want to mention why this issue 
is worth studying. The Turkish Republic attached importance to language. Many parts 
of the language issue such as simplification and alphabet change were discussed in 
the Late Ottoman Empire, however, even if the mentality was different, the Republic 
was able to achieve these goals years after. Why would a state change the alphabet 
used by the society? By not satisfying with just changing the alphabet, the Republic 
intervened to vocabulary and their anaphors. Therefore, the semantic world that the 
language belongs, aesthetics, references of the language suffer a change and 
reproduce themselves. Most apparent reason of the language reforms of the Early 
Republic seems the involvement to a different Weltanschauung, perspective, or way 
of life. Let’s take kader, kısmet, nasip, tevâfuk, yazgı and şans as examples. While 
kader, kısmet, nasip, and tevâfuk have a common metaphysical semantic world, şans 
and yazgı, which are produced after language reforms, do not have any metaphysical 
connotations even if they are used instead of previous words. That is to say, the Early 
Republic tried to cut off connections with traditions while building a nation state. The 
issue I mentioned applies to the relation between millet and ulus. Starting with these 
ideas, I will focus on the production of the term ulus. This will cover broad strokes 
process of production, usage, spread, space, and success. With a hope to have taken 
a step in this wilderness, I will attempt to write the conceptual history of the term 
ulus. 
 
1.1. Literature and Research Sources 
Since I explained the conceptual history school and their publications, I will not 
mention them here again. The way Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues wrote 
conceptual history will be my guide in this thesis. That means I will investigate the 
history of the term through three main pillars: first, pre-Islamic usage of the term, its 
etymology, and the later usage if available; the second, whole process of recreation 
and release to the social; and third, from 1933 to contemporary usage. 
 
Since I am critical about nationalism, in related parts I will utilize from sources in this 
manner. As I will mention below under the chapter outline, I will rely on Eric 
Hobsbawm,  Anthony  Smith,  Ernest   Gellner,  and   Benedict   Anderson,   who  are 
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authorities on the issue of nationalism. Moreover, the way Liah Greenfeld explains 
nationalism in Nationalism Five Roads to Modernity (1993) also affected my 
approach. I will also use certain book sections and articles about language and 
creating a national language. I will combine these sources to explain nationalism and 
language in context. 
 
Before addressing the conceptual history of the term ulus, I will explain the 
connection between language and nation building using the examples of French and 
German. Furthermore, I will discuss the Ottoman experience in the context of 
language policies. In this regard, books written by Robert Cooper, Robert McColl 
Millar, Sue Wright, Harold Schiffman, and Tomasz Kamusella were important to 
understand the relation between language and nation building, the types of language 
policies implemented in different countries, how language policies affected societies, 
and where the Turkish language policies can be placed in this literature. While writing 
about the language planning in France and Germany, I was influenced by Anne 
Judge’s article in Language and Nationalism in Europe (2001), edited by Stephen 
Barbour and Cathie Carmichael, and Tomasz Kamusella’s The Politics of Language and 
Nationalism in Modern Central Europe (2009). Hans Pohlsander’s book on German 
nationalism and Eli Nathan’s book on German citizenship were also helpful in 
covering the problem. While writing the Ottoman part, I mostly tried to use the most 
recent historical literature on the issue. C.A. Bayly’s The Birth of The Modern World 
1780-1914 (2004), Frederick Anscombe’s State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and 
Post-Ottoman Lands (2014), and Stephan Berger, Alexei Miller, and Hovard 
Eissenstat’s articles in the book Nationalizing Empires (2014) were eye-opening and 
helpful in understanding the last century of the Ottoman Empire and nationalism in 
Ottoman lands. Moreover, David Kushner’s book on Turkish nationalism and İlber 
Ortaylı’s texts helped me to cover the process in the Ottoman Empire. 
 
Before discussing language policies in the Turkish Republic, I attempted to scrutinize 
the development process of Turkish identity from the end of World War I. While 
explaining the developments, I conscientiously avoided the official historiography. 
Soner Çağaptay’s Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey Who is Turk? 
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(2006), Ahmet Yıldız’s "Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene" Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno- 
Seküler Sınırları (2001), Erik Zürcher’s article “The Vocabulary of Muslim Nationalism” 
(1999), Binnaz Toprak’s article “Türkiye’de Dinin Denetim İşlevi” (2009) were 
particularly helpful to understanding and covering the general mindset of the period. 
Regarding language policies, the Turkish history thesis, and creating a new identity, I 
utilized from Etienne Copeaux’s Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine (2006), 
Büşra Ersanlı’s İktidar ve Tarih Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu (2003), Ayşe 
Kadıoğlu’s article “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of 
Official Identity” (1996) and Uriel Heyd, Geoffrey Lewis’s works. 
 
There are some master and PhD theses about Turkish language reform. One of the 
most comprehensive such works is Hüseyin Sadoğlu’s PhD thesis in political science 
entitled “Uluslaşma Sürecinde Türk Dil Politikaları 1839-1950” (2002). This thesis was 
published under the name of Türkiye’de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları (2010). I utilized 
this book to trace the language reform process through my thesis. However, my 
thesis has differences in terms of literature and bibliography. I discussed topics 
mainly related to religion and culture. Beside this, there are some other masters 
theses about language policies in Turkey such as Andre Zakari’s “A Modernist 
Approach towards Turkish Nationalism: The Case of Language Policies in Early 
Republican Turkey 1928-1938” (2012), and Eda Topuz’s “Atatürk’ün Dil Politikası” 
(2013). After I explained and discussed the link between language policies and nation 
building in Turkey, I examined the conceptual history of the term ulus in this thesis. 
 
While investigating the Turkish history thesis and language reform, I took care to use 
primary sources such as Mustafa Kemal’s own speeches, parliamentary minutes, and 
relevant books that were published such as Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (1930), Afet 
İnan’s Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal’in El Yazıları (2000), and Atatürk Hakkında 
Hatıralar ve Belgeler (1959). On the other hand, there are books that were published 
by Turkish Language and History Associations such as Vecihe Hatiboğlu’s Ölümsüz 
Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi (1973), Agah Sırrı Levend’s Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme 
Safhaları (1949), Zeynep Korkmaz’s Türk Dilinin Tarihi Akışı içinde Atatürk ve Dil 
Devrimi (1963). 
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How did I make an archeology of the term ulus? For the etymology of the term, Sir 
Gerard Clauson’s book An Etymological Dictionary of the Pre-Thirteenth-Century 
Turkish (1972) was my guiding source. Beside this, Ferdinand Lessing’s Mongolian- 
English Dictionary (1960), and the etymological dictionaries of Hasan Eren, İsmet Zeki 
Eyüboğlu, Radloff, and Bedros Kerestedjian also helped me to make an etymological 
archeology. At the beginning of my research, I scanned the parliamentary minutes to 
find the first use of the term. I found the term was used for the first time in late 1934 
during parliamentary speeches. Then I have read the 1931 and the 1935 party 
programs of Cumuhuriyet Halk Fırkası. The term ulus was not used in the 1931 
program; millet was used instead. However, in the 1935 program the opposite was 
the case: there was not any use of millet and all words derived from “nation”, such 
as national or international, were variants of ulus. So, I could be sure that this term 
was created between 1931 and 1934. Furthermore, I focused on the process of the 
establishment of Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association – TDK). I went to 
Ankara to scan sources in library of the TDK and read the minutes of the Turkish 
Language Congress. What I sought was to find discussions on the creation of this 
term. I could not find such a discussion on this significant term. However, I found 
Hasan Âli Yücel’s quests in the Türk Dili periodical, which was published by the TDK. 
Some parts of this periodical were devoted to giving new equivalents for existing 
words. For instance, Hasan Âli Yücel scans some old books then finds words and offers 
new meanings for them instead of the existing words. In an effort to create a purer 
Turkish language. As I will explain later on in detail, the term ulus also was available 
in the first couple issues of this periodical. Besides, for the words, whose meanings 
were changed, some small lists were sent to newspapers. So, newspapers published 
these new vocabulary lists and declared that they would use the new words instead 
of the old ones. Newspapers also constitute a primary sources for me in this study. I 
scanned and quoted the newspaper Hakimiyet-i Milliye and Ulus through this 
significant period. 
 
In the chapter where I discuss the contemporary usages of the term ulus, columns 
written in Hürriyet by Mümtaz Sosyal and news texts from HaberTürk and Ulus were 
helpful for me to discuss the issues. Doğan Gürpınar’s Ulusalcılık İdeolojik Önderlik ve 
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Takipçileri (2011), Onur Atalay’s Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu (2006), and Ali Bayramoğlu’s 
article (2011) about ulusalcılık were advisory sources for my discussion about 
ulusalcılık. Articles in the nationalism volume of the book series Modern Türkiye’de 
Siyasi Düşünce (2008) were important to cover the discussions on different types of 
nationalisms in Turkey. 
 
1.2. Outline of Chapters 
This thesis questions first the relation between language and politics. I investigated 
for this purpose how nation building influenced language politics. The Ottoman case 
was examined afterwards. Through the Republic of Turkey and its language politics 
such as alphabet change and Sun-Language theory, creation of the term ulus were 
examined thoroughly. Here is how I structured this thesis’ chapters. 
 
In the introductory chapter I mentioned how conceptual history was established as 
an academic branch in Germany. I also mentioned its varieties and their differences 
from each other. This chapter also includes answers as to why we should study 
conceptual history and its existence in Turkey. 
 
The first chapter focused on nationalism, the nation state, and language politics. 
German and French nation building story leaded this part. A brief history of the 
concept “nation” was required to understand European story. In this chapter, Eric 
Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, and Antony Smith’s books will guide me on nationalism 
and creating national identity, furthermore W. Roger Brubaker’s comparative 
analyses on German and French nation building, Pierre Birnbaum’s comparison 
between two nations, Norman Berdichevsky’s book, and George Orwell’s Politics and 
English Language article will lead me on relation between language and politics. After 
this first part of the chapter I explained language policies in the Ottoman Empire and 
Ottoman intellectual’s ideas on language. So, I explained these issues until the end of 
the World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. 
 
In the second chapter I brought the subject to the Republic of Turkey and discuss its 
language  policies.  This  will  cover  alphabet  change,  the  foundation  of     Turkish 
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Language Association (Türk Dil Kurumu –TDK), and perspectives on it. I benefited in 
this part especially from Geoffrey Lewis, İlker Aytürk, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Hüseyin 
Sadoğlu, Afet İnan, Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, Nail Tan, and Ahmet Yıldız. I discussed in this 
way the reason of these reforms and the idea behind them. All these discussions are 
also crucial to understand volition behind the transformation from millet to ulus. 
 
In the second part of the second chapter, subject will transfer to the term ulus. Here, 
I will attempt to trace and explain etymology and usage of the concept before Islamic 
period. Etymologic dictionary authors such as Gerard Clauson, Gerhard Doerfer, 
Ferdinand Lessing, and İsmet Zeki Eyüboğlu will help me not to deviate from the road. 
After the investigation whether the term was used post-Islamic era in Turkish 
language, I will focus on the reproduction and usage process of the term. Hasan Ali 
Yücel’s vocabulary quests in 1933, the start of the use of the word, and the field of 
use such as parliamentary minutes, political speeches, book, and newspapers will be 
examined in this part. 
 
In the last chapter, I attempted to analyze and interpret the usage of the term I gave 
in the third chapter and different usages. I mentioned, for example, on change from 
hâkimiyet bilâ kayd-u şart milletindir to egemenlik ulusundur, differences between 
milliyetçilik and ulusalcılık. I mainly combined in the third chapter topics I explained 
in the first and second chapters in order to analyze and understand the contemporary 
use of the term. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FICTION OF A ZEITGEIST: NATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE POLITICS 
 
 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the history of vocabularies and the history of 
societies go hand in hand. Therefore, tracing the history of concepts can help to 
understand historical events. In this context, I will describe and explain the 
phenomenon of nationalism through the history of the term “nation” in this chapter. 
In order to lay out the historical background of my thesis, I will begin by showing how 
this term obtained the meaning we understand today. Moving on from here, I will 
discuss the relation between the nation-building process and creating a national 
language, with a focus on the German and French examples. I will then explain the 
relation between politics and language in the Ottoman case. 
 
The idea of nationalism, which transformed issues related to society in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, created a new and different Gemeinschaft, or 
modern society, from the old ones. Nationalism appeared as a new type of idea for 
social cohesion in the early nineteenth century after the French Revolution. 
Nationalism offered a new way of understanding historical context, so it projected a 
new definition of society and created a new political system, whose units of analysis 
and decisions were nations. According to this system of thought, nations would 
govern themselves. As Elie Kedourie argues, one of the successes of nationalism was 
to give a new meaning to the concept of nation, which until the end of the eighteenth 
century had been unknown (1961, p. 14). Nationalism consecrated an involuntary 
identity and constituted a system through this identity. As Benedict Anderson states 
in his book Imagined Communities, “It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into 
destiny” (2006, p. 12). That is to say, nationalists assumed the antiquity of the nation 
even though it was clearly a modern entity, and believed the shiny day of nationalism 
would continue forever. 
 
Nationalism as a concept has spread all over the world, but it has not taken the shape 
of a universalist ideology such as Marxism or liberalism. It does not have a  common 
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ethics or politics aside from everyone’s preferring his or her own nation. Therefore, 
this priority and Gemeinschaft of modernism has created a new world system. As a 
consequence, the creation of societies, which have been homogenized in terms of 
language, culture, race, and history, has resulted in new artificial political units. There 
are basically two types of nationalism in the literature. One is civic and the other is 
ethnic nationalism. The dominant type of nationalism in a place depends on the 
society, history, and role of the state. From this point of view American and Turkish 
nationalism are different from one another. Whether the state founds the nation or 
vice versa has a big impact on defining the type of nationalism in a society. A great 
deal has been written on these issues, but my immediate focus is on how the nation 
has historically been constituted and how this term has acquired the meaning we 
understand today. 
 
2.1. From Natio to Nation: on the Genealogy of a Concept 
Most European languages use same form of the term “nation”: die Nation, la nation, 
nasjon, and natsiya. Languages such as Czech, Finnish, and Latvian use different 
words for it such as narod, nemzet. At this level, the term nation concerns us. “The 
origin of the term nation as it is currently used in most European languages can be 
traced back to Latin word natio, derived from the verb nascor, I am born” (Hroch & 
Maleckova, 2001, p. 203). Nascor or nasci is the base verb, which means “to be born” 
in Latin and such derivations as son (natus) or daughter (nata) comes from this verb 
(Vaan, 2008). The natio, which is related to “to be born,” means breed, stock, and 
kinds according to Charlton Lewis’ etymological dictionary (1958) and Lewis adds, “in 
a more restricted sense, a race of people used commonly in more limited sense than 
gens usually applied by Cicero to distant and barbarous people” (p. 1203). 
 
As seen from these descriptions, natio is related to the verb “to be born” and refers 
to a small group of people related by birth or place of origin. However, this Latin term 
was used not for Roman people, but rather for distant and barbarous groups. 
Therefore, it had a derogatory connotation. Romans did not describe themselves as 
a Natio Romanorum but as a Populus Romanus. The term populus meant citizens and 
referred to the people as the source of sovereignty. That is to say, populus had a more 
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positive connotation than natio in ancient Rome. While natio originally meant a 
group of people larger than a family but smaller than a clan or tribe, it gradually lost 
its negative connotation in later centuries. The striking point here is that the nation, 
which began as a derogatory depiction, gradually evolved into a positive identity that 
served to separate the self from others. 
 
Natio acquired a different meaning in medieval times. Medieval universities such as 
Paris, Oxford, and Bologna were divided into nationes. This term represented student 
fraternities in a university and they varied according to students’ birth places and 
languages. Therefore, their togetherness formed a mutual protection and society in 
universities. For example, as Carleton Munro states, Paris University was divided into 
four nationes in medieval times. These were the honorable nation of the Gauls, the 
venerable nation of the Normans, the very faithful nation of the Picards, and the very 
constant nation of the English (1921, p. 369). These sections designated neither a 
nation as we understand today nor modern geographical borders. And belonging to 
a nation was restricted to one’s studentship period. After graduation, this identity 
dissolved and the student returned home (Greenfeld, 1993). That is to say, in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries “nation” meant a group or a community of opinion 
in universities. The term thus extended its meaning but had not yet come to mean a 
political organization and identity. Over time, the meaning and connotation of the 
term continued to change. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, nation was used 
to distinguish between different groups within councils of the Catholic Church. Each 
member of a nation had a high status, namely he was an elite. The term nation thus 
matured by accumulating new layers of meaning in this fashion. 
 
In the early sixteenth century in England “the word ‘nation’ in its conciliar meaning 
of ‘an elite’ was applied to the population of the country and made synonymous with 
the word ‘people’” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 6). With the early modern period the concept 
of nation emerged as a political community. This period enlarged the meaning of 
nation from a community of opinion or elites to a political meaning. As the size of the 
group referred to by the term nation increased, so too did it come to include each 
layer of society. During first usage of the term in Latin, the term had a derogatory 
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meaning. Later, in universities and the Church, it had a special and mostly elite 
connotation. However, after it acquired the meaning of a political community—the 
nation we understand today—the term came to encompass all people in society 
without distinction. In other words, the semantic field of natio has risen and 
expanded to the semantic field of populus. 
 
As I cited above from Liah Greenfeld, in the sixteenth century nation was first used in 
England as a population of a country synonymously with the word people, Volk in 
German. This was the first use of the word in the sense in which we understand today. 
As Greenfeld explains, the word “people” was used for population of a region before 
its nationalization, but it specifically applied to the lower classes. The equation of two 
concepts (nation and people) created a new “elite,” which involved the whole 
population (1993, p. 6). In reality, this crowded “elite” group was an imaginary 
identity. Nevertheless, this identity attained a great motive force among people and 
states. Empirical research can be conducted on whether there was a relation 
between the foundation of and independent Anglican Church and the first usage of 
the term nation in England, in the sense we understand today. Because the 
Reformation in Europe created a position counter to the Catholic Church, a new 
identity was formed through Protestantism. This directed states to take a secular 
rather than their previous religion-oriented shape. With the dissolving of old religious 
identities, a new secular identity was produced for a new type of association. We see 
its most concrete shape in Enlightenment thinkers and social contract theorists, who 
ascribed new meaning to the individual, state, nature, and society. This secular state 
formation was interlaced with national ideas, and it became the identity of the 
modern individual and state. In short, nationalism took on the mission of becoming 
the non-religious identity of the modern state. 
 
In the same period elsewhere in Europe a different political use of the term natio 
emerged. Natio appeared as a political nation, in the sense of political elites. After 
the war between the Habsburg dynasty and the Hungarians, the word nation was 
used in the text of the peace treaty. Nation here identified the Hungarian nation: not 
the whole Magyar nation, but the privileged estates, in contrast to their subjects, the 
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plebs (Hroch & Maleckova, 2001). Natio Hungarica “did not mean the generality of 
the people inhabiting the territory of Hungary, but the ‘barons, prelates, and nobles 
of Hungary,’ an exceedingly small part of the population” (Kedourie, 1961, p. 14). 
According to this case, language and race were not sufficient for inclusion in the 
Hungarian nation. It was belonging to the Hungarian nobility that made one part of 
the nation. 
 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nation lost its pejorative meaning 
completely and came to include such ideas as being the bearer of sovereignty, the 
supreme object of loyalty, and the basis of political solidarity. The French Revolution 
acted as a catalyst of national ideas in the region. The ideas of self-determination and 
creating unique nations with regards to language, history, and race forced ongoing 
political and identity system to change in waves. 
[Thus], the word “nation” meaning “sovereign people” was now applied to 
other populations and countries which, like the first nation, naturally had 
some political, territorial, and/or ethnic qualities to distinguish them, and 
became associated with such geo-political and ethnic baggage. As a result of 
this association, “nation” changed its meaning once again, coming to signify 
“a unique sovereign people” (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 8). 
As a person who argues that England was the first nation in the world, Greenfeld’s 
making such a distinction between English and later national identity can be 
understood. In the circumstances, it required some pillars, which designated the 
edges of the new definition of nation. 
 
The term nation has acquired such a meaning that an actuator of modern period 
instead of a passive and others related meaning. Going closer to populus in its Latin 
meaning, nation has become the holy identity of the modern individual as well as the 
sovereign and decision-maker of a state. As mentioned before, although national 
identity is a product of modernism, it is viewed as a deep-rooted identity that will last 
forever. This illusion was created by some elements such as common history, 
language, and culture. I will focus these further, but now I want to scrutinize the 
relation between the French Revolution and the nation state. 
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2.2. The Politicization of the Concept 
There were many social, historical, political, and economic reasons for the emergence 
of the French Revolution. However, the impact of ideas in paving the way for it cannot 
be stressed enough. Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Enlightenment philosophers 
established the infrastructure of the revolution. As a result of their efforts, the Ancien 
Régime was demolished, and the republican regime was established with the 
Assemblée Nationale instead of the monarchy, and the Catholic Church was obliged 
to make reforms. As had happened in England before, the realm of the Church was 
restricted, and so the system and individual were redefined. 
 
In the meantime, the abovementioned philosophers’ ideas constituted the 
characteristics of new political system. For instance, Montesquieu had written on the 
importance of separation of powers and usage of the legislative power through 
representatives elected by the people. Rousseau explained state-individual relations 
through the social contract and the general will, in which individuals accordingly 
consign their rights to state. This renunciation of rights forms the base of society and 
state according to Rousseau. On the other hand, the Kantian autonomous individual 
and ethic also had an influence on the modern individual and state in terms of 
rational thinking, rights, and freedom. 
 
When these antecedents and the consequences of the Revolution are thought of 
together, the Geist of the modern state and nationalism becomes clear. People 
realized with the French revolution that kingdoms, which were believed to get their 
legitimacy from God, can be destroyed. Thus, legitimacy and sovereignty were taken 
from the metaphysical source of legitimacy and given to the nation. In the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which was approved by the National Assembly of 
France in 1789, we can see the reflection of this new understanding. The third article 
of the declaration says, “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the 
nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed 
directly from the nation” (The Avalon Project; Decuments in Law, History, and 
Diplomacy, 2016). As seen from this article, the sovereignty and the right of decision- 
making were attached to the nation in the post-revolution era. That is to say, the 
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nation became the only source of legitimacy in the modern state, nobody was 
allowed to use sovereignty instead of the nation or for the nation. On one hand 
multinational empires started to be divided into small units, and on the other 
dispersed nations in different states started to unite. This process is called the era of 
nation states. 
 
What are the social elements that determine the boundaries of a nation? As with 
other social phenomena, this case does not have a single answer that everyone 
agrees on. Some prioritize racial factors to explain a national identity, while others 
prioritize common culture, citizenry, or belief in belonging to the same nation. This 
variation of priorities brings us to the distinction between civic and ethnic 
nationalisms. It is usually presumed that civic nationalism forms a community 
regardless of its subjects’ ethnicity, religion, or language, based on a common 
citizenship. Moreover, according to civic nationalism the state is the agent that 
defines the nation. The USA is a great example of this type of nationalism. On the 
other hand, language, race, culture, and maybe religion are the pillars of ethnic 
nationalism. However, due its lack of strict boundaries, the importance of language 
for example cannot be denied for civic nationalism either. Since there is an 
interrelation between the nation and state, the founder effect of nation on state or 
vice versa cannot be divided from one another and both should be evaluated 
together. Since it is directly relevant to my thesis, I will focus here on the comparative 
effect of language on national identity and the state’s instrumentalization of 
language in nation-building. 
 
2.3. Language as a Pillar of the Nation State 
To show more clearly the foundational role of language, the Reformation process can 
be a good example. The Catholic Church dominated the social and political life of the 
pre-modern era in Europe and religious practices were performed in Latin not only in 
the Vatican but in every church in Europe. Moreover, the Holy Book was in Latin and 
clergy construed it into local languages. This context created a domination of Latin in 
throughout Europe. However, with the Reformation movements, pioneers like 
Martin Luther and Jean Calvin argued for the Bible’s translation into local languages. 
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Martin Luther, for instance, translated the Latin Bible into German. The German Bible 
had an impact on religion as well as the creation of German nation. On one hand, 
Germans began converting to Protestantism, and on the other hand Luther’s writings 
formed the basis of German national identity together with those of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. 
 
Much later, republican elites in Turkey, who noticed the constitutive role of language, 
tried to make religious practices and the Quran Turkish. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, who was 
charged with writing a Turkish translation of the Quran, discovered the republican 
elites’ intention of Turkish worship. The Turkish adhan, the call for prayer, can be 
given as a different example in this matter. The adhan was recited in Turkish from 
1932 to 1950 and this was advocated in the contexts of nationalization, national 
language, and secularism. I give these examples to show the role of language in the 
creation of an identity. However, these can be interpreted for religion as well. 
 
Kedourie expresses the connection between language and identity as follows: 
“Language is the means through which a man becomes conscious of his personality. 
Language is not only a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of 
an inner experience, the outcome of a particular history, the legacy of a distinctive 
tradition” (1961, p. 62). Kedourie explains why states perceived language to be 
important and so intervened and directed it in accordance with their policies. 
Bureaucracy and the spread of a written language can be given as an example related 
to this issue. With the centralization of the state, bureaucratic procedures increased, 
and so a public language was required for these procedures. That is to say, the 
language of one group came to dominate over other languages in a society with 
impact of states. On the other hand, as Benedict Anderson investigates in his book, 
after the invention of printing press, publishing became a profit-oriented activity and 
publishers were obliged to select a similar language to what society used. These 
circumstances caused either the spread of certain dialects and the marginalization of 
others, or a demand to purify language of foreign words. Thus, as wtih the history of 
the concept nation, written language in Europe ceased to be the privilege of  nobles 
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and clergy and as the nation’s self-consecration, public language lifted effectiveness 
and base. Thus, new political units appeared in conjunction with nations. 
 
The official language, which took form and spread during the monarchical period, 
made it easy to imagine the nation as a new political entity (Sadoğlu, 2003). However, 
this is not the only reason for the emergence of nationalism. There is undoubtedly an 
interrelation between nationalism and language, but nationalist models define the 
characteristics of this relation. For that reason, an investigation of the German and 
French nationalization processes will enable us to understand the role of language in 
the nation state. There are different factors for every nation in this matter but to 
comprehend the main points, these two examples constitute the core of the issue. 
 
I have already mentioned that the values of modern states and the features of being 
a nation nourish each other in general terms or to be more precise, it is very difficult 
to distinguish one from the other due to lack of strict boundaries. The state possesses 
a power that distributes an identity related to birth. On the other hand, as long as the 
state was centralized, the bureaucracy correspondingly grew and this required more 
bureaucrats literate in the official language of the state. To provide literacy for the 
whole population in a state, all children went to elementary school by the end of the 
eighteenth century (Kamusella, 2009). Thus, other than the local languages or 
dialects, the state language was disseminated throughout the whole country. This 
also allows us to perceive the homogenizing effect of the modern nation state on 
language. 
 
Here, the distinction Ernest Gellner makes about type of the polity and language is 
important. According to Gellner, the homogenization of language is related to a 
distinction between agrarian and industrial societies. Agrarian societies live in a world 
of their own. People sustained their economic and social needs in their own localities. 
The state did not concern itself about matters other than collecting taxes and 
ensuring peace. The state moreover did not have any interest in connecting with its 
subjects and it had no plan to homogenize all sections of society. Different languages 
and  different  usages  did  not  constitute  a  categorical  problem  for  the  polity. In 
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agrarian societies the dichotomy of linguistic majority and minority did not exist. This 
distinction is valid for the monolingual character of modern states. In agrarian 
societies and states, “there were no pressures for linguistic homogenization or 
convergence, [so] rulers of territory of any size always governed multidialectal if not 
multilingual populations” (Wright, 2004, p. 24). In contrast, industrial societies are 
mobile and ready to shift from one activity to another. People have to communicate 
with others they do not know and who are probably from a different cultural 
environment. “They must also be able to communicate by means of written, 
impersonal, context-free, to-whom-it-may-concern type messages. Hence these 
communications must be in the same shared and standardized linguistic medium and 
script” (Gellner, 1983, p. 35). Precisely for this reason, members of a nation must be 
educated in the same way. Hence, they will be able to use the same language and 
idioms to communicate with each other. And in society, where the organic solidarity 
exists, the human need required for the state will be provided. 
 
The increase of dictionary writing can be given as another example in this regard. The 
history of dictionary writing can be traced back to the 2,300s B.C. to the Akkadian 
Empire. However, the number of dictionaries increased especially in nineteenth 
century. This increase in the number of dictionaries giving both the equivalents of 
words in a different language and explains the meaning of words can be correlated 
to the politics of language. Just like the effect created by the printing press, 
dictionaries also have contributed the standardization of the language within the 
borders of the state and thus the delimitation of language within specific 
geographical areas. This standardization and homogenization in language has 
marginalized traditional languages. Tomasz Kamusella describes this marginalization 
as follows: 
The official/national language of a state replaced other written languages 
traditionally used within the polity, whereas popular education and mass 
media contributed to leveling differences in speech, which meant the 
liquidation of these forms of oral language construed as dialects of the 
official/national language (2009, p. 9). 
As Benedict Anderson (2006) says, with the spread of printing in Europe, works were 
published in vernacular languages to reach the masses and sell more books. This 
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pragmatic purpose nourished social changes related to language. Martin Luther 
wrote his translation of the Bible in the bureaucratic language used in Saxony in order 
to be understood by more people. This process made a great contribution to the rise 
of modern High German. Naturally, as long as magazines, books, newspapers, and 
novels were written in a certain vernacular, other dialects lost impact and the written 
language expanded its usage area. A similar example was seen in Italy as well. With 
the unification of Italy, the Tuscan dialect was chosen as the standard Italian 
language. The most important determinant in selecting Tuscan instead of the 
Piedmont dialect, which was the political center, was the influence of literature 
(Sadoğlu, 2003). Boccaccio, Dante, and Machiavelli wrote their books in the Tuscan 
dialect and this situation paved the way for the Tuscan dialect to become standard 
Italian in the future. The standardization of languages for national purposes left other 
vernaculars the fate of being cultural element or linguistic mosaic. 
 
As the prominence of vernacular languages increased, efforts were made in many 
countries to create truly national vernaculars. In Norway, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, 
some nationalist intellectuals demanded a purer Norwegian as distinct from the 
extremely Danicized written language (1992). In England, George Orwell upheld in his 
1946 article “Politics and English Language” never to use foreign phrases instead of 
Saxon words (Orwell, 2016). In Turkey, the Republican cadre actualized sharply a 
similar policy in the early 1930s. Firstly in 1928, “to heighten Turkish-Turkey’s 
national consciousness at the expense of any wider Islamic identification, Atatürk 
imposed compulsory Romanization” (Anderson, 2006, p. 45). Then in the early 30s, 
the Republican cadre promulgated the simplification and purification of language in 
concert with intellectuals and linguists. This policy centered on the exclusion of 
foreign vocabularies from Turkish and their replacement by neologisms inspired by 
pre-Islamic Turkish. 
 
2.4. Types of Language Policy and Examples 
In this section, I will explain the varieties of language planning and give examples by 
correlating them with nation-building. “Language planning is a government- 
authorized, long-term, sustained, and conscious effort to alter a language's function 
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in a society for the purpose of solving communication problems” (Kennedy, 1982). 
The aim of language planning is the tackling of communication problems among 
people in respect to this definition. And governments are asserted as the actor of 
language planning. As a different definition, Joshua Fishman states the following: 
“The term language planning refers to the organized pursuit of solutions to language 
problems, typically at the national level” (Cooper, 1989, p. 30). This example implies 
a relation between nation-building and the language planning. As I mentioned above, 
the rise of bureaucracy created a need for a standard communication tool for people 
coming from places where vernacular languages were spoken. Various types of 
language planning, including standardization and purification, were implemented as 
a consequence of this need. Apart from this, the role of language in creating self- 
awareness and identity in the process of being a nation is also a different face of this 
issue. I will explain it in relation to Germany. Robert Cooper (1989) distinguishes the 
actors of planning as different from the abovementioned definitions. He thinks that 
language planning is created sometimes by individuals working outside of official 
foundations, sometimes the product of official institutions such as churches, 
professional associations, schools, etc., sometimes created by governments, and 
sometimes by all of these together. Actors are formal elites, influential people, and 
authorities. 
 
What can be the aims of language planning? Taking into consideration that there are 
hundreds of vernacular and official languages in different parts of the world, the 
variety of probable reasons and aims of language planning is not surprising. While it 
emerges as language purification in some polities, in others it aims at the revival of a 
dead language. Modernization, the standardization of language, script change, 
reform in language (such as grammar and spelling change), the spread of language’s 
usage field, and stylistic simplification can be other reasons for language planning 
(Nahir, 2003). Some polities may implement several of these together. 
 
There are three main types of language planning. These are corpus planning, status 
planning, and acquisition planning. Corpus planning is related to coining new words, 
changing spellings, adopting a new script, and the creation of new    forms  (Cooper, 
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1989). In corpus planning, language planners decide what is correct, what is pure and 
what is the best usage for language, linguistically as well as ideologically. If a new 
concept emerges corpus planners produce a means to express this concept (Millar, 
2005). The establishment of Turkish Language Association (TDK) or the Académie 
française can be given as examples for corpus planning. I will investigate corpus 
planning in detail below. The other two types of planning are status and acquisition 
planning. “Status planners attempt to achieve greater status for their language 
variety within a given polity in relation to other language varieties. Acquisition 
planning is an activity designed to encourage the greater knowledge, and (eventually) 
native use, of a language variety” (Millar, 2005, p. 100). Status planning is related to 
the spread and prestige of a language or a dialect in a given territory. For example, 
“when speakers of a minority language are denied the use of that language in 
educating their children, their language has no status. Alternatively, when a 
government declares that henceforth two languages … be officially recognized…, the 
newly recognized one has gained status” (Wardhuagh, 2006, p. 357). Martin Luther 
can be given as a different example of this type of planning. Luther selected the 
Saxony dialect in order to write the Bible translation. In this way, the Saxony dialect, 
which had been spoken widely in German territories, became lingua franca and 
constituted the basis of the standard German as a result of Martin Luther. As 
mentioned above, the same is true for the role of Dante and other writers in the 
Piedmont dialect’s becoming standard Italian. 
 
Corpus planning has more strict and fundamental contents than the other two. The 
language planning in the Early Turkish Republic period can be positioned and 
evaluated under corpus planning. Corpus planning is structural and directly related 
to the written language itself. It includes discussions of the writing system (e.g., the 
alphabet suggestion of Enver Paşa, the so called hurûf-u munfasıla/hatt-ı cedîd or 
transition to Latin from the Arabic alphabet in the Turkish Republic) and an 
imperative spelling system (e.g., the spelling difference between American and 
British accent such as colour and color, orthographic change of words in Turkish as to 
spell the name دمحأ /ˈɑːmɛd/ as Ahmet). “Corpus planning corresponds to two 
widespread convictions: that language usage helps bring about social change, on one 
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hand and that language usage helps reinforce or stabilize social change, on the other 
hand” (Fishman, 2006, p. 4). Thinking specific to Turkish, there was the idea that 
alphabet and word change would bring about social change and the modernization 
of society. As Fishman (2006) says, the ideology pursued by corpus planning is more 
generally related to imperative ideological direction. For this reason, actors intervene 
in the language in a very strict and ideology-driven way regardless of the semantic 
world of words specifically in the context of the Turkish case. As a matter of fact, the 
aim of language planners was to cut off the connection of the semantic tradition in 
language. 
 
Linguistic purity can be seen in the center of corpus planning. Planning actors discuss 
purism due to different reasons. Norwegians tried to construct a more “Norwegian” 
Norwegian than their existing Danicized language, whereas for the Turkish language 
there were different agendas as well such as modernization and the de-Islamization 
of language. Planning for modernization has as a basic goal the cleansing of a 
language of its “foreign” factors. And these interventions in language have very close 
relations with ethnic nationalism. To create an ethnically homogeneous society in a 
given territory, polities especially intervene in language to produce a unique 
language. 
 
I have discussed thus far how national identity occurred and how various types of 
language politics are available. I will discuss the relation between the two and give 
examples of them in the French and German cases. At the end of this chapter, I will 
also discuss the Ottoman case. The Republican period and its strict implementations 
will be covered in the next chapter. The history of nation building brings into the open 
how linguistic unity is a part of the development of a nation state and national 
consciousness. A national language has some important roles in the nation-building 
process. First of all, a language provides utility. It becomes a common means of 
communication among citizens and this provides an economic and political efficiency, 
which I discussed above concerning bureaucracy and compulsory education. 
Secondly, a common and unified language contributes to social cohesion and creates 
a common culture. The common culture already has been an element of being a 
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nation but here we see an interrelation. Thus, in some cases refusing to learn the 
national language can be seen unpatriotic and schismatic. And thirdly, if the language 
of a group is distinctive from a neighbors’ language, this can be asserted as an 
element of being a nation. For that reason, the language matters much more 
compared to the past, and leaders became more interested in language (Wright, 
2004, p. 42). 
 
Language politics emerge as status planning in some countries and this can be divided 
into two forms. Status planning is mostly related to the level of the language and its 
being an official language in a given territory. Mostly the language shape of the 
capitol city or of the dominant group is chosen as the official language. The language 
takes root and spreads because all formal institutions, education, and official 
correspondence use the national language. Thus, other languages cannot take any 
status in the public field. In countries where ethnic nationalism exists, this plan 
emerges as a powerful tool for independence and sovereignty (Wright, 2004, p. 45). 
That is to say, the spatial scope of language determines the borders of the nation. 
The German example is here particularly important. Wright’s quotation from German 
nationalist Fichte explains how language determines the border of a nation: 
“whenever a separate language was to be found there was also a separate nation, 
which had right to manage its all affairs and rule itself” (2004, p. 45). Moreover, 
Kedourie quotes a different passage from the same book of Fichte Reden an die 
Deutsche Nation (Adresses to the German Nation). According to this, Fichte describes 
the nation directly with language: “we give the name of people [nation] to men 
whose organs of speech are influenced by the same external conditions, who live 
together and who develop their language in continuous communication with each 
other” (1961, p. 64). 
 
2.4.1. France 
Language policies can be traced back to long before the French Revolution. In the 
past, traditionally, an estimated seven regional language were spoken in French 
territories: Basque, Catalan, Alsatian, Breton, Corsican, Flemish, and Occitan (Judge, 
2002). However, with such causal agents as the centralization of monarchies and 
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vitiation of Latin, the French language became dominant in the territory. François I 
declared an edict in 1539 in Villers-Cotterêts, whose article 111 commanded the use 
of the French Language for the establishment of the civil state and the compilation 
of notarized law (Schiffman, 1996). The article of the edict stated that the reason for 
the new ordinance was due to a poor understanding of Latin words. However, the 
reason was actually breaking the influence of Latin. Although the regional aristocracy 
and church opposed it, the edict went in effect (Sadoğlu, 2003). This edict can be seen 
as an example of status planning, because it did not reform the written language as 
corpus planning would have, but instead it made a decision about the status of the 
language. But with the Académie française corpus planning stepped in. Cardinal 
Richelieu founded the Académie française in 1635, and it is now the most famous 
language academy in the world. In the beginning, the institute aimed to simplify, 
enrich, and refine the French language. However, the institute later became a center 
where the language politics of the state were determined and implemented (Sadoğlu, 
2003). Richelieu’s political purposes were realized and the unofficial club became an 
official language academy. Richelieu wanted the academy to regulate the French 
language not only in regard to purification but also in terms of improving the abilities 
of the language for all domains, including science and scholarship. That is to say, 
Richelieu wanted French to replace Latin (Cooper, 1989, p. 10). 
 
After the revolution, the monarchy was destroyed and the formation of the state 
changed. At first, language issues were not essential for the state-building process, 
since the Constituent Assembly accepted the principle of bilingualism and translation. 
However, the Jacobins wanted to establish a centralized and uniform state against 
feudal and provincial polities during discussions in the Convention Nationale. The 
importance of language emerged at this point. Revolutionaries realized all citizens 
should speak the same language. The standard French, the language of the élite, was 
their obvious choice. Having a standard language appealed to actors. Moreover, a 
common language was useful to enable communication in a society at both a vertical 
and a horizontal level. Other languages were banned, and thus “one state, one 
nation, one language” became a slogan in France. (Judge, 2002, p. 73). To teach every 
citizen the national language, primary school education became a necessity. The 
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conflict, which started in the sixteenth century against Latin, had already made 
French with its académie and protectionism a powerful language even in the 
international area. 
 
2.4.2. Germany 
German unification occurred in the late nineteenth century (1871). Compared with 
France and England this date corresponds to a later period. Before unification, there 
were large and small German states in German-speaking territories. Communication 
between a person from today’s Switzerland and one from northern Germany was 
quite difficult in this period. German was the first language to open a battlefront 
against the dominance of Latin. Luther produced a new perspective on religion with 
translation of the Bible. It is possible from here to make a connection between 
religion and language as well. The birth of Protestantism shook the existing system in 
Western Europe and long-term wars happened between Protestants and Catholics. 
During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), language communities were founded in 
German territories, similar to the Académie française, in 1635. The Fruchtbringende 
Gesellschaft (Fruition Society) was founded in 1617 in Weimar. Moreover, different 
language societies (Sprachgesellschaften) sprang up in 1633, 1642, and 1644. 
Language societies increased numerically and effectively in the eighteenth century. 
The state and bureaucracy after German unification intervened in language planning 
and implemented many standardization and purification policies. 
This purism process was encouraged by a variety of language associations and 
pressure groups, most notably the Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein; it 
would have got nowhere without the active participation of members of the 
federal and state governments and bureaucracies in the process, however 
(Millar, 2005, p. 118) 
Besides wars in the name of religion, these dates show us that there was a war to 
protect language as well. These language societies were founded especially in the 
Saxony region and, as we already know, Luther had written in the Saxony dialect. In 
addition to that, a book for German grammar was written in the eighteenth century, 
which was again in Ostmitteldeutsch. There was not any other competitor against 
these standardization movements of this dialect. And at the end of the process, a 
vernacular language became the German national language (Kamusella, 2009; Millar, 
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2005). And speakers of Low German dialects learned standard German as if a foreign 
language in schools. The actual standard German was agreed after German 
unification. Imperial actors implemented Duden’s orthography as the standard 
spelling norm (Kamusella, 2009). 
 
Although political unification occurred late, German national ideas were active in 
culture. Because of that, German identity has a unique significance in the context of 
language and nation. Unlike France, the German nation was constituted upon 
language and culture. As I previously quoted from Fichte, some German intellectuals, 
poets, and philosophers have written on the connectedness of these two concepts. 
Poets and philosophers filled the bottom of the German identity. They thus created 
a kind of Kulturpatriotismus and Kulturnation before they were a nation state. And 
the elements of this kulturnation were common language and common culture. In a 
poem poet Ernst Moritz Arndt described the boundaries of the German state as 
wherever German was spoken. (Pohlsander, 2008). These statements show the 
character of German national identity. Fichte wrote his Addresses to the German 
Nation “shortly after Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and the dissolution of the Holy 
Roman Empire, emphasized language as the basis of German national unity. The 
German nation, he wrote, stretched ‘as far as the German tongue was spoken” 
(Nathans, 2004, p. 29). And lastly nationalist Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, who lived until 
the middle of the nineteenth century, wanted the German state to be religiously 
Protestant and linguistically pure from foreign words. And he also said that only 
subjects of German history belong to the German state (Pohlsander, 2008). As seen, 
German nationalism was founded on language, culture, and historical unity. These 
factors reveal the ethnic rather than civic foundations of German nationalism. 
 
Considering both the linguistic and spatial character of German nationalism and the 
standardization process of language, the importance of language on nation building 
appears more clearly. First, a dialect from among a lot of vernaculars distinguished 
itself under the influence of printing and Luther. Then the dialect spread and took 
root in all German-speaking polities. Thus the language entered into a process of 
standardization.   At   the   same   time,   national   ideas   spread   among     German 
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intelligentsia and the characteristics of German nationalism started to be shaped. 
German national ideas had more linguistic, cultural, and ethnic tendencies than the 
American and French ones. Therefore, such phenomenon as identity became 
meaningful not by means of the state, but a nation. 
 
2.5. Language Planning and the Ottoman Experience 
Language politics in the Ottoman State had a different route from those in France 
and Germany. Language policies were not related to building a nation state or a 
national identity in the Ottoman context. Most of them had to do with centralization, 
bureaucratic structure, and settling journalese. While multi-ethnic monarchies were 
going out of existence in Europe due to the process of nationalization, the Ottoman 
state endeavored to attune itself to the new circumstances by maintaining its multi- 
ethnic structure. The Gülhâne Hatt-ı Hümâyûnu (the Tanzimat Edict) was published 
with this goal in 1839 during Abdulmecid I’s reign. This edict opened a new social and 
political era in Ottoman history. The Tanzimat Edict aimed, on the one hand, at ex- 
military and administrative innovations, and on the other hand at production of a 
modern identity out of the Millet system. Greeks and Serbians had already rebelled 
in the Balkans with religious and nationalist impetuses in the early nineteenth 
century. These types of movements shook the Millet system, which defined 
traditional social layers of the polity. Therefore, the Ottoman State formed an 
Ottomanist identity with support of intellectuals after the Tanzimat Edict. “A 
counterpoint to the nationalism… Ottomanism was a state policy designed to unite 
the diverse cultural and ethnic components of the existing empire under the umbrella 
of a shared political identity” (Bulut, 2009, p. 448). That is to say that, the Ottoman 
identity was spatial rather than ethnic and cultural. The Islahat Edict (1856) added a 
new perspective on the Tanzimat Edict. New steps were taken to reinforce the 
Ottoman identity. All Ottoman subjects became equal before the law regardless of 
their religion. Furthermore, the right to work in the civil service was officially given 
to all subjects on a non-discriminatory basis (Gümüş, 2008). As is seen, the new social 
constructing began to transform the Millet system into a citizenship-based modern 
identity. On the one hand, the reforms strengthened ethnic identities while corroding 
religious community identities (Sadoğlu, 2003). On the other hand, Russia “began to 
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partition the European parts of the Ottoman Empire into small, aggressive Christian 
principalities following the Balkan War of 1878” (Bayly, 2004, p. 206). This process 
directed the Ottoman administration and elites to adopt the circumstances and 
develop different perspectives on being an Ottoman subject. 
 
The Tanzimat Era was a period of reformation and modernization, which started in 
1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876. Another feature of the 
Tanzimat Era was reformation in education. In the classical era, education was under 
the protection of the ilmiye and was being done in accordance with Islam. However, 
with the reformation process, Western-type schools were established. During Sultan 
Mahmud II’s reign, the idea of reforming the sıbyan schools appeared and iptidai 
schools were established (Cihan, 2007). The rüştiye schools, which were like 
secondary schools, were established in the Tanzimat Era and the idadi and the sultani 
schools followed them as modern schools. As I mentioned before, school had an 
important role as a tool for establishing a common means of communication among 
subjects in a modern state. Therefore, to provide for the bureaucracy’s need and 
create a common identity, compulsory education was implemented as a state policy. 
The Ottoman State also performed this policy in the context of Ottomanism. With the 
April 1847 Regulations to teachers of the sıbyan schools, six years of compulsory 
education (sıbyan and rüştiye) was decided (Gündüz, 3-10). Here, the principle of 
compulsory sıbyan education, which Sultan Mahmud II had previously commanded 
in 1824 for the first time, was repeated (Akyüz, 1994). However, a lot of non-Muslim 
schools were established during the Tanzimat Era but they were only subject to 
licensing control. They were free to implement their own curricula. This situation was 
an obstacle to standardization, which was to impart a citizenship identity to subjects 
(Sadoğlu, 2003). Ottomanist politics wished to have a collectivity among the 
education system of all societies in the Ottoman state. The Empire aimed to teach a 
common culture and language to all its subjects in these schools. However, the 
number of newly opened public schools was not enough in non-Turkic cities (Kushner, 
1998). 
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All subjects were to be able to work as civil servant as mentioned in the Islahat Edict. 
However, to be able to attain this right, they had to know Turkish. The 1876 Kânûn-ı 
Esâsî, the first constitution, declared this necessity: 
Madde 18 - Tebaa-i Osmâniyenin hidemâtı devlette istihdâm olunmak için 
devletin lisân-ı resmîsi olan türkçeyi bilmeleri şarttır (Gözübüyük & Kili, 1982, 
p. 29) 
Art. 18 - Admission to public office has a condition - the knowledge of Turkish 
which is the official language of the State (The Ottoman Constitution, 
Promulgated the 7th Zilbridje, 1293 (11/23 December, 1876) , 1908, p. 369) 
As I discussed for the French and German examples, centralization and the rise of 
bureaucracy increased the need both for a phonetically, grammatically, and 
orthographically standardized language, and for a written language that was close to 
the public language. Since the number of personnel in the bureaucratic organization 
was low in traditional states, polities employed people with limited educated for 
bureaucratic service. Because of that, the rate of literacy was low and polities did not 
require to scale up (Ortaylı, 2007). This process started intensively during the 
Tanzimat era. Thus, discussions related to language were prominent in this period. 
 
Efforts to simplify and standardize the language also intensified in the Tanzimat era. 
The Encümen-i Daniş (advisory committee) had a significant importance on this point. 
The Encümen-i Daniş was founded in 1851 primarily for the purpose of providing and 
translating course books in Turkish for students of the Dârulfünûn. To write books in 
a plain language that the public could understand was on aim of the committee as 
well (Uçman, 1995). Care was taken to write books in a simple Turkish. Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha’s grammar book Kavâ’id-i Osmaniye was presented to the Sultan on the 
opening day of the Encümen-i Daniş and published under this name (Uçman, 1995). 
In addition to this, the committee aimed at publishing more grammar books and 
dictionaries to standardize and simplify the language (Karaçavuş, 2009). In the sense 
of organizational form, selection of members, and aim the Encümen-i Daniş is similar 
to the Académie française, but the most significant similarity was that they both 
attached importance to the simplification of language (Bilim, 1985). However, the 
Encümen-i Daniş was dissolved a few years after its foundation without achieving its 
goals. 
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Language planning in the Ottoman State involved an academy similar to the French 
example. At the same time, the discussions in literature and in the press also 
contributed to language standardization. The first newspaper in Turkish, Vakayi-i 
Mısriye, was published by Mehmed Ali Pasha in Cairo in 1826 (Sadoğlu, 2003). The 
first official newspaper in Ottoman history was Takvîm-i Vekâyi in 1831. The Takvim- 
i Vekayi formed a basis for later Turkish periodicals. The first private newspaper, 
Tercümân-ı Ahval was published by Agah Efendi and İbrahim Şinasi in 1860, followed 
a simple language policy. Şinasi wrote a mukaddime (introduction) in the first issue 
of the newspaper and explained why such a newspaper was important, and what its 
publishing policy was. In the mukaddime Şinasi says the following about the language 
of the newspaper: 
Bu itibar-i hakikate mebnî, giderek, umum halkın kolaylıkla anlayabileceği 
mertebede işbu gazeteyi kaleme almak mültezem olduğu dahi makam 
münasebeti ile şimdiden ihtar olunur (Tercüman-ı Ahval, issue 1, 1860) (Şinasi, 
1960) 
Although most men of letters in the Tanzimat Era supported articulate and easily 
understandable written language, Şinasi argued both for plain language and, for the 
first time, for society’s right to know what happens in politics in the mukaddime of 
the Tercüman-ı Ahval (Sadoğlu, 2003). Ali Suavi articulated the same idea in the 
introduction of his newspaper Muhbir. He wrote “tasrihi caiz olan her şeyi, asitanede 
kullanılan adi lisan ile ya’ni herkesin anlayabileceği ifade ile yazacaktır (1861)” (Koç, 
2007, p. 14) 
 
On the one hand, writers and intellectuals defended a simpler Turkish: on the other, 
the priority of the Turkish strengthened in the field of education during the Sultan 
Abdülhamid II’s reign. Non-Muslim schools had not been audited in terms of their 
curricula before. However, the opening of foreign and non-Muslim schools was 
attached to the permission of the Sultan by law in 1893 (Sadoğlu, 2003). Moreover, 
an ordinance was declared in 1894 on the necessity of Turkish education in foreign 
and non-Muslim schools. According to the law, all schools in the empire had to give 
compulsory Turkish lessons (Kushner, 1998, p. 124). 
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Discussions on the naming of language in the last decade of nineteenth century are 
important to trace nationalist particles in the Ottoman state. The name of the 
language spoken in the Ottoman state was normally called lisân-i Osmanî (Ottoman 
language). However, with the rise of Turkism, some writers defended that the name 
of the spoken and written language was lisân-i Türkî (Turkish language). According to 
Sadoğlu, Süleyman Pasha, who had an important role in the declaration of the First 
Constitution, did research on Turkish language and the history of the language. 
Süleyman Pasha was strictly against the characterization of Turkish as lisân-i Osmanî 
and the name of his grammar book was İlm-i Sarf-ı Türkî (Sadoğlu, 2003). 
 
Şemseddin Sami, who wrote Kâmus-i Türkî, a competent dictionary of Ottoman 
Turkish, held with Süleyman Pasha. As seen from the name of his dictionary, 
Şemseddin Sami was of the opinion that the language should be called Turkish. 
According to Şemseddin Sami, the Ottoman language was formed after the 
encounter between Chagatai, Arabic, and Farsi, as well as old French formed mixture 
of Welsh and Latin. Thus, Sami accepted Chagatai as the real original Turkish. He 
characterized the language as the Ottoman language here, but he renounced this 
idea afterwards. Later, he said that Ottoman could be name of the state, but not of 
nation or language (Şen, 20014). Thus, he supported to reach national base of 
literature and language. Şemseddin Sami dwelled on origin of the Turkish language, 
simplification of language, and incorrectness of the phrase lisan-i Osmanî in his 1898 
article “Lisan ve Edebiyatımız” (our language and literature). Sami upheld 
simplification, but he was opposed to refining Turkified words. Arabic and Farsi noun 
phrases should be left according to him (Doğramacıoğlu, 2010). The most important 
issue in this article is his construction of a relation between Turkish identity and the 
Turkish language. 
Her bir kavim ve ümmet, büyük olsun küçük olsun kuvvetli olsun zayıf olsun 
manevi varlığını sağlamlaştırıp kuvvetlendirmeye, çalışmalıdır. Kavmiyet ve 
ırkın birinci işareti esası bütün fertlerin eşit olarak ortak malı söylediği lisandır. 
Bir lisanı konuşan halk, bir kavim ve bir ırk teşkil eder. Bundan dolayı ırkı 
varlığını temin etmek isteyen her kavim ve ümmet en önce lisanı düzeltmeyi, 
kurallarını koymaya ve o dili geliştirmeye ilim ve fen ve diğer sanatlara ait 
kitaplara ve klasik sayılmaya değer seçkin edebi eserlerle zenginleştirmeye 
borçludurlar (Sabah, Nu. 3232, 8 August 1898; Kushner, 1998, p. 85). 
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As seen from this quotation, Şemseddin Sami declares clearly that language is an 
indicator of the nation. Moreover, similarly to Fichte, he implies that language 
determines the boundary of the nation. To strengthen the existence of the nation, 
language should be standardized. Şemseddin Sami was the first person among 
Ottoman intellectuals to argue for a direct relation between language and national 
identity (Sadoğlu, 2003). 
 
The Yeni Lisan Hareketi (New Language Movement) and Genç Kalemler periodical 
(Young Pens) will be my last examples for language politics in Ottoman history. They 
were connected with each other and represented a different perspective from the 
language planning that started after the Tanzimat Edict. Former proposals for 
language standardization and simplification were related mostly to modernization 
and the centralization of the state. However, the language planning of Yeni Lisan was 
directly related to Turkish identity and its starting point was Turkism (Demir, 2012). 
 
Genç Kalemler was a periodical that was first published in 1911 in Salonika. The first 
issue of the second volume of the periodical opened with an editorial titled Yeni Lisan 
(Akalın, 2011). Thus, Genç Kalemler became the journal in which Yeni Lisan’s ideas 
were written. The editorial argued against the use of Arabic and Farsi phrases, with 
the exception of some ingrained ones and certain Arabic and Farsi plurals. Arabic and 
Farsi words should be written as pronounced in spoken language. Words belonging 
to other Turkish dialects will also not be used. The written language should be created 
based upon the Istanbul dialect (Sazyek, 2013). Yeni Lisan was neither eski lisan (old 
language), which was written redundantly and complicatedly, nor purification 
(Sadoğlu, 2003). 
 
The leading author of the periodical was Ali Canip Yöntem. Ömer Seyfettin joined the 
periodical afterwards and wrote the editorial that triggered a new language 
movement. With participation of Ziya Gökalp, who accepted the inseparable relation 
between language and nation, the core cadre of the periodical was completed. Yeni 
Lisan’s simplification policy was not only linguistic, they aimed to create a language 
that had national characteristic (Demir, 2012). Thus, written language and spoken 
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language would converge and Milli Edebiyat (National Literature) would be 
established. Milli Edebiyat was a period of literature that started with Yeni Lisan and 
ended in the early years of the republic. A pan-Turkish feeling appeared and spread 
among some Ottoman elites after the Young Turk revolution in 1908. However, this 
feeling was not widespread, though some literati began to write feverishly about 
Turkish language and culture (Bayly, 2004, p. 213). 
 
It is common to read the history of the late Ottoman Empire through the three 
categorical divisions of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and Turkism. However, new 
historiography reads that period differently from a broader perspective. The process 
of nation-state building occurred after different events such as revolutionary 
autonomization (Greece, Serbia, Belgium), hegemonic unification (Germany, Italy), 
evolutionary autonomization (Norway), and lastly centers of empires became a 
nation (Spain, Portugal) (Berger & Miller, 2014, pp. 3-4). The process in the Ottoman 
Empire was also an example of an imperial nation. This term refers to a nation 
building project which was implemented in an imperial core. The project never aimed 
to create a nation that included all subjects and all imperial territory (Berger & Miller, 
2014). As the Ottoman Empire lost territory in Europe, it developed new policies 
according to its new population. Abdulhamid II “reinterpreted the Ottomanism to fit 
new demographic realities with the loss of most of the Balkan territories… As the 
empire became more Muslim, the symbols of legitimacy became more Islamic” 
(Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451). On the other hand, Abdulhamid’s language had an ephasis 
on Turkishness as well. This was not in the scope of nationalism, but was a useful 
quality of the state (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451) After the independence of Albania in 
late 1912, the Muslim variety decreased in the empire. Thus, political discourse 
adopted to fit the new demography, as had happened before. The emphasis on 
Turkishness increased in this period among Ottoman elites. However, because the 
literacy rate was very low in the Ottoman state, the perspective of Ottoman elites 
reached the public only belatedly. As a result, “nationalism had still not emerged as 
a coherent set of ideas and political practices even in 1914” in the central Ottoman 
lands (Bayly, 2004, p. 219). Thus language policies in the Ottoman Empire were not 
similar to those in the German and French examples mentioned above. 
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In this chapter, I discussed how interrelated national identity and language are by 
investigating the history of the term “nation”. I showed how the term nation came to 
gain the meaning we understand today and which elements this term covered. 
Factors such as race, culture, and homeland were all united under the term “nation”. 
However, in this chapter I mostly discussed the significance of language on being 
nation and creating a nation state. To clarify this argument, I firstly explained the 
types of language planning, then I discussed them in the context of the French and 
the German cases. Finally, I discussed the rising importance of language for the 
centralizing Ottoman State. However, language policies there were not similar to 
those of France and Germany. Ottoman language policies were mostly about the 
centralization of the state and simplification of the language. This was not mainly 
about creating a nation state. In the Tanzimat era, simplifications, standardizations, 
and other language programs were not directly related to nation building, but rather 
to Ottomanism and the state. However, with the rise of Turkist tendencies among 
some intellectuals in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, a connection between 
nationalist ideas and language was made. Yeni Lisan and Milli Edebiyat were the 
examples I gave for these perspectives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUILDING A NATION: FROM MILLET TO ULUS 
 
 
3.1. The Milli Mücadele and religious borders of the Turkish identity 
In the previous chapter I mainly discussed how the term nation became the soul and 
the mortar of the social cohesion in Western Europe in the modern era. In that part I 
firstly explained the history of the concept of the “nation,” which had a derogatory 
meaning in Roman times and which subsequently gained new layers of meaning and 
an enlarged semantic field. This process continued until the term gained a meaning 
that defined the character and the identity of modern states. As the scope of the term 
changed, it lost its derogatory meaning and became something worth fighting for. 
Politicization of the term spread in waves from Western Europe to other parts of the 
world. The factors which determined the boundaries of a nation varied from region 
to region. This distinctness brings us to civic and ethnic nationalisms. On one side civic 
nationalism was determined by space and citizenship, on the other side ethnic 
nationalism was determined by culture, ethnicity, language, and history. This classical 
classification was criticized by some scholars on account of the fact that there is not 
a strict distinction between the two and interpenetration is possible 
 
I secondly discussed the correlation between nation and language. I focused on the 
impact of the language in determining the boundaries of a nation. German 
nationalism and German idealism serve as especially significant examples on this 
issue. Starting from this point of view, I thirdly discussed the type of language 
planning adopted in different countries and how these policies supported and 
strengthened national identity. I used the examples of France and Germany to 
highlight the different experiences about the influence of language on nation- 
building. 
 
At the end of the chapter, I tackled the Ottoman experience and discussed how the 
language was used during the modernization process of the state after the Tanzimat, 
and how the importance of language continued to increase during that period  until 
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World War I. The conditions of the Ottoman Empire were different from those of 
Germany and France. Nation-building was beside the point for the Ottoman Empire. 
However, language and its form came into prominence towards the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. Language gradually gained crucial importance for the Turkish 
Republic, which was founded in what remained of Ottoman Anatolia. 
 
In this chapter I will scrutinize the role of language in nation building in Turkey. I will 
explain the process starting from the Milli Mücadele period and discuss the character 
of Turkish identity during this period. Then I will investigate the transition of the 
identity with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. 1930 was the turning point 
for the identity and nation building in Turkey. Nation building gained a secular and 
sometimes an ethnic character after 1930. Turkish history thesis and language 
reforms processed in parallel with this idea of nation building. I will explain and 
discuss changes and interactions in detail. Then, I will focus on the reproduction of 
the term ulus during this process and compare it with the term millet. 
 
3.1.1. Turkishness until the Establishment of the Republic 
In the late nineteenth century national ideas emerged gradually among the Ottoman 
Turks. However, Turkish nationalist thought was commonly blended with religious 
identity. It was difficult to make distinction between the two and they fed and 
strengthened one another. A secular ethnic connotative nationalism has been barely 
endeavored to be placed by force of the state mechanisms in 1930s. As C.A. Bayly 
states in his book The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914, in such areas as “the 
central Ottoman lands and parts of Austria-Hungry, Russia… nationalism had still not 
emerged as a coherent set of ideas and political practices even in 1914” (2004, p. 
219). 
 
The identity perception of Ottoman Muslims was affected by Greek, Serbian, 
Romanian, and Bulgarian revolts and wars. These territorial declines resulted in the 
emergence of nation states in the Balkans: As nation states, these Balkan states also 
aimed to establish homogenous entities within their boundaries. However, the 
skeleton  of  these  homogeneities  was  made  up  mostly  of  religious  identity and 
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concerns. For instance, “the first Greek constitution, adopted in 1822, defines the 
citizens of the new Greek state as the ‘autochthonous inhabitants of the realm of 
Greece who believe in Christ’” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 5). This case shows us how national 
identity and religious affiliation determined the homogenous entity within a state. 
 
All these processes in the Balkans were the beginning of a very difficult period for 
Muslims living in the region. Muslims were subjected to religious exclusion and 
slaughters. Huge migration flows followed and became a part of these religio- 
national processes. Much of the Muslim population in the Balkans was forced to 
migrate to Anatolia. Thus, the Christian population decreased and the Muslim 
population increased in the Ottoman Empire. The Hamidian regime reinterpreted 
Ottoman identity to fit its new demography. And the discourse of Islamic legitimacy 
began to be expressed. The more the Muslim population increased in the Empire, the 
more Islamic the symbols that the state used (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 451). “In a world 
in which Christian anti-Turkish rhetoric had become a successful rallying cry, it was 
not surprising that the later sultans began to see themselves increasingly as Muslims” 
(Bayly, 2004, p. 221). 
 
The content of the entity issue began to be filled in different ways during the Young 
Turks era. The emphasis on Turkishness and Ottoman Turkish relatively increased 
alongside Muslimness. That is to say, the gap between being a Turk and being a 
Muslim narrowed. Thus, nationalist discourse and Islamic discourse came to more 
closely resemble each other. The Ottomanist identity referred to a more Muslim and 
Turkish character with the help of the demographic situation in the last years of the 
Empire. All these experiences “helped to create a sense of ‘Muslimness’ as an ethnic 
category” (Eissenstat, 2014, p. 459). The Young Turks aimed to make the Ottoman 
realm a Turkish one. However, their definition of Turkishness covered Muslims in 
Anatolia and Thrace. The Arab rebellions against the Empire also increased the 
importance of Anatolia in the eyes of Muslims in Anatolia. “Now, the Turkish-Muslim 
community of Anatolia (and Thrace) was convinced that Turkey was its only 
homeland” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 8). 
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The Turkish-Muslim Anatolian community, which fought for its independence against 
the Allied Powers’ invasion after World War I, was such an overarching collection of 
thoughts. The document which declared the end of Ottoman involvement in World 
War I was the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. According to the armistice, 
the region of Anatolia was legally opened to occupation by the Allied forces. Despite 
the fact that inhabitants of Anatolia had been perpetually at war since 1911, some 
armed forces, the so called Kuvâ-yi Milliye (National Forces), were organized against 
the occupation of Allied forces due to the absence of effective government and 
military security from the state (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 340). In parallel with that, 
from the armistice of Mudros until the end of October 1920 almost 30 local and 
national congresses convened around Anatolia (T.B.M.M., 1993, pp. 7-12). This 
interval is called the congress and protocols period in Turkish historiography. 
 
Here, it will be helpful to give some conceptual details from the historical chronology 
to digress by comparing this period with era after the 1930s. This will make it clear 
how certain terms were involved with new meaning. Investigating the protocols and 
speeches in these congresses will help to understand the mindset of that period. This 
will help to comprehend and compare the changes over the next decades of the 
Turkish Republic. 
 
The first article of the Amasya Protocol, 21 June 1919, declared that “the integrity of 
Fatherland [vatanın tamamiyeti] and national independence [milletin istiklâli] are in 
danger” (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 344). The protocol described the remainder of 
Ottoman territory as vatan and urged national (milli) independence. The answer to 
the question of who the nation (millet) here is, as I explained above, is the Turkish- 
Muslim Anatolian community. Similar emphases can also be seen in the first article 
of the Erzurum Congress resolutions: “Trabzon ve Canik Sancağıyla Vilayat-ı Şarkiye… 
hiçbir sebep ve bahane ile yek diğerinden camia-i Osmaniye’den ayrılmak imkanı 
tasavvur edilemeyen bir küldür… Bu sahada yaşayan bilcümle anasır-ı İslamiye 
yekdiğerine… öz kardeşlerdir” (Ezherli, 1992, p. 8). Here again it was stated that the 
Muslim communities of the provinces were inseparable from each other. After the 
Erzurum and Sivas Congress, the Ottoman government called elections. The last 
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Ottoman Chamber of Deputies met in Istanbul on 12 January 1920. Deputies in the 
chamber improved Societies for Defence of National Rights decisions taken in the 
Sivas Congress and these decisions were unanimously accepted on 28 January as 
Misak-ı Millî (National Oath) in the Ottoman Chamber and announced on 17 February 
1920. 
 
The Misak-ı Millî was seen as the manifestation of the Turkish Independence War 
(Kayalı, 2008, p. 127). “This dictated that those areas of the Empire that were within 
the Mudros Armistice line of October 30, 1918 and ‘inhabited by the Ottoman- 
Muslim majority’ were an ‘indivisible whole’” (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 11). As can be seen 
from these examples, the basic aim of struggle in the remainder of Ottoman land was 
the protection of the fatherland and the fundamental owners of the land were 
conceived of as the Anatolian Muslim community. The newspaper Hâkimiyet-i Milliye 
(national sovereignty) was established as a propaganda organ of the Societies for 
Defence Rights on 10 January 1920. 
 
The vocabulary of the period what is called Millî Mücadele (National Defence) was 
mostly about the Ottoman-Muslim majority, unity of the Fatherland, millî irade 
(national will), and protection of the sultanate and caliphate. In the conceptual 
context of the period, terms like millî and millet especially had Islamic connotations 
rather than secular national ones. “The national independence struggle had a strong 
Islamic flavor and until the end it was waged in the name of caliphate and Sultanate” 
(Zürcher, 1999, p. 83). Similarly, Gotthard Jäschke also says that the aim and the 
mission of the national movement (milli hareket) was to protect the sultanate and 
the caliphate. When the Grand National Assembly was established, this aim was 
changed to rescuing the sultanate and the caliphate. In this condition, it left 
theoretically untouched the sultan’s rights (2009, p. 86). However, according to 
Ahmet Yıldız, the term millî, which had both an Islamic and a nationalist connotation, 
gave ground at least conceptually to transition to nationalist discourse (2001, p. 91). 
Within the process, the Turkish State swayed to a secular level and implemented 
harsh decisions in defiance of customs. 
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On Friday 23 April 1920, the Grand National Assembly was founded in Ankara with 
Islamic rituals. Deputies swore allegiance to the sultan and caliph and reaffirmed their 
desire to save him from the hands of the enemy (Lewis, 1991, p. 251). A declaration 
was prepared by the assembly and issued in Hâkimiyet-i Milliye on 28 April. According 
to the declaration, the National Assembly was working to save the sultan and caliph 
from enemy attack, to save Anatolia from fragmentation, and to connect the capital 
city to the homeland again (Ezherli, 1992, p. 42). While the new political movement 
in Anatolia on the one hand was displaying loyalty to the sultan, on the other hand, 
it emphasized the fatherland, national will, and Muslim Anatolian community. Using 
imperial heritage and nationalist items at the same time can be seen as a 
manifestation of being an imperial nation. The term imperial nation is used for a state 
that “includes former centers of empires abandoned by their imperial possessions” 
(Berger & Miller, 2014, p. 4). That is to say, imperial nation refers to a nation-building 
project that was implemented in the imperial center (Berger & Miller, 2014). Thus, 
the nation in the process of self-construction exhibits behavior like its imperial past. 
As I mentioned above, this can be seen in the acceptance of the remainder of 
Ottoman territory as the fatherland and Anatolian-Muslims as the nation. 
 
In a speech on 1 May 1920, Mustafa Kemal explained the Muslim elements that 
constituted the Turkish nation (millet) in the following words: 
Burada maksut olan ve Meclisi âlinizi teşkil eden zevat yalnız Türk değildir, 
yalnız Çerkes değildir, yalnız Kürt değildir, yalnız Lâz değildir. Fakat hepsinden 
mürekkep anasır-ı islâmiyedir… Anasır-ı İslâmiyeden mürekkep bir kütleye 
aittir… Binaenaleyh muhafaza ve müdafaasiyle iştigal ettiğiniz millet bittabi bir 
unsurdan ibaret değildir. Muhtelif anasır-ı İslâmiyeden mürekkeptir. Bu 
mecmuayı teşkil eden her bir unsur-u İslâm, bizim kardeşimiz ve menafii 
tamamiyle müşterek olan vatandaşımızdır. (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006, 
p. 74) 
In this speech, Mustafa Kemal articulated the groups that made up the nation. He 
stated that this nation was made up of the Muslim elements within Anatolia. 
Moreover, Mustafa Kemal stated that these were the groups who were to be 
protected and defended. This situation shows us the character and content of the 
identity of that time. 
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A similar example can be given from the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which showed 
that Muslim groups were the fundamental and determinant part of identity in Turkey. 
The treaty is seen as the certificate of formation of the Turkish nation state. Turkey 
did not react as a standard nation state in the matter of minorities. The standard 
definition of minority was according to race, language, and religion in that period. 
However, Turkey wanted minorities to be only according to religion as had been the 
case in the Ottoman Empire. And at the end, international minority rights were given 
only to religious groups, as Turkey had demanded (Oran, 2001, p. 222). The 
population exchange with Greece was also relevant to this issue. Turkey was engaged 
in nation building and it also wanted to create a homogenous society. This 
homogeneity consisted of Muslims in Turkey. A population exchange with Greece 
was on the agenda during the Lausanne negotiations. According to this, Turkey was 
to send all Orthodox Christians to Greece and Greece was to send all Muslims 
regardless of their race to Turkey. Karamanlis were Turkish-speaking Orthodox 
Christians and they were also sent due their religion. Turkey took care to establish 
the nation state on a religious basis, predicated in one sense on the Ottoman millet 
system (Oran, 2001, pp. 331-333). 
 
Nationalism in today’s sense was weak among Anatolian inhabitants during the 
period of the Milli Mücadele, the establishment of the Grand National Assembly, and 
in the following years. Religion was the main social bond during this period. Thus, the 
nationalist wing could not bear the consequences of opposing religion while fighting 
on many fronts at the same time. Over the years, however, republican elites gradually 
overpowered first the religious authority (caliphate) and then began to interfere in 
the religious practices of the society (Oran, 1988, pp. 74-75). A fast secularization 
movement in bureaucracy and daily life started after the establishment of the 
republic. And after the abolishment of the state religion from the constitution in 
1928, secular identity and ethnic nationalism rose with the support of the political 
authority. This process aimed to build an identity and revealed itself in many areas, 
including the simplification of language and a new historiography. 
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As I mentioned before, layers of the term millet centered on religion in that time. 
However millet began to be used increasingly as the equivalent of the term nation 
from the late nineteenth century onward in some written works such as dictionaries 
and newspapers. This situation created a certain ambiguity in the concept. This 
vagueness was successfully used as a manipulation tool by Mustafa Kemal, the chief 
of the Grand National Assembly (Büyük Millet Meclisi). And although the majority of 
the Assembly was dominantly on the side of coterie of religious representatives, the 
first article of the Teşkilât-ı Esâsiye—the first constitution of Turkey—was able to pass 
the assembly in 1921 without objection. The article was as follows: “Hâkimiyet bilâ 
kaydü şart milletindir,” which means that sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the 
nation. 
 
The vagueness of the term millet made it possible for religious representatives in the 
assembly think that what was desired from this article was the rights of the Muslim 
community. However, this was a preparation for Mustafa Kemal to make the nation 
dominant over the sultan-caliph (Mardin, 1991, p. 66). Moreover, according to a 
community that was connected to the dynasty religiously and traditionally, only those 
deprived of religious and fatherland feelings would have thought of a country without 
the sultan-caliph (Yıldız, 2001, p. 96). However, the hakimiyet-i milliye slogan was 
both a mission and a tool for Mustafa Kemal. The people seemed to be the subject of 
the struggle against the enemy and the readjustment of the state, but were actually 
used as the object. In the process of substituting national legitimacy for religious 
legitimacy, Mustafa Kemal Paşa was very prudent (Yıldız, 2001, pp. 96-97). This policy 
culminated in the abolishment of the sultanate and the establishment of the republic. 
And in later years, identity and legitimacy were openly moved into a secular space. 
 
3.2. The Establishment and Secularization of the Republic 
Allied forces invited both the Ankara and Istanbul governments to Lausanne for the 
peace negotiations. However, Mustafa Kemal did not want to present an image of 
divided authority and so worked for the Ankara government to join the negotiations 
as the sole authority. Mustafa Kemal decided suddenly and precisely to end the 
political  authority  of  the  sultanate.  On  1  November  1922,  the  Grand   National 
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Assembly decided to disband of the institution of the sultanate. However, it accepted 
that the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman dynasty. According to the decision, the 
assembly would elect the caliph from this dynasty (Lewis, 1970, pp. 257-259). In this 
circumstance, the sultanate and the caliphate were separated from one another. 
Moreover, the caliph was elected by the Grand National Assembly from the Ottoman 
dynasty. This was a practice that was unprecedented in the history of the caliphate. 
The assembly elected Abdülmecid Efendi as the new caliph on 18 November and the 
Lausanne negotiations started officially on 20 November 1922 (Alpkaya, 1998, p. 23). 
Choosing a caliph who did not have the right to be the sultan was a temporary 
solution to prepare society for further changes (Jäschke, 2009, p. 89). 
 
The abolishment of the sultanate was an important milestone on the road to a new 
state. This seemed to strengthen the slogan “sovereignty belongs to the nation,” 
because this would signify the political principle that no authority was accepted 
above national sovereignty and the national will. The Grand National Assembly had a 
pluralist structure. There were representatives in it from Istanbul Chamber of 
Deputies, Societies for Defence of Rights, sheikhs, and Kurdish leaders. Thus, the 
Assembly witnessed heated debates. The assembly was not suitable for Mustafa 
Kemal to take sharp decisions for the future. In July 1923 an election was held and 
most of the opposition groups were excluded from the new parliamentary structure 
(Lewis G. , 1974, p. 89). The first important political action of the new parliament was 
to ratify the Treaty of Laussanne that brought international recognition to Turkey on 
23 August 1923 (Lewis B. , 1970, p. 260). 
Hâkimiyet bilâ-kayd ü şart milletindir. İcra kudreti, teşriî salâhiyeti milletin 
yegâne hakikî mümessili olan mecliste tecelli ve temerküz etmiştir. Bu iki 
kelimeyi bir kelimede hulâsa etmek kaabildir: ―Cumhuriyet. Yeni Türkiye‘nin 
emr-i teceddüdü daha nihayet bulmamıştır. Harbten sonra Türk teşkilât-ı 
esasiyesinin inkişafı henüz kat‘i bir şekil almış addedilemez. Tadilât ve tashihat 
yapmak ve daha mükemmel bir hale getirmek elzemdir. İkmaline başlanan bu 
iş henüz bitmemiştir. Kısa bir zaman zarfında Türkiye‘nin bugün fîlen almış 
bulunduğu şekil kanunen de tesbit edilecektir. (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve 
Demeçleri, 2006, p. 83) 
This  quotation  is  from  Mustafa  Kemal  Paşa’s  statement  to  a  Neue  Freie Presse 
reporter on 27 September 1923. In it, Mustafa Kemal articulates that Turkey became 
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a de facto republic and that legal regulations would also be determined in a short 
time. The vagueness of the term millet allowed some groups to understand the slogan 
“hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir” as meaning that sovereignty belongs to millet- 
i hakime, that is to say, to the Muslims in this territory. However, Mustafa Kemal 
interpreted this slogan as directly related to a republican regime. This ambiguity of 
the term gave Mustafa Kemal Paşa the opportunity to direct the assembly to the 
purpose he wanted. A month after this speech, the republic was proclaimed with an 
amendment to the Teşkilatı Esasiye on 29 October 1923. With the change of the 
constitution in 1924, Turkey was defined a republic whose religion was Islam and 
whose language was Turkish (Karpat, 2007, p. 35). 
 
The legitimating role of Islam was reflected in some speeches in the assembly. The 
deputy of Şarkihisar, Mehmet Emin Bey, took the floor and said that the prophet 
constituted Allah’s government and that was a republic. Then he said a prayer to the 
new government and shouted, “long live the republic.” Following his speech, the 
deputy of Urfa, Şeyh Saffet Efendi, took the floor and said that proclaiming a republic 
meant a reversion to the time of hulefâyı Raşidin (Alpkaya, 1998, p. 95). He meant by 
this that the republic was the political system of the first caliphs and that 
republicanism was the true Islamic way of governing. When the republic was 
proclaimed, some deputies tried to legitimize this new system with Islamic narratives. 
This shows how religious legitimacy still made itself felt also during the proclamation 
of the republic. 
 
The president Mustafa Kemal delivered an opening speech in the parliament on 1 
March 1923. He articulated how religion should be separated from politics and 
argued that this separation would help appearing profound knowledge of Islam as 
following: 
İntisap ile mutmain ve mesut bulunduğumuz diyanet-i islâmiyeyi, asırlardan 
beri müteamil olduğu veçhile bir vasıta-i siyaset mevkiinden tenzih ve îlâ 
etmek elzem olduğu hakikatini müşahede ediyoruz. Mukaddes ve lâyuhti olan 
itikadat ve vicdaniyatımızı muğlâk ve mütelevvin olan ve her türlü menfaat ve 
ihtirasata sahne-i tecelliyat olan siyasiyattan ve siyasetin bütün uzviyatından 
bir an evvel ve katiyyen tahlis etmek milletin dünyevî ve uhrevî saadetinin 
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emrettiği bir zarurettir. Ancak bu suretle diyanet-i İslâmiyenin maaliyatı tecellî 
eder. (Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri I-III, 2006, p. 344) 
The newspaper Vakit reported this speech the following day with the headline: 
“Reisicumhur Hazretleri nutuklarında diyanetin vasıta-ı siyaset olmaktan kurtarılması 
lüzumunu söylediler” (Tunçay, 1999, p. 91). According to Mustafa Kemal, religion was 
being used and instrumentalized in politics. The newspaper presented the speech 
with this implication. Mustafa Kemal’s argument for separating Islam from politics 
was based on the idea that it was for the benefit of Islam. He articulated that Islam 
should be dissociated from the turbulent and self-seeking field of politics. Another 
issue Mustafa Kemal mentioned in this speech was that of establishing a unified 
national education system. This meant that education would also be separated from 
religion and be placed under the control of the government. The caliphate was 
abolished on 3 March 1924. Moreover, the law on the unification of education 
(tevhid-i tedrisat) was passed. Turkey thus entered a new era in respect to daily life 
and the relation between religion and politics, culture, and political legitimacy. 
 
Turkish national identity was built on a religious base until 1924. However, that year 
symbolized a sharp change to a secular definition of identity. New conditions meant 
a transition from a religiously based model of sovereignty to modern nation-based 
one. The process of the Milli Mücadele temporarily reversed the secularization trend 
that had been ongoing since the Tanzimat era. In that time, for the first time non- 
Muslims were not represented in the Assembly. A coalition that consisted of all the 
ethnic groups in Anatolia fought against the invading Christian armies. Socio-political 
legitimacy was grounded on Islam (Yıldız, 2001, p. 128). After 1924, however, 
secularization became the character of the Turkish Republic and bureaucracy, social 
life, appearance, and identity were determined accordingly. This aimed a destruction 
of the social memory of Anatolian society. Turkishness began gaining a political 
definition in 1924. These who were citizens of the republic and accepted Turkish 
language, culture, and the republican national doctrine were seen as Turks. However, 
in the late 1920s this definition changed again and a more ethnically based definition 
was added to the definition of what it meant to be a Turk (Yıldız, 2001, p. 126). Thus, 
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the regime played with the cultural and religious codes of the society for these 
fluctuant definitions. 
 
The new state took drastic measures by trying to wipe out the traces of 
Ottoman/Islamic history in the society to open a new page for the sake of 
modernization. However, the bureaucratic elites of the republic perceived 
modernization and progress as a cultural transition movement but not an economic 
and political one. These elites viewed the European model as the highest level of 
civilization and were eager to adopt the symbols of Europe. Thus, like European 
orientalists, they saw Islam as an obstacle to development and especially European 
civilization. Laicism in the republic developed as a positivist ideology to save Turkish 
minds from Islamic sources and to encourage people to adopt the modern doctrine 
of civilization. As laicism was weakening loyalty to old traditions, nationalism was 
seen as something that could serve as a new basis for the political identity of the 
Turkish people (Karpat, 2007, p. 43). In the new period after 1924, the government 
tried to end Islam’s status as a source of legitimacy and accelerated secularization. 
 
Most changes in the early republican years had the aim of changing the ethos of 
Turkish society instead of effecting structural reforms. The aims of the republican 
changes were to create a modern state. However, this modern state was based on 
an ideology of Westernization. Even nationalism was described from a Western 
position rather than a national one. That is to say, the Turkish nation consisted of a 
people that would share a common future with Western civilized nations but not of 
a people that shared a common past (Toprak, 2009, p. 448). Secularization and laicism 
set the limits and the main character of this process. With the abolishment of the 
caliphate, religion, which had penetrated even the smallest points of everyday life, 
was excised from these fields. Despite the large-scale secularization in the nineteenth 
century, the ulema (religious scholars) were still needed for birth, education, 
marriage, death, and inheritance services. However, these fields were also 
secularized in the new era (Mardin, Modern Türkiye'de Din, 1991, p. 97). This 
secularization program was implemented  under three phases. These phases    were 
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symbolic secularization, institutional secularization, and functional secularization 
(Küçükcan, 2003, p. 486). 
 
Firstly, symbolic secularization mainly concerned those areas of culture and societal 
life that were based on Islamic traditions and symbols. The most important change 
under this section was alphabet reform from the Arabic to Latin script in 1928. 
“Because the new regime regarded language as a connection with history, culture, 
and sacred scripture, changing the alphabet was an ‘effective step towards breaking 
old religious traditions’ and weakening the link with the past” (Küçükcan, 2003, p. 
487). Making the hat in public places obligatory (25 November 1925), replacing the 
Hijri calendar with the Gregorian calendar (1 January 1926), changing the weekly 
holiday from Friday to Sunday, and banning religious clothing were examples of 
symbolic secularization. 
 
Secondly, institutional secularization was about decreasing the institutional bases 
and political influence of Islam. The most significant implementation of this type was 
the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924. In the same year, the Şeriye ve Evkaf 
Vekaleti (the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations) was abolished. A 
Directorate of Religious Affairs and a General Directorate for Foundations were 
established as two different institutions instead of that ministry. “Thereafter, the 
state tried to transform the Ümmet (or Umma, the Community of Believers) into a 
secular national entity in order to eradicate religion as a common bond of solidarity” 
(Küçükcan, 2003, p. 487). With the abolishment of tekkes and zaviyes, Sufi 
movements and their activities were declared unlawful (30 November 1925). Thus, 
Islam was deprived of legitimacy and solidarity. 
 
Thirdly, the secularization of the courts and the educational system can be evaluated 
under functional secularization. Sharia law was abolished and an Italian-based 
criminal code was accepted (1 June 1926). Moreover, the Swiss civil code was 
accepted as the new civil code in Turkey (4 October 1926). On the other hand, 
education programs and systems were also changed under secularization. As 
mentioned above, with the tevhid-i tedrisat, education became strictly controlled by 
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the state and all educational institutions were unified under the Ministry of National 
Education. As Binnaz Toprak argues, most Kemalist revolutions were not related to 
the modernization indexes of the social sciences. However, such changes were apt to 
give impetus to the main purpose of Kemalism. And this aim was to shift Turkish 
society from an Islamic attitude to a Western one (2009, p. 449). 
 
These three areas were matters directly related to identity. Republican elites tried to 
vitiate Islam from societal life, institutional structure, education, and law. These 
implementations were done in order to modernize. However, this modernization 
process was strictly implemented to adopt the Western world. These concepts were 
used to cut off the influence of Islam in all layers of the country. From the start of 
these secularizing reforms until 1928, republican elites put a different building 
process into place. The Turkish Republic, which attempted to rid itself of its Ottoman 
and Islamic past in early 1930s, introduced and worked for a new description of 
Turkish identity. This new description of identity inclined to a more ethnic base. 
Forgetting and opposing recent history, the nation-building process in Turkey 
glorified pre-Islamic history and embraced new language policies. Recent changes 
before the transition to this process were the alphabet change from the Arabic to the 
Latin script and the removal of Islam as the state religion from the constitution. 
 
On 9 April 1928, the second article of the constitution, which stated that Islam was 
the state religion, was withdrawn from the constitution. The national oath also 
included references to Allah, so it was replaced by a new oath made in the name of 
honor. Additionally, the National Assembly renounced enforcing the Şeriat. These 
were replaced by articles separating religion and state (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 378). 
The Turkish Republic announced that secularization had covered a long distance with 
these constitutional changes. The presence of Islam in the constitution meant that 
the common bond of solidarity in Turkey was based on Islam. The removal of this 
article, on the other hand, meant the direct opposite. At least, republican elites tried 
to promote and enforce this understanding. The removal of Islam as an identity 
determinant created a definitional gap. Therefore, the Kemalist regime tried to fill 
this gap with an ethno-secular national identity. History and language  investigation 
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societies were established in the following years in order to ground and rationalize 
the new identity. This was a transition to a new stage in terms of the construction of 
identity and nation building in the Turkish Republic. 
 
Few among the republican changes could symbolize Western and nationalist 
character of “Kemalism” like alphabet change. Western, because adopting the Latin 
alphabet would open the door to the Western world. Nationalist, because it 
separated and distinguished Turkish society from Islamic sources and Arab 
coreligionists to the same extent (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 215). On the one hand, the 
alphabet change was an indicator to show the republic’s demand for Westernization; 
on the other hand it meant the deletion of written memory, forgetting of recent 
history, and rejection of Islamic history. These phenomena were at the same time 
requirements for the creation of a nation-state. Sabri Akural also states that this 
alphabet change should be treated under the heading of nationalism rather than 
secularism. This is because this change was actually an aspect of a broader linguistic 
reform program which demanded the creation of a national language purged from 
foreign languages (1984, p. 134). According to republican elites, the Arabo-Farsi 
alphabet was deficient for expressing the Turkish language and it was not suitable as 
a national alphabet. Because reading and writing this alphabet was difficult, the rate 
of literacy was very low in Turkey. Atatürk believed that the literacy rate would 
increase after switching to a Latin-based alphabet. 
 
A large campaign was started to create a Latin-based script in 1928. A lot of meetings 
were organized in Dolmabahçe Palace in August to discuss the alphabet issue. İsmet 
İnönü wrote some points on the blackboard in these meetings and they were 
accepted. He said there was no other solution than to accept a Turkish alphabet 
based on the Latin script in place of an Arabic script that did not fit the Turkish 
language (Levend, 1949, p. 373). This attitude and statement are very revealing in 
terms of how İnönü rejected the alphabet in which almost all Turkish works had been 
written for centuries and appropriated the Latin script instead of the Turkish 
alphabet. This statement can be seen as one of the most obvious examples of oblivion 
culture and creating a culture from scratch. On 1 November 1928, the Grand National 
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Assembly tendered the new alphabet on a golden plaque to Mustafa Kemal on the 
first day of the new legislative session. And on 3 November the code, forbidding 
usage of old alphabet, effective as of the start of 1929, was promulgated in the official 
gazette. In the following days some exams were performed to check the ability of civil 
servants in the new alphabet (Lewis B., 1970, p. 277). 
 
As I mentioned above, the argument for an “alphabet revolution” was that the Arabo- 
Farsi alphabet was not suitable for the Turkish language, because vowels in this 
alphabet were not significant to express the wealth of vowels in Turkish. The new 
alphabet brought a significant limitation to the pronunciation of Arabic- and Farsi- 
origin words. Thus, the gap between Turkish-origin and foreign-origin (namely, Arabic 
and Farsi) words grew increasingly wider (Sadoğlu, 2003). According to Uriel Heyd, 
the new alphabet, which was created according to Turkish vocal harmony, 
transformed turkizated Arabic and Farsi words to different foreign elements (Heyd, 
1954, p. 23). Therefore, the alphabet change gave Mustafa Kemal psychological 
grounds for purging vocabularies in the following years. Thus, by the end of 1928, the 
laic republic was established completely and consolidated its power. The only 
remaining issues that did not completely fit Kemalism only related to Turkish identity, 
citizenship, and history. The Turkish state became a republic because the sultanate 
was abolished and became in part laic because the caliphate was abolished. Thus, 
these two characteristics of the state showed its opposition to the past. 
 
3.3. Transition to ethno-secular nationalism; from Millet to Ulus 
3.3.1. The instrumentalization of history for the new identity 
History gives people a consciousness by means of the past. It is not directly a 
collection of past events, but a source of meaning derived from them. Thus, historical 
consciousness influences our identity; at the same time identity shapes the way we 
investigate past events and creates a consciousness. Thus, this reciprocal situation is 
the factor affecting our perception of the future. That is to say, to determine the 
future of a group or a nation, one must first defining the past so-called history of this 
group or nation (Fazlıoğlu, 2014). History is an object lesson, a power, and a 
perception of the future. Because of that, history is a field where nationalists  make 
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sense of themselves. They build the past according to their ideas. Thus, they can 
answer easily from a nationalist perspective the question of whether a nation is a 
produced or a continual identity. As Benedict Anderson explains, nationalist 
historians do not accept the modernity of nations but rather see nations as archaic 
phenomena (1993, p. 19). That is to say, nations existed in all historical periods but 
actually nationalism is not a process of self-consciousness of nations. Nationalists 
produce nation even if they do not exist (Anderson, 1993, p. 20). This shows how 
history is important for nationalists to prove the strength of the nation. Writing a 
history of a nation constitutes an important pillar of building a nation and identity. It 
is possible to see this effort in Turkey as well, from the late 1920s onward. Nationalist 
ideology needed to construct a ground for the nation in Turkey while implementing 
the principle of laicism to rescue the nation from having to sit on the grounds of 
religion. And this was realized by launching a movement to nationalize language and 
history (Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme, 1988, p. 200). 
 
It is possible to see this kind of historical perspective in Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk. In 
1927, in the second anniversary of the establishment of his political party, the 
Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası1 (Republican People’s Party) Mustafa Kemal gave a long 
speech about events after 1919. Mustafa Kemal started his speech with the day he 
arrived in Samsun on 19 May 1919. Nutuk is one of the most significant official history 
books in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal laid the foundation in this speech for how the new 
Turkish historiography would be. Mustafa Kemal’s statements show us what he 
thought about the Turkish nation and its history as follows: 
En bariz ve en maddî ve en kat'î delâili tarihiyeye istinaden beyan edebiliriz ki, 
Türkler on beş asır evel Asyanın göbeğinde muazzam devletler teşkil etmiş ve 
insanlığın her türlü kabiliyatına tecelligâh olmuş bir unsurdur. Sefirlerini Çine 
gönderen ve Bizansın sefirlerini kabul eden bu Türk Devleti ecdadımız olan 
Türk milletinin teşkil eylediği bir devletti. (Atatürk, 1969, p. 1240) 
 
1 Mustafa Kemal established the Halk Fırkası on Septermber 9, 1923. After the establishment 
of the republic, the party’s name became Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası and lastly in the fourth 
party caucus in 1935 the name of the party was changed to Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. Fırka 
(side, division, party) was an Arabic word. However, during Turkification of the vocabulary, 
the word fırka was abolished and parti was adopted instead. The problem here is that the 
term parti was not Turkish but French. A French origin word was set as Turkish instead of an 
Arabic word. Even this example can show us the character of the language reform in the 
1930s. 
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This short paragraph contains the core of the Türk tarih tezi (Turkish history thesis) 
that would be declared in the following years. Firstly, Mustafa Kemal said that Turks 
established great states in the center of Asia fifteen centuries ago. Secondly, he 
added that this information constituted conclusive evidence. Thirdly, people of these 
countries developed all the abilities humanity would later possess, and these spread 
from there to other parts of the world. And lastly, the Turkish ancestors of the Turkish 
nation established this country. This paragraph shows us that Mustafa Kemal 
believed in the continuity of a nation and he brought evidence from fifteen centuries 
ago with the belief that there was a conclusive evidence of this. Actually, no such 
evidence existed. Moreover, he implied that the abilities of humanity appeared in 
this Turkish state and spread to other parts of the world from there. This idea was 
one of the claims of the Turkish history thesis. In the following year, a new 
historiography was built on these ideas and argued for the continuity, strength, and 
intelligence of the Turkish nation. Thus, an ethnic-based definition of identity was 
added to Turkish identity. 
 
Ayşe Kadıoğlu explains the situation and the reason why a new Turkish identity was 
needed as follows: 
By 1930, it was generally agreed by the Republican elites that the reforms that 
were undertaken in the course of the 1920s had not taken root. This problem 
was to be remedied with further reforms from above that were geared 
towards creating a new Turk. The emerging new Turkish identity, then, was 
distinguished by its manufactured character. Turks were a “made” nation by 
virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Ottomans along the similar 
Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in creating the 
Frenchman. (Kadıoğlu, 1996, p. 188) 
“Kemalist” laicism was in an unconsummated situation to create a surrounding 
identity. This was a factor driving Kemalist nationalism to acquire an ethnic color. 
Kemalist laicism was weak among society and it was necessary to find a new ideal 
that would compete with ideal of Sharia and supplant it (Yıldız, 2001, p. 159). Islam 
had been the source of a common bond between Turkish people for centuries. 
However, the parallelism between people’s understanding and institutional system 
was broken after abolishment of the ulema, tekkes, and the caliphate. And lastly, 
after the removal of religion from the constitution, the institutional system of the so- 
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called state had to find a new common bond instead of religion. Society could not be 
expected to adopt the new identity spontaneously. The excitement and romantic 
content of the republic was extremely poor on a mass scale. Therefore, it failed to 
replace Islam as a unifying and mobilizing ideal. When the republic broke connections 
with the legitimizing soul of the Milli Mücadele, which was Islam, it had to find a new 
identity and soul to replace Islam. And these were self-referencing ideals (Yıldız, 2001, 
p. 160). Thus, an education system had to be adopted quickly to spread the new 
ideals. A quest for a new identity not associated with religion was one face of the 
program. The other side of it was about increasing the self-confidence of society and 
showing the abilities of the Turkish nation to the West. 
 
There was a prevalent prejudice in Europe that saw the Turkish race a second-class 
race at that time. Republican elites created the Turkish history thesis and sun- 
language theory as a defense reflex to prove that Turks had served as midwives to all 
civilizations (Yıldız, 2001, p. 160). This face of the history thesis was a reflection of 
defense psychology. According to the republican elites, Turkishness and the Turkish 
race was seen as non-civilized, low-level characters. The history and language theses 
were incarnational forms of efforts to change the rude, barbarian, and backwards 
idea of Turkishness that most Westerners even some Turkish intellectuals held (Yıldız, 
2001, p. 163). There was also a new state that tried to reach the level of modern 
civilization and embrace Western principles. Islam was seen as an obstacle for 
progress like Western orientalists. A modernization program was implemented with 
a laic path. Thus, according to the republican elites, Turkish society gained self- 
confidence. Therefore, Western ideas of Turks were prejudiced because Turks made 
a successful progress. Kemalist nationalism did not content itself with that much. It 
took a few steps forward and said that Turks, who were ancestors to all humanity, 
established great states in the pre-historical era. These Turks were the sources and 
inventors of all civilizations. Thus, all archaic civilizations such as the Sumerians, the 
ancient Egypt were of Turkish origin. Kemalist elites supported Turkish nationalism 
with pre-Islamic successes. Central Asia was chosen as the sources of the oldest 
successes of the Turkish nation. Pagan names such as Cengiz, Oktay, and Mete were 
spread among the children of Kemalist elites. Central Asian origin played  important 
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role among the upper classes of the republican regime (Mardin, 2000'lere Doğru 
Kültür ve Din, 1991, p. 232). 
 
The historical research that began under Mustafa Kemal’s control, gave some results 
in 1928-29, and some were published in notes. The first institutive efforts in history 
research came from Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) and Tarih Tetkik Heyeti 
(Investigation Committee for History), which was established in 1930. However, 
when the Türk Ocakları were abolished and joined the Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası in 
1931, this committee was transformed to the Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti 
(Investigation Society for Turkish History - TTTC), which was established with 
founders of the old institution (Ersanlı, 2003, p. 111). A new institution, which was 
controlled directly by the regime, was established after the abolition of the Türk 
Ocakları. This was an important step for the Kemalist regime in controlling the 
intellectual life. Thus, Kemalism was the only producer of historical discourse 
(Copeaux, 2006, p. 61). 
 
Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları, which can be considered as the declaration of Turkish 
history thesis, was published in late 1930. The book focused almost entirely on 
prehistory and antiquity. The book explained how Turks civilized other parts of the 
world as they spread out from the motherland in Central Asia (Copeaux, 2006, p. 60). 
The book consisted of 607 pages and only 50 pages was about Ottoman history and 
12 pages about Seljuk (Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları, 1930). This was also a sign of the 
glorification of the pre-Islamic sources of the new identity. There is a part in the 
introduction of the book that explained why this book was written. I quote a section 
from this article below: 
Bu kitap muayyen bir maksat gözetilerek yazılmıştır. Şimdiye kadar 
memleketimizde neşrolunan tarih kitaplarının çoğunda ve onlara mehaz olan 
fransızca tarih kitaplarında Türklerin dünya tarihindeki rolleri şuurlu veya 
şuursuz olarak küçültülmüştür. Türklerin, kendi ecdatları hakkında böyle yanlış 
malumat alması, Türklüğün kendini tanımasında, benliğini inkişaf 
ettirmesinde zararlı olmuştur…. Bununla milletimizin yaratıcı kabiliyetinin 
derinliklerine giden yolu açmak, Türk deha ve seciyesinin esrarını meydana 
çıkarmak, Türkün hususiyet ve kuvvetini kendine göstermek ve milli 
inkişafımızın derin ırkî köklere bağlı olduğunu anlatmak istiyoruz. (Türk 
Tarihinin Ana Hatları, 1930, p. 1) 
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As is seen, the book aimed to destroy some prejudices about Turkish history. These 
prejudices were obstacles for the development of a national identity, and revealing a 
Turks’ intelligence and moral quality was the aim of the book. Moreover, according 
to the book, there was a bond between national development and racial origins. This 
shows us how the new identity bound together nation ethnicity. Thus, Kemalist 
historians instrumentalized racial themes and said that the brachycephalic Turkish 
race created the oldest civilization in the world. This race established the Egyptian, 
Anatolian, and Aegean civilizations. In other words, it was a European race (Yıldız, 
2001, p. 182). This attitude was a reflection of both self-confidence and inferiority 
complex. A new national identity was established through the claim of being 
European and was increased national confidence. As mentioned before, with Binnaz 
Toprak’s statement, the national identity of Kemalism imitated the West. Thus, the 
relationship established with European civilization proved the quality of the Turkish 
race according to Kemalists (p. 185). 
 
Ayşe Afetinan, Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter, wrote Vatandaş İçin Medeni 
Bilgiler (Civil Information for Citizen) in 1930. This book was tought in secondary and 
high schools. It both explains Mustafa Kemal’s thought and how a Turkish citizen 
should be. In the chapter related to millet, it said that there was not any nation bigger, 
older, or purer than the Turkish nation, and that it was unprecedented in human 
history (Afetinan, 2000, p. 28). 
 
To teach and spread the history thesis to society, thousands of pages of history books 
were written for secondary and high schools. As mentioned above, these books also 
explained myths from distant history and tried to create a common bond. The distant 
past was chosen because as the more distant the past the less discussion it would 
provoke. With school teachers’ attendance the First Turkish History Congress was 
made in 1932 to introduce the history thesis (Ersanlı, 2003, p. 139). In parallel with 
the history thesis, further language reforms in line with the Sun-language theory were 
implemented. 
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Büşra Ersanlı scrutinizes how the understanding of the terms millet and milliyetçilik 
(nation and nationalism) underwent change by looking at the 1923, 1927, and 1931 
guidelines of Mustafa Kemal’s Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası. Indigenizing Turkish culture 
was an inevitable necessity in the party guidelines of 1923. That is to say, the cultural 
definition of Turkishness was more important than citizenship at that time. National 
definition could not go further than a cultural togetherness. However, in 1927, new 
concepts were added to the guidelines such as milli dayanışma (national 
sovereignty), unity of language, and unity of ideals. The most important aim of the 
party was shown as improving Turkish language and culture. The millet was described 
in the guidelines of 1931 as a political and social whole that comprised linguistic, 
cultural, and ideal unity (Ersanlı, 2003, pp. 104-105). Adding that kind of a definition 
of millet to the party guideline and program shows us the increasing importance of 
language for being a nation. 
 
3.3.2. Language Movements in the Light of the History Thesis 
Millî his ile dil arasındaki bağ çok kuvvetlidir. Dilin millî ve zengin olması millî 
hissin inkişâfında başlıca müessirdir. Türk dili, dillerin en zenginlerindendir, 
yeter ki bu dil şuurla işlensin. Ülkesinin yüksek istiklâlini korumasını bilen 
Türk millet, dilini de yabancı diller boyunduruğundan kurtarmalıdır. (quoted 
in Korkmaz, 1963) 
Mustafa Kemal wrote this on 2 September 1930 and Sadri Maksudi Arsal cited this on 
the first page of his book Türk Dili İçin. Mustafa Kemal mentions four issues in this 
paragraph. Two of them were the detection and the other two were signs for further 
language reforms. Firstly, he says the link between language and the national 
sentiment is very strong. Secondly, according to him language should be national for 
the development of national sentiment. Thus, as is seen, he saw a direct relation 
between nation and language. This understanding directed him and Kemalist elites 
to intervene in the Turkish language in order to create a national Turkish language. 
Thirdly, he gives signs and argues for the need to intervene in language. Therefore, 
he says language will encourage national sentimnt, if language is processed 
consciously. And fourth, he gives a decision and says that the Turkish nation will clean 
its language from “foreign” elements. This discourse resembles the German 
nationalist philosopher Fichte’s discourse.  As I explained  in  the previous   chapter, 
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German nationalism, and Fichte particularly, see a direct relation between nation and 
language. “Whenever a separate language was to be found there was also a separate 
nation, which had right to manage its all affairs and rule itself” (Wright S., 2004, p. 
45). Fichte explains here how language determines the borders of a nation. 
Moreover, Kedourie quotes a different passage from Fichte’s book Reden an die 
Deutsche Nation (Adresses to the German Nation). According to this, Fichte describes 
the nation directly with language. “We give the name of people [nation] to men 
whose organs of speech have been influenced by the same external conditions, who 
live together and who develop their language in continuous communication with 
each other” (1961, p. 64). This shows how Turkish national identity was inclined to an 
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic basis rather than one based on citizenship or territory. 
 
Mustafa Kemal used more striking statements in a speech in Adana in 1931. 
According to this, Turkish means language. If a person says he is Turkish, he or she 
should speak the Turkish language. A person who cannot speak Turkish cannot belong 
to the Turkish culture and community. Those who cannot speak Turkish can betray 
Turkish society. Therefore, they should be become true Turks who speak the Turkish 
language. Although they are Turkish citizens, they are not accepted as “real Turks” 
due to the fact that they do not speak Turkish. These statements show the borders 
of the Turkish nation. The ethnic borders of the identity dominated in the new 
process. To imply that not speaking Turkish could be a reason for betrayal was very 
risky and shows how far this relation between nation and language could go. Mustafa 
Kemal’s statements are as follows: 
Türk demek dil demektir. Milliyetin çok bariz vasıflarından birisi dildir. Türk 
milletindenim diyen insanlar, her şeyden önce ve behemehâl Türkçe 
konuşmalıdır. Türkçe konuşmayan bir insan Türk harsına, camiasına 
mensubiyetini iddia ederse buna inanmak doğru olmaz. Halbuki Adana'da 
Türkçe konuşmayan 20.000'den fazla vatandaş vardır… Efendiler ! Herhangi 
bir felaketli gününüzde bu insanlar, başka dille konuşan insanlarla el ele 
vererek aleyhimize hareket edebilirler. Türk Ocaklarımızın başlıca vazifesi bu 
gibi unsurları, bizim dilimizi konuşan hakiki Türk yapmaya çalışmaktır. Bunlar 
Türk vatandaşlarıdır. (quoted in Akalın, 2005, p. 30) 
According to the new discourse, language was the leading element that made the 
nation a nation. Become a nation, a group should first have a distinct language. 
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Language is the mirror of a nation’s history and changes gradually like the society. 
Words from different languages can be added to languages in consequence of 
cultural transaction. However, nations that reached the level of national 
consciousness knew how to save their language against foreign languages (Korkmaz, 
1963, p. 1). These arguments aimed to explain the following: Languages changes 
according to the cultural situation of society. Turkish society made a great change in 
the first ten years of the republic, so language should also change accordingly. It is 
natural to have some foreign words from other languages as a consequence of 
interaction. However, if a nation has a strong national consciousness, it will save its 
language from the intervention of foreign languages Therefore, The Turkish Republic 
and its rulers tried to strengthen the Turkish national consciousness and identity. 
Thus, the Turkish language will be cleaned off of intervention of foreign languages. 
Vecihe Hatipoğlu, who has some works defending Persian and Sumerian language as 
Turkish, also explains the dialectical connection between language and nation. 
According to her, strong nations have strong languages. Strong languages are the 
biggest factor in creating strong nations. The Turkish language was also strong, but 
only as long as it was processed consciously. Language constitutes and strengthens 
the national structure (1973, p. 12). 
 
In parallel with the history thesis, language research was carried out. Language was 
also a part of the process, like history, of creating a new national identity. As is seen 
from the quotation above, Mustafa Kemal had already given signs of this creation in 
1930. History and language were two coherent locomotives of the secular Turkish 
identity-building process. History meant investigating the past and dominating the 
future. Investigating, developing, and processing language meant developing and 
processing the future. Thus, these two issues and facts were questions of life and 
death (Hatiboğlu, 1973, p. 12). Furthermore, Afetinan articulates in Medeni Bilgiler 
that the Turkish language is a holy treasure for the Turkish nation and its heart and 
mind. The Turkish language, according to her, is the key point that saves elements of 
Turkish nation such as ethics, tradition, and interest (Afetinan, 2000, p. 29). 
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A national language is supposed to provide a variety of functions. A national language 
should provide vertical and lateral communications in a country. That is to say, 
regardless of geographic origin and societal status, all members of the nation should 
understand and speak this language. A national language should reflect the nation 
and should embody in itself the nation, and national language should bear the trace 
of the nation (Thiesse, 2010, p. 160). However, the process in Turkey did not fit this 
description. Language reforms in Turkey did not aim at overlapping history, tradition, 
and language. Instead, they drove a wedge between them and brought and created 
a new common bond from the distant past. Baskın Oran both supports and rejects 
Thiesse’s arguments as follows: Language reform aimed at two things. Firstly, 
decreasing language origin discriminations of village-city and lower-upper strata and 
creating a nation and national unity through this implementation. Secondly, ensuring 
strictly detachment of young generations from Ottoman political and cultural 
tradition by putting Turkish origin words instead of Arabo-Farsi words (Oran, Atatürk 
Milliyetçiliği Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme, 1988, p. 202). Kemalist elites wanted to 
provide a national language that could be understood by everyone, and that broke 
all ties to recent history. 
 
How was the process implemented? Mustafa Kemal assembled a meeting with the 
participation of A. Afetinan, Samih Rıfat, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, Sadri Maksudi, and Ruşen 
Eşref on the last day of the first history congress on 11 July 1932 in Çankaya. And 
Kemal opened the establishment of an association for discussion. At the end of the 
meeting, it was decided to establish an association named Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti 
(Investigation Society for Turkish Language, TDTC hereafter) (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 235). 
There were mainly two aims in establishing a language society. Firstly, the 
simplification of the Turkish language, creating a harmony between the spoken and 
written languages, and determining the rules of the Turkish language. Secondly, 
investigating dead languages that have value for historical documents and making 
philological comparisons (İnan, 1959, p. 294). However, Soner Çağaptay explains the 
establishment of this society through different arguments. According to him, the Türk 
Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti wanted to prove that Turkish was the mother language of great 
civilizations.  Thus,  the  Tarih  Cemiyeti  established  the  TDTC  for  this        mission. 
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Moreover, Atatürk believed that Turkish and Indo-European languages were relatives 
and that Turkish was the origin of these languages. TDTC would do research how 
Turkish was the mother tongue of Sumerian, Egyptian, and Etruscan civilizations. 
Thus, this would prove that Turkish was the most effective factor in the evolution and 
the advancement of all the world languages (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 50). During the entire 
process, this association, so called society, was directed by political elites. This was 
different from Western associations with similar aims such as the Académie 
française. It directed language with prestige rather than a political influence and 
functioned conservatively (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 237). However, the TDTC and Türk Dil 
Kurumu (Turkish Language Association) later had revolutionary characters. 
 
The first Turkish language congress was held between 26 September and 6 October 
1932. The TDTC had been founded just two months earlier. However, the language 
congress was held fast and declarations were presented. The declarations and 
discussions were mainly suitable to the abovementioned principles and the Turkish 
history thesis (Korkmaz, 1963, p. 54). However, some antithetical opinions were also 
presented such as those of Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın). What Hüseyin Cahit told on the 
first day of the congress had a great impact on participants. Mustafa Kemal, who 
watched developments from the loge, brought Samih Rıfat, despite the fact that he 
was ill, to corroborate the republican elites’ thesis. Hüseyin Cahit actually was not 
against the change of language, but he was against the intervention of the state. 
According to him, language would simplify on its own in time. There was no need for 
state intervention (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 238). 
 
The chef of the TDTC was Samih Rıfat. He defended for years that there was a kinship 
between Turkish and Indo-European languages. This assertion was a product of a 
coping mechanism of Kemalist elites, because it helped the idea that the Turkish 
language was not undeveloped and that was it even the ancestor of European 
languages. Either it must be admitted that the Turkish language was the ancestor of 
Indo-European languages, so that the injustices to Turkish would be resolved easily, 
or Turkish should be accepted as a natural member of this family (Aytürk, 2013, p. 
104). When Samih Rıfat attended the congress in spite of his illness to advocate  the 
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Kemalist thesis against Hüseyin Cahit’s declaration, he repeated these arguments. 
Samih Rıfat’a arguments contained the whole infrastructure of the Sun-Language 
theory that became famous in 1935-1936. According to İlker Aytürk, the Sun- 
Language theory was wrongfully attributed to Feodor Kvergic. In point of fact, Samih 
Rıfat’s thesis in the congress was predecessor of the Sun-Language theory, but 
because he died shortly after the congress, establishing a connection between him 
and the Sun-Language theory did not occur until much later (Aytürk, 2013, p. 105). I 
will come back to this subject below. 
 
After the end of the first language congress, the board of directors of the TDTC 
prepared a work program. This program laid out the subsequent projects of the TDTC. 
According to the program, the Turkish language would be turned into a complete 
instrument of national culture. Foreign words would be purged from the written 
language, and a national language whose basic elements were öz Türkçe (pure 
Turkish) would be created. To achieve these goal, a Turkish dictionary would be 
prepared and scientific terminology would be determined so as not to fall behind the 
West (Türk Dili, 1933, s. 1-2). 
 
After the TDTC established its center in Ankara, the committee prioritized 
investigation of word compilations (derleme) from folk speech. Governors in cities, 
kaymakams in districts, and directors of schools and teachers in schools embarked 
upon this word compilation as a duty in accordance with a guide prepared by the 
committee. All words would be written as vouchers and sent to district centers, then 
to cities and then to Ankara. All vouchers would be checked by the TDTC and would 
be brought into force. Word compilation was started in early 1933 and approximately 
130.000 vouchers were accumulated in 19 months in Ankara (Levend, 1949, p. 368). 
These words were accumulated to use as the equivalents of Arabic and Farsi words. 
Furthermore, word scanning (tarama) was started from books of local and foreign 
Turcologists and classical Turkish books to find equivalents for Arabic and Farsi words. 
At the end of this investigation 125,000 vouchers were collected, and it was published 
as Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları: Tarama Dergisi in 1934 (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 
244). On the other hand, lots of neologisms were artificially produced as if a game 
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with words and derivational affixes of Turkic languages such as Uigur, Chagatai, 
Kazakh, and Turkomen to reach öz Türkçe. The aim was to use these artificial words 
be as substitutes for Arabic and Farsi words that had been used for hundreds of years 
and that were firmly entrenched in social memory. 
 
The second Turkish language congress was conducted in 1934. As a result of 
compilation and scanning efforts, öz Türkçe words started to be replaced instead of 
“foreign words.” The committee itself also took part in this implementation. The 
word tetkik (A) and cemiyet (A) were changed to araştırma and kurum respectively. 
Thus, the name of the committee became Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu. And the name 
of the TDTC was changed to Türk Dil Kurumu in 1936 (Turkish Language Society, TDK 
hereafter) (Lewis G. , Turkish Language Reform A Catastrophic Success, 1999, p. 45). 
 
The republican elites argued for the oldness of the Turkish race and tried to prove it 
with the Turkish history thesis in the early 30s. Along the same line, Kemalists claimed 
the same thesis for the Turkish language in parallel with the history thesis. According 
to them, the Turkish language was the ancestor of all languages in the world. They 
attributed this thesis to a philological base and the Sun-language theory arose from 
this point of view. Efforts to find Turkish equivalents to “foreign words” perpetually 
continued. However, the situation had come to such a point that everybody wrote 
articles with words they excursively found. Thus, sometimes articles would only be 
understood by their own writers. Some found equivalents even for Turkish words. 
There was an opinion on the necessity of a linguistic philosophy to get rid of this 
situation. The Sun-language theory was a product of this pursuit (Levend, 1949, p. 
393). 
 
Hermann Feodor Kvergić, a Viennese philologist, wrote La psychologie de quelques 
Eléments des Langues Turques by utilizing Freud’s psychoanalysis to investigate the 
Turkish language and sent this book to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk2 in 1935. According to 
 
2 In accordance with law no. 2525 that was accepted on 21 June 1934, all Turkish citizens had 
to adopt a surname. Five months after this law, in accordance with law no. 2587, Atatürk was 
given as a surname to Mustafa Kemal. The law did not mention Mustafa but only Kemal   as 
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this, cultural words spread from the Turkish language in the Stone and Metal Ages to 
other languages in the world. Thus, they concluded that there was no need to purge 
words from the language, because they could be originally Turkish. In this direction, 
a lot of words were explained through a Turkish base. For example, etymology of the 
word botanik (botany, Greek origin) was explained with bitki (herb). Bitki and botanik 
were phonetically similar, so this was a proof for them. Etymology of the term termal 
(thermal, Latin origin) was explained with the word ter (sweat) (Levend, 1949, p. 394). 
Thus, there was no need to expend energy to find a Turkish equivalent for these kind 
of words. The number of these so-called philological works—seemingly a game— 
climbed into the thousands. As with the history thesis, the Sun-language theory was 
also an effort both to supersede and to join the West. That is to say, Kemalists on the 
one hand argued that Turkish was the ancestor and source of Western languages, 
while on the other hand they showed the kinship of Turkish society and language with 
the West and Western languages. 
 
The source of the Sun-language theory was mostly seen as Kvergić. However, İlker 
Aytürk articulates the following by utilizing the archives of the TDK. In a letter to 
Tahsin Mayatepek, İbrahim Necmi Dilmen wrote that the Sun-language theory “was 
a brilliant discovery, roused in the grand genius of Our Exalted Leader by the 
Institute’s years-long preparations on linguistic data” (Aytürk, H.F. Kvergic and the 
Sun-Language Theory, 2009, p. 30). According to Aytürk, this linguistic theory might 
have been created by Atatürk. Thus, the language theory, which seemed as a 
scientific work, was perhaps a political decision and that strained credulity. The 
probability that Mustafa Kemal created this theory personally strengthens the thesis 
that Kemalists went to all lengths to create a nation on behalf of their wishes. In 
 
 
 
 
his first name. According to the law, no one after Kemal Atatürk could take Atatürk as a first 
name or surname. However, with the effect of the Sun-language theory, Yusuf Ziya Özer and 
Naim Hazım Onat persuaded Atatürk that the name Kemal passed to Arabic from Turkish and 
its original form was Kamâl. Kamâl meant castle in Turkish. Atatürk used his name in this form 
in a telegram that he sent for a language feast on 3 February 1935. Moreover, in the CHP 
Congress in 1935 Kamalizm was used instead of Kemalizm (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 252). Mustafa 
Kemal’s national ID card can be seen in Anıtkabir in this form. 
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Tomasz Kamusella’s words, this theory was an extreme kind of linguistic nationalism 
and it subsided after Mustafa Kemal’s death in 1938 (2009, p. 267). 
 
The Turkish language experienced a corpus planning at the hands of the state and 
republican elites. I explained the types of language planning in the previous chapter. 
Corpus planning was implemented in Israel and Germany as well. Turkish language 
nationalism was similar to both these examples. Israel resurrected an alphabet that 
was not used by society. However, this can be more understandable than the Turkish 
case, because Hebraic alphabet was the alphabet of Jews. Considering the Turkish 
language, the Latin script seems rather imported. On the other hand, the center of 
lingual nationalism was Germany. This inclined German nationalism toward ethnic 
nationalism. Determining the border of nation mainly with language constituted an 
important period of Turkish nationalism whose character underwent change in a 
short period. 
 
I explained how the Turkish language was instrumentalized by the Kemalist regime 
to create a national identity outside of religion. Since religion was a fact that 
determined a position for individuals and the society, there was a need to change the 
social bond to complete the bureaucratic and systematic changes that were 
implemented after 1924. Some examples from this period would show how these 
changes served the purpose of building a nation and an identity. 
 
In Ramadan 1932 (January), it was decided by the regime to recite the call to prayer 
in Turkish. This practice was without precedent in the history of Islam. The call to 
prayer had been recited in Arabic for centuries. However, the Kemalist regime 
intended to change the language of worship to Turkish in order to restrain the religion 
and its unmanipulable strictness. However, the Turkish call to prayer was not easy to 
settle among believers and religious officials. On 3 February 1932, the Turkish call to 
prayer was recited from the Ayasofya Mosque and nationwide recitation was planned 
after the first Turkish language congress (Ayhan & Uzun, 1995, p. 39). The other pillars 
of this project were a Turkish Quran and Turkish prayers. The project of Turkish 
worship contained a number of matters in itself. It served the nation building project 
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through language policy and bringing religion under control. Thus, the Kemalist 
regime wanted to enjoy the best of both worlds. Reciting the call to prayer in Turkish 
continued until the time of the Democrat Party. Reciting the call to prayer in Arabic 
was resumed before Ramadan in 1950 (Ayhan & Uzun, 1995, p. 41). 
 
Making öz Türkçe out of Arabic and Farsi words that had been used for centuries, and 
which were expressed as foreign words during this period, caused a transition in the 
semantic world of the language. Connotations of words and layers of meaning 
changed and disappeared in this manner. The maturation of the language was not 
left to its natural course. Instead, it was obtrusively made by language planners such 
as Kemalist elites and the state. Words that were being used lost their histories and 
neologisms and words that lacked social validity were inserted instead. For example, 
the word ahlak (Arabic origin) has a religious connotation and means “innate 
peculiarity, natural disposition, and character of a person” (Cowan, 1976, p. 258). In 
addition to this religious base, the word means morality and ethics. The equivalent 
that TDK gave to ahlak is aktöre and sağtöre (Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, 2016). The word 
töre belongs to the social life of pre-Islamic Turks and its layers of meaning come 
mainly from social order, tradition, and customs. That is to say, it has a social rather 
than a religious base. This shows that these two terms belong to different semantic 
worlds. However, Kemalist elites gave aktöre and sağtöre—which were produced 
from töre—as equivalents to the term ahlak, which basically referred to a character 
and morality from disposition—. Thus, ahlak underwent a semantic restriction and 
assumed a tradition-originated ethics, and became a secular word by being stripped 
of its metaphysical base. The word kader (A) also has an Islamic connotation and 
basically means “divine foreordainment, predestination, and fate” (Cowan, 1976, p. 
746). However, the TDK gave yazgı as the equivalent. In Turkish Yaz-mak means to 
write and the word yazgı was produced from this origin. It is possible that it was 
considered appropriate because of the term alın yazısı (forehead script), that means 
destiny as well. 
 
The examples I gave above can be augmented. However, when all these efforts to 
build a new identity, a common bond, and a new state are considered, the soul of 
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these implementations can be understood through the change of the name of the 
identity. It is about how the new identity determines itself. I have attempted to 
describe the character of Turkish identity until the abolition of the caliphate, after 
which republican elites filled the identity with secular elements. Finally, I explained 
the transformation and tendency of identity from a religious base to a more ethnic 
base after 1929. The history thesis and language reform were implemented for this 
aim in the following year. The main purpose here was to build a nation independent 
from religion and recent history. Because these had an impact on society, republican 
elites had to get rid of powers such as religion, language, and history in order to steer 
society in the direction of their requests. Being able to achieve this goal meant a 
victory over the recent past and religion. Thus, everything connoted by these two 
phenomena was blurred or taken off the agenda. Kemalist elites wanted to build a 
nation but the Turkish equivalent of the term nation had both religious and historical 
connotations. The term millet was the equivalent of this term and during the 
language reform it changed to ulus. In the next phase of the study I will scrutinize and 
compare the conceptual history these two terms. 
 
3.4. Politization of a Religious Term; History of Millet 
Hebrew word ללמ (melel) means to speak (Clines, 2011, p. 328). And הלמ (mila) 
means word and statement. The word millet ةلم forms from Arabic letters of ل ل م (m- 
l-l) and is from word stem of ىلما (imlâ), to dictate. From this base, the word millet 
was used as equivalent of religion in respect to dictating something heard and read. 
Moreover, the word means “path” as well (Şentürk, 2005, p. 64). 
 
The term millet was used fifteen times in the Quran and mostly as composition of 
millet-i İbrahim (Şentürk, 2005, p. 64) and it is translated as the creed of Abraham 
(4:125) in English (Badawi & Abdul Haleem, 2008, p. 895). Moreover, the term was 
used as the precise religion (2:128) or while stating religion of Jews and Christians 
(2:120) (Yusuf-Ali, 1937, pp. 50-54). 
 
Ottoman society was constituted mainly on the basis of religion, and the status of 
individuals  was  determined  according to their religions. Society was  divided   into 
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millets according to branches of religions and this type of usage of the term was 
available in Ottoman literature from the classical era onward. Millets were arrayed 
hierarchically and rights varied from millet to millet. Muslims were considered as one 
millet and they were dominant (millet-i hakime) over other millets. In addition to this, 
the hierarchy continued with the Rum, Armenian, and Jewish millets respectively. 
These names that indicate nations today were used for religious groups in that time. 
Bulgarians and Greeks were under the Rum millet. The concept of millet never 
designated an ethnic or linguistic groups. It was a cultural and administrative concept 
that designated a religious group (Eryılmaz, 1992, p. 11). However, a critical literature 
has developed in the last twenty years around this classical understanding of the 
millet system. Some historians allege that the millet system was not visible contrary 
to common opinion. According to this argument, the word millet was used in the 
nineteenth century as an autonomous structure and taife was the term used for non- 
Muslim groups. Macit Kenanoğlu investigates these discussions in his book Osmanlı 
Millet Sistemi: Mit ve Gerçek. According to his explanation, taife and millet were 
sometimes used instead of one another, and he adds the usage of millet in the 
classical era (Kenanoğlu, 2007, p. 44-56). There were differences in the groups for 
which the term millet was used. These usages highlights the religious nature of the 
millet system. For example, even all Armenians were not considered just one millet 
in the Ottoman Empire. The Gregorians were considered as Armenians, while 
Catholics were considered as Catholics. These two groups were organized as different 
millets (Ortaylı, 2005, p. 66). There is not any direct equivalent in English of the term 
millet in this sense. 
 
This situation can be traced in Ottoman dictionaries as well, even though millet 
started to be used as equivalent of nation in the Ottoman literature. Şemseddin 
Sami’s Kamus-i Türkî gives religion and denomination as equivalents of millet (1901, 
p. 1400). Then he adds that religion and millet are the same. Furthermore, Muallim 
Naci’s dictionary Lugat-ı Naci explains millet in the same way as Sami (1901, p. 831). 
 
A non-religious meaning was acquired by millet in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.  However,  the  secularized  meaning  of  the  word  at  first  existed  only in 
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dictionaries (Yıldız, 2001, p. 50). There were different words in Ottoman Turkish for 
the term nation, such as cins, kavim, ümmet, millet, and ahali. This was a source of 
debate among intellectuals. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa and Kaninpaşazade Rıfat Bey used 
the term kavim for nation. On the other hand, Ali Suavi translated it as ümmet. Ali 
Suavi wanted to call Ottoman society as a nation. This translation was adopted and 
the term ümmet was used in Ottoman Turkish at first (Türköne, 1991, p. 258). 
However, for intellectuals who preferred millet for nation, religion was a common 
bond to homogenize and to bind under a feeling of common interest (Yıldız, 2001, p. 
51). Therefore, millet was more suitable to homogenize the society due to its 
connotation. This constituted a vagueness between millet and ümmet after a while. 
 
Şemseddin Sami discussed this topic in his dictionary Kamus-i Türkî. Under the millet 
entry he explains his views. According to him, millet states a religious group and it 
covers more people than ümmet. The phrase ümmet-i İslamiye is wrong for him. The 
correct phrase should be millet-i İslamiye. Saying Türk milleti is also not correct, so 
Türk ümmeti should be said, because millet-i İslamiye constitutes different Muslim 
elements and ethnic groups (Sami, Kamus-i Türkî, 1901, p. 1400). The dictionary of 
Lugat-i Naci also makes the same explanation under the millet entry. According to 
this dictionary as well, ümmet should be used for the term nation (Naci, 1901, p. 831). 
However, in a different dictionary that Şemseddin Sami prepared from French to 
Ottoman Turkish, Kamus-i Fransevi, he translates nation as ümmet, kavim, and taife. 
He adds millet parenthetically to the entry. Moreover, he translates the term 
“national” as millî with derivation from millet (Sami, Kamus-i Fransevi, 1886, p. 429- 
430). Although he prefer ümmet for the first equivalent, he translates national as 
millî. These discussion of the period affected the perception of our understanding 
today as well. The vagueness of millet and ümmet is available in today’s usage. There 
is a misperception that ümmet covers more people than millet. The opposite of 
Şemseddin Sami’s explanation is very common among people today. 
 
At the end of all discussions, millet was accepted and used as equivalent of “nation” 
in Ottoman literature. Redhouse’s dictionary, 1884, gives millet as the first equivalent 
for nation and does not use millet for religion or religious groups (1884, p. 529). 
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According to Türköne, the main tendency of Ottoman intellectuals was to use millet. 
Ottoman intellectuals believed that religious ties were sources of common history 
and interest. Millet had religious connotations and because of that, it was in demand 
in dictionaries as well. And ümmet stayed on the sidelines. The word millet alone 
stated millet-i İslam and this changed to Türk milleti. However, this change was about 
content of the concept. Millet still retained its connotation (Türköne, 1991, p. 261). 
This perception was blurred systematically after the abolishment of the caliphate. 
 
I explained how the borders of the Turkish identity and the term millet was apropos 
of Islam until 1924 in the beginning of this chapter. This situation makes more sense 
when considered in the light of the abovementioned conceptual history of millet. 
However, the history of the Turkish Republic affected the history of words as well. 
The alterations in the political system and daily life influenced and change the 
gradation of words’ layers of meanings. Some words lost some meanings and gained 
different meanings. This is natural development in the process of a language. 
However, the implementations took place differently in Turkey due to language 
reforms. The term millet also received its share from these policies and ulus started 
to be used instead. I will scrutinize the history of the concept ulus in the next phase 
of this chapter. I will cover its etymology, usage in pre-Islamic period, Ottoman usage, 
and reproduction. 
 
3.5. Resuscitation of a Term: Variable History of Ulus 
While all Arabic and Farsi words were being purged from Turkish, efforts to find a 
new equivalent for the term millet also continued. For millet, Tarama Dergisi offered 
eight possibilities. However, the Mongolian pronunciation of the Turkish uluş was 
chosen. According to Geoffrey Lewis, this was a wrong horse. Mongolians used this 
term to define a confederation of peoples. By the 14th century the Turks had taken 
this term back with its Mongolian form ulus and it was used until the seneteenth 
century (1999, p. 56). 
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3.4.1. Etymology of the Term 
Before explaining how the term was adopted in the mid-1930s by the TDTC, I will 
present its etymology and usage in the pre-Islamic period. Sir Gerard Clauson’s An 
Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish has the most detailed 
explanation. Clauson gives the term as uluş, not as ulus. “Originally it meant country 
in a geographical sense, but it began to be associated with the names of cities, and 
by eleventh century in some languages it meant “city” rather than “country”” 
(Clauson, 1972, p. 152). However, the word passed to Mongolian and due to 
Mongolian phonetics the word became ulus and it acquired a political meaning rather 
than a geographic one. It was used for people under the rule of Mongolian Çingis’ 
sons as well. For example, the ulus of Çağatay. That is to say, it meant a 
“confederation of peoples.” Ferdinand Lessing defines ulus (улс) in his Mongolian 
English dictionary as “people, nation, country, state, empire, and dynasty” (Lessing, 
1960, p. 873). These equivalents are in contemporary usage. However, it still has a 
geographic sense and, as is seen, ulus is used as nation in Mongolian as well. Radloff 
gives narod (Russian), das Volk (German) (peoples) as the first equivalent for ulus 
(улус) in his etymological dictionary (Radloff, 1893, p. 1696). Peoples were divided 
into tribes (aymağ), tribes into clans (boy), and clans into families (uruğ) (Clauson, 
1972). The term passes in the old inscriptions for example as buxarak uluş (the 
country of Bokhariots), burxanlar uluşı (the country of the Buddhas), Cinadéş uluş 
(the country of China). Being a topic I will discuss further, budun and ulus are 
confluent terms. Clauson gives an example if both used side by side: uluş bodun (the 
people of the country). As is seen, uluş has a geographical meaning and bodun 
indicates people. Terms changed their meanings in time. The term passes in a 
different example as follows: uluğ Monkol uluş beg (beg of the great Mongol empire). 
The term had territorial meaning in this example as well. The term meant village in 
some languages such as Çigil. Mahmud Kashgari also gives the term as village in his 
dictionary Dîvânü Lütagti’t-Türk. According to his dictionary, uluş, not ulus, meant 
village in the Çigil dialect. And he adds that uluş meant city in the dialect of Balāsāgun 
and its neighbor the country of Argu (Mahmûd, 2005, p. 621). According to Clauson, 
the term meant country of people in the sense of a political unit under a ruler in the 
77  
Ottoman Empire between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries and sometimes as 
tribe in the seventeenth century (Clauson, 1972, p. 153). 
 
Etymological dictionaries written in Turkish have different explanations. Hasan Eren 
gives ulus as aşiret (clan) and halk (people) (1999, p. 422). Ulus means halk (people) 
in the Tuva language. Eren adds how the last letter of the term became –s from –ş in 
Mongolian. And he says that the ulut (улут) form of the term came from Mongolian 
form. Starting with Mongolian invasions, the term spread across Turkish lands as ulus 
again. And the term passed to Farsi as ulūs (Eren, 1999, p. 422). However, İsmet Zeki 
Eyüpoğlu explains ulus in his etymological dictionary differently from common 
expression. He claims that ulus comes from old Turkish word ülüş (Eyüboğlu, 1998). 
Ülüş means portion and share. No other etymological dictionary explain the term in 
this way. Clauson, for example, does not mention a similarity between these two 
words. Bedros Kerestedjian took ülüş to his etymological dictionary as شولوا, but he 
did not mention ulus (Kerestedjian, 1912, p. 64). The word ulus and ülüş were written 
similarly in Ottoman Turkish. Ulus is سولوا and ülüş is شولوا. This similarities can be 
the cause of the explanation. Şemseddin Sami’s Kamus-i Türkî has ulus as an entry. 
He explains ulus as tribe, ümmet, and a bigger group of people than aşiret (clan). As I 
already explained, Sami used the term ümmet for nation. It is a considerable 
translation, if he used ümmet with the same meaning for ulus. Because if it is so, Sami 
would be the first man to translate ulus as nation. Then he adds ulus divided into il, il 
into oymak (phratry), oymak into uruk (family) (Sami, Kamus-i Türkî, 1901, p. 223). 
 
How is the term ulus used in classical Turkic books and sagas? The term ulus is passed 
nineteen times in Maaday-Kara, an Altaic saga from South Siberia (Gürsoy-Naskali, 
1995). The saga was written in Altai Turkish and the term was used to mean “peoples” 
and “everyone” in the saga. For example, bastıra ulus kaykaşkadıy (everyone is an 
admirer) (Gürsoy-Naskali, 1995, p. 38) or bastıra ulus bu süündi (all peoples rejoiced) 
(p. 174). Ulus is used in the form of uluş twenty eight times in the Kutadgu Bilig, 
Karahanid Turkish Yusuf Has Hacib of Balasagun, in the sense of village or city (Arat, 
1979, p. 494). The term is used in the Orkhon inscriptions, which are among the most 
important old Turkish written works. The inscriptions were written in the early eighth 
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century and are located within the borders of Mongolia. The term ulus is written in 
the inscriptions as uluş. Ulus is used in the north side of the Kül Tigin monument as 
“kurıya kün batsıkdakı Sogd Berçik er Bukarak uluş budunda Enik sengün Oğul Tarkan 
kelti (Batıda gün batısındaki Soğd, İranlı, buhara ülkesi halkından Enik general, Oğul 
Tarkan geldi) (Ergin, 1970, p. 59) which means general Enik and Oğul Tarkan who are 
from people of Sughd, Iranian, and Bokhariots countries came from the west at 
sunset. This example was given by Clauson, and in it ulus means country in a 
geographical sense. 
 
What is of interest here is the confusion between budun and uluş. In the pre-Islamic 
period, these two terms had different meanings and were not interchangeable. 
According to Clauson, budun (originally bodun) was used “for an organized tribal 
community, a people, in the sense of a community ruled by a particular ruler” (1972, 
p. 306). Budun is maybe the most frequently used term in the inscriptions. It is 
possible to see multiple instances of the word as Türk budun in the inscriptions. Türk 
budun means Turk people: Clauson gives this phase as Türkü budun, or Türkü people. 
While budun had a meaning about human groups, ulus had a geographical sense. 
Considering the time that the inscriptions were written, there was not a 
misunderstanding between these terms. However, when there was an effort to find 
an öz Türkçe equivalent for millet, there was a debate about whether to use budun 
or ulus. Muharrem Ergin, who translated the Orkhon inscriptions to modern Turkish, 
translates budun as millet (Ergin, 1970). 
 
3.4.2. Ottoman Usage of the Term 
I have already mentioned that the term uluş entered Turkish usage after the 
Mongolian invasions in the form of ulus. Etymological dictionaries say that the term 
was used, albeit rarely, in Ottoman Turkish between the fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In the scanning investigations that were carried out by the TDK on books 
written after the thirteenth century, the term ulus was found in books between the 
fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. The investigations were published as Tarama 
Sözlüğü by the TDK. Tarama sözlüğü made the archeology of the term in Ottoman 
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Turkish as follows (XIII. Yüzyıldan Beri Türkiye Türkçesiyle Yazılmış Kitaplardan 
Toplanan Tanıklarıyle Tarama Sözlüğü, 1972, p. 3955-3956): 
Yine dönmedim ya’ni namustan 
Yol azdım ırak düştüm ulustan. (XIV, p. 239) 
These verses belong to Süheyl ü Nevbahar as translated by Hoca Mesut in the 
fourteenth century. Dehri Dilçin scanned the book. Ulus means country and 
homeland. 
Kanı ulus, kanı şehr ile diyar 
Kanı mülk ü kanı il, kanı hisar. (XIV-XV, p. 515) 
Ulus was given with the words “city” and “region” in the İskendername written by 
Şair Ahmedî in 1389. Turkish-language teacher Hicri Göncel scanned this book. Ulus 
had a geographical sense here in this book as well. 
1) İlde, ulusda her ki boyun hana sunmadı 
Sultan yasağı oldur anı han esir eder (XV, p. 140) 
2) İl, ulus ve memleket tutmak ulu iştir. (XV, p. 18) 
3) Bezendi il ü gün anda temamı 
İle ulusa düştü şadmanî (XVI, p. 144) 
Ahmed-i Dâ’i was a Germiyanid poet in the fifteenth century. The first example 
belongs to his Divan. Turkish-language teacher Nurettin Koç scanned this book for 
the TDK. The second quotation belongs to Tarih-i Âl-i Selçuk, which was translated by 
Yazıcıoğlu Ali in the fifteenth century. This book was scanned by Kilisli Rıfat Bilge. And 
the third example is from Diyarbakırlı Şerifî’s translation of Firdewsi’s Şehname in the 
sixteenth century. This book was also scanned by Kilisli Rıfat Bilge. Ulus was used in 
all examples here with the term il (country). It is understood from this that the term 
was used in a geographical and political sense in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Ulus, furthermore, passes in Hikmetname by Antepli İbrahim bin Bâli’ (fifteenth 
century), and in a translation of Gülşen-i Raz by Şeyh Elvan Şirazi (fifteenth century) 
as well. 
1) Uluslar: hem kabaildir, sebepler: hem vesaildir (XVII, p. 43) 
2) Ulus: halk ü aşirettir, çeri sınmak: hezimettir (XVII, p. 71) 
3) Halkı ekser ulus kavmi konar göçer evli taifedir (XVII, p. 252) 
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The first and the second examples were taken from the Arabic-Turkish dictionary 
Cevâhir-ül Kelimât, which was written by a man named Şemsi in the seventeenth 
century. This book was scanned by Turkish-language teacher Atıf Tüzüner for the TDK. 
These examples are different from the previous ones, because ulus indicates here a 
group of people directly. The examples express ulus as “clan” and “tribe.” The third 
example is from Katip Çelebi’s Cihannüma, 1654, and was scanned by Kilisli Rıfat 
Bilge. 
El-heltat: yurttan yurda konup göçer olan taife-i insaniye denir ki göçer evli 
ta’bir olunur. Türkmenler ulus ta’bir ederler (XVIII-XIX, 1, p. 335) 
Antepli Mütercim Ahmet Asım translated Mecdüddin Firuzâbâdi’s fifteenth-century 
dictionary el Kâmus’ül-Muhît in the very early nineteenth century. This book says that 
Turkmens called migrant settler groups as ulus. This book was scanned by Velet 
İzbudak. It is seen that with the seventeenth century, ulus acquired a meaning about 
human groups, and lost its territorial meaning. 
 
On the other hand, the TDK also prepared a dictionary to show how words were used 
in folk speech around Turkey. An ulus entry was also available in this dictionary, which 
was published as Türkiye’de Halk Ağzından Derleme Sözlüğü. According to this, firstly, 
ulus was found in Lapseki, Çanakkale with the meaning of göçebe (nomad). This 
meaning shows similarity with the entry in the abovementioned 19th-century 
dictionary. Secondly, ulus was found in Maraş with the meaning of oba (nomad group 
or camping side). And lastly, it was encountered in Bergama, İzmir with the meaning 
of aşiret, or kavim (clan, tribe) (Türkiye'de Halk Ağzından Derleme Sözlüğü, 1993, p. 
4035). As is seen in the examples, ulus mostly referred to tribe at that time. This 
understanding started with the seventeenth century, because it had a territorial 
meaning before that. And moreover, as I mentioned above, Şemseddin Sami 
translated ulus as “tribe” and as a group of people bigger than an aşiret (clan). That 
is to say that, when the Turkish Republic was founded and while the language policies 
were being implemented, the term ulus had these layers of meaning. 
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3.4.3. A Concept in Operating Room: The Revitalization of Ulus 
The TDTC started publishing the journal Türk Dili (Turkish Language) in April 1933. 
This journal was the media organ of the TDTC and explained and presented the 
program and plans for the future investigations of the organization. It had a section 
devoted to French translation as well. Furthermore, Türk Dili had some parts that 
offered new translations for Arabic and Farsi words. These parts were created by 
investigating old classical Turkish books. The etymology commission of the TDTC 
undertook this investigation. Hasan Âli (Yücel) was the head of this commission. 
According to the explanation of the society in the journal, the first job was to 
investigate concepts associated with military and administrative terminology. There 
was a list of words found in Kitab-ül İdrak Li Lisan-il Etrak in the first issue of the 
journal. Hasan Âli listed words that might be alternative for old terminologies. He 
offered and recommended öz Türkçe words instead of Arabic and Farsi terms by 
investigating this book. The second issue of the journal was published in June 1933 
and Hasan Âli offered military and administrative terms from Gokturk inscriptions 
that were published by V. Thomsen and W. Radlov in this issue. Here Hasan Âli gives 
budun as an equivalent to millet. He makes this investigation from Radlov’s Tonyukuk 
inscription. Curiously enough, he investigates ulus as well as ulıs from Thomsen’s 
Orkhon inscriptions. However, the term ulıs was given here as “tribe” (kavim, kabile) 
(Türk Dili, 1933, pp. 37-40). It can be understood from this that Hasan Âli offered 
budun instead of millet. According to his investigations ulus indicated a smaller group 
than budun. In the third issue of the journal, word scanning was made by Mehmet 
Şükrü (Akkaya). He investigated the first comprehensive dictionary of Turkic 
language, Mahmud Kashgari’s Dîvâvü Lügati’t-Türk. Budun was given instead of millet 
according to Mehmet Şükrü’s list as well (Türk Dili, 1933, pp. 45-51). 
 
The TDTC published the fifth issue of Türk Dili in April 1934. The term budun was used 
in this issue while mentioning the Turkish nation (Türk budunu) (Türk Dili, 1934, pp. 
20-23). It can be seen that ulus was still not used as nation and that budun was used 
instead. This blurriness is reminiscent of the discussion between ümmet and millet in 
the Ottoman case. Türk Dili journal has importance owing to its status as the bulletin 
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of the TDTC. Because of that, it is obvious that ulus had still not been chosen as the 
equivalent of “nation” in April 1934. 
 
By the time the sixth issue was published, the shape of the situation and translation 
had changed slightly. Dil anketi (language survey) was also an investigation to find 
equivalents for terms. This issue published some accepted words as well as words 
that were accepted only by the survey commission. Equivalents for the term millet 
were accepted in the society yet, but accepted only by survey commission. According 
to that, the commission accepted budun as the first equivalent and ulus as the second 
equivalent for the term millet and it offered budunluk for the term millî (national) 
(Türk Dili, 1934, p. 59). These investigations were made from the Radloff dictionary. 
Ulus was used for the first time that much transparently with millet in the sixth issue 
of the journal in May 1934. 
 
The eighth and ninth issues were published together in September 1934. Although 
equivalents had been found and used for millet in previous issues, millet and milli 
were frequently used in this issue. It can be seen that ulus was used with the word 
uruk (phratry) as “Türk ulus ve uruğları” (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 11). This means that ulus 
had not been accepted as nation yet, but it was used to identify a smaller group like 
tribe or phratry in September 1934 when this issue was published. 
 
The adventure of the term in the parliament is also curious. Ulus passes in 
parliamentary documents on 12 June 1933 for the first time. This is quite an 
interesting date, because the first record of the term was in April 1933, as I 
mentioned above in the discussion of Türk Dili. And the term was used in a 
parliamentary document only two months after this investigation, although it was 
not accepted by the TDK. This record was in a legislative proposal about Mustafa 
Kemal’s properties. “Gazi Mustafa Kemal Hazretlerinin bütün yurt ve ulus işlerindeki 
görüş ve yapışları…” (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1933). Ulus was used alongside the term 
yurt which was used instead of vatan. It is seen that ulus was used as “nation” here. 
The term ulus did not pass in parliamentary documents for one year after this record. 
The next time ulus was used in parliament was on 7 June 1934. Ulus here was   used 
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in a record about settlement law with aşiret (clan) and oba (nomad group) (TBMM 
Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). This record shows that ulus was not used in the sense of nation. 
 
The tenth issue of Türk Dili was published in October 1934. This issue was critical for 
the term ulus. In this issue, ulus was used as nation. There was a word list showing 
Saffet Arıkan’s suggested öz Türkçe words. In this list, budun was directly translated 
as millet and ulus was translated as millet and halk (peoples) (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 9). As 
is seen dichotomy between budun and ulus was distinguished. However, the spread 
of ulus in the literature started after October 1934. Moreover, Türk Dili gives a 
telegram sent by Atatürk for the Language Festival on 26 September 1934. Atatürk 
uses ulus very clearly as nation in the telegram. “Dil bayramımızdan ötürü Türk Dili 
Araştırma Kurumu Genelözeğinden, Ulusal kurumlarından, türlü orunlarından birçok 
kutunbitikler aldım. Gösterilen güzel duygulardan kıvanç duydum. Ben de kamuyu 
kutlarım” (Türk Dili, 1934, p. 1). 
 
As is seen, the language of the telegram contains fully öz Türkçe words. Some of them 
are not used today and it is difficult to understand some words. This telegram has 
importance for the term ulus. Because, as far as I found, this is the first time Mustafa 
Kemal used this word in a document. After this time, Atatürk increased gradually the 
usage of the term in his speeches and documents. It is clear from this case that, being 
an authority, Atatürk accepted the word ulus as “nation.” However, this acceptance 
did not reflect directly to journalese. The newspaper Hakimiyeti Milliye under the 
influence of Kemalist regime spoke of the League of Nations (Milletler Cemiyeti) as 
budunlar cemiyeti (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 2). Atatürk used ulus as nation but the 
overlap with budun could not been solved completely. 
 
Swedish crown prince Gustaf Adolf VI visited Ankara on 2 October 1934. Atatürk 
made a speech at the banquet held in honor of the prince. This speech is important 
both for the vocabulary of the öz Türkçe movement and the term ulus. A part of the 
speech is as follows: 
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Altes Ruayâl; 
Bu gece, ulu konuklarımıza, Türkiye‘ye uğur getirdiklerini söylerken, 
duyduğum, tükel özgü bir kıvançtır… İsveç - Türk uluslarının kazanmış oldukları 
utkuların silinmez damgalarını tarih taşımaktadır. Süerdemliği, önü, bu iki 
ulus, ünlü sanlı sözlerinin derinliğinde sonsuz tutmaktadır… Avrupa‘nın iki 
bitim ucunda yerlerini berkiten uluslarımız, ataç özlüklerinin tüm ıssıları olarak 
baysak, önürme, uygunluk kıldacıları olmuş bulunuyorlar; onlar bugün en 
güzel utkuyu kazanmıya anıklanıyorlar: baysal utkusu. (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 
1934, p. 1) 
This text cannot be understood by any Turkish citizen without a dictionary today. It 
contains a lot of fabricated words which are not used today. This is important to see 
to the point the öz Türkçe movement had reached at that time. On the other hand, 
Atatürk used ulus in this speech several times as “nation.” This can be understood as 
an effort to encourage the use of the term in daily language. The newspaper 
Hakimiyeti Milliye reported this speech in its leading article and gave equivalents for 
the öz Türkçe words in this speech on the second page. Although equivalents for all 
öz Türkçe words were given in the list, no equivalent was given for ulus (Hakimiyeti 
Milliye, 1934, p. 2). 
 
The first usage of ulus in parliamentary proceedings was on 1 November 1934. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made a speech in the parliament for the fourth gathering year 
of the fourth legislative period. Kemal Atatürk used the term ulus and its derivations 
21 times in this speech. Millet did not pass even once in this speech. The term millet 
was excised entirely from Atatürk’s lexicon (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). The 
newspaper Hakimiyeti Milliye reprinted in opening speech on its front page and 
presented the equivalents for öz Türkçe words on the second page. Ulus was given as 
millet and ulusal as milli (Hakimiyeti Milliye, 1934, p. 2). This meant that ulus was the 
winner of the struggle with budun. Atatürk had already noted in his hand writings 
between 1934 and 1936 in this manner. He translates budun, but he wrote pudun as 
peoples and ulus as “nation.” Moreover, Atatürk suggested uluş as an equivalent for 
“state” (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları, 2011, p. 275). However, in origin both words are the 
same, they only had phonetical changes. Moreover, Atatürk suggested Türkiye Büyük 
Ulus Otağı or Türkiye Büyük Ulusal Toplantısı instead of Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 
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(Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları, 2011, p. 235, 314). However, it did not change and millet was 
used in the name of the parliament. 
 
Ulus was frequently used in parliament after 1 November. However, budun was also 
used in the parliament as nation two times until 1935. Once by İsmet İnönü on 5 
December 1934 (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934), and once by the parliamentary deputy 
speaker on 23 December 1934 (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1934). There is not any other 
record outside of these in parliamentary minutes and budun was not found in 
parliament after 1935. Osmanlıcan Türkçeye Cep Kılavuzu, which was published by 
the TDK (TDAK at that time) in 1935, gave ulus as the only equivalent for millet (p. 
205). Thus, budun disappeared from mainstream literature without establishing its 
presence. 
 
October 1934 had great importance for the fate of the term ulus. On the one hand, it 
was used frequently in order to engraft the term in daily language. On the other 
hand, some associations, places, and newspapers were renamed with ulus. The 
newspaper Hakimiyeti Milliye, which was founded as the media organ of the state 
during the Turkish War of Independence in 1920, published its last issue under this 
name on 27 November 1934. On 28 November 1934, the newspaper was published 
under the name Ulus. The headline of the newspaper was as follows: 
Hakimiyeti Milliye’yi kuran Atatürk’tür, gazetemize ULUS adını da O verdi. 
Adımız, andımızdır: Atatürk’ün ulusçuluk yolunda yürüyeceğiz. (Ulus Gazetesi, 
1934) 
Atatürk founded Hakimiyeti Milliye. He gave our newspaper the name    Ulus 
also. Our name is our oath: We will walk the path of Atatürk’s nationalism. 
The name of the newspaper was changed. Thus the soul and motto also was changed. 
Besides that, its publishing house was also named Ulus Basımevi instead of Hakimiyeti 
Milliye Matbaası. This staggering and clear headline actually declared the relation 
between the term ulus and Atatürkist nationalism. The newspaper was published 
every day with the motto of adımız andımızdır. This implied that the newspaper 
indigenized the laic Kemalist type of nationalism. This type of nationalism was built 
on a produced nation. The community already living in Turkey was manipulated with 
some strict policies and millet was converted to ulus. As I have already   mentioned, 
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Atatürkist nationalism both fought the Turkish community and imitated the West to 
make itself accepted among Western states. Thus, a Western character pervaded the 
Kemalist interpretation of Turkish nationalism. I will discuss this topic in the next 
chapter in detail. 
 
Not only were the names of newspapers and printing houses changed. The names of 
some places also had their share of this change. The clearest example of this was Ulus 
Meydanı (Ulus square). The changing story of the name of this square in the Ulus 
district of Ankara has similarities with the conceptual history I have explained here. 
The square was in use in the Ottoman period. Taşhan was built in the square as a 
large commercial building in 1888. There was also a teacher school for males built in 
1880. The name of the square was Taşhan Meydanı in this period (Bayraktar,   2013, 
p. 22). The first building of Grand National Assembly was also built in the square in 
1920. Thus, the symbol of the square was changed. Taşhan was used as hospital 
during the Milli Mücadele. Taşhan square was arranged as a republican square with 
the name of Hakimiyet-i Milliye Meydanı (National Sovereignty Square) after 1923, 
and celebrations and ceremonies were conducted there (Bayraktar, 2013, p. 23). 
With the construction of Zafer Anıtı (Victory Monument) in 1927 in the square, the 
name of the square became Millet Meydanı. With the language reform, the name of 
the square was converted to Ulus. Nuray Bayraktar alleges that the square became 
oficially ulus in 1930 by quoting from Anıl Çeçen. However, considering the 
reproduction of the term in 1933-34, the claim that the change was made in 1930 
does not seem true. 
 
The term ulus was used instead of millet as an equivalent for “nation” after late 1934. 
Kemalist circles used the term intensively in their writings and columns. However, the 
term did not become popular among some circles. For example, the newspaper Vakit, 
of which Ahmet Şükrü Esmer was a charter member, did not use the term ulus. 
Hikmet Feridun Es’s newspaper Akşam also refrained from using the term ulus. 
 
How did literary people view the replacement of millet with ulus in the meaning of 
nation? There were different views. Peyami Safa, for example, stated that it was not 
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sure whether people would adopt the term ulus instead of millet, which was a widely 
used term. Nurullah Ataç argued that millet was a foreign word. Because of that, it 
should be purged from Turkish and the Turkish word ulus should be adopted instead. 
Ömer Asım Aksoy defended that ulus was a Turkish term and it will be enough only 
to check Şemseddin Sami’s Kamus-i Türkî in order to understand it. Tekin, in contrast, 
stated that millet had settled in folk speech and was society’s own property, and thus 
that purging this word because of its foreign origin was not appropriate. According to 
Faruk Timurtaş, ulus did not mean millet. It meant “city” and “peoples” and ulus was 
hardly ever found in old Anatolian Turkish. According to Timurtaş, reviving ulus 
instead of millet was wrong (Bayar, 2006, p. 290-291). Moreover, Timurtaş evaluated 
ulus as a wrongly produced but broadly accepted word in his dictionary Uydurma 
Olan ve Olmayan Yeni Kelimeler Sözlüğü. According to this dictionary, other words 
that were derived from the term ulus such as ulusal, ulusçu, ulusallaşmak, and 
ulusçuluk, were also in appropriate and fabricated (1979, p. 140). The debate over 
ulus continued over the following decades. Hayat publishing house published Büyük 
Türk Sözlüğü in 1969. The first definition for millet is “religion” in this dictionary. 
“Nation” was given as the third meaning. On the other hand, after explaining how the 
term ulus was used among old Turks, the dictionary says using ulus instead of millet 
was incorrect and fabricated (1969, p. 1199). 
 
Because the souls of concepts are influenced by the change of concepts, different 
ideological discourses select and use terms expressing their views. This situation can 
be seen very apparently in discussion of Turkish language in TV shows, coffeehouses, 
and even in parliament. Some ideological groups abstain from using certain words in 
order to show their political positions. For instance, the term yurt was given as the 
equivalent for vatan (homeland) during the period of language policies discussed. 
Conservatives and nationalist people are bound up with this concept as well as 
Kemalists. However, conservatives and nationalists prefer using the term vatan, 
whereas Kemalists and leftists use the term yurt in order to explain the concept. It is 
difficult to encounter a conservative person who uses yurt to correspond the concept 
of homeland in Turkey. This represents a political stance. As in this example, ulus and 
millet share the same fate. Some particular groups use ulus or millet as an expression 
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of their political attitudes. In the next chapter, I will explain and discuss how these 
two terms settled in the Turkish political vocabulary. 
 
In this chapter, I have explained and traced back the mental change due to historical 
and political experiences, and the reflection of these developments in language. In 
order to do this, I firstly described the idea of Anatolia and the future apprehension 
of the Anatolian community after World War I. Anatolian Muslims carried out a war 
in order to rescue their territories from Western invasions in the post-war period. A 
new parliament was established in Ankara in 1920 and this parliament declared to 
loyalty to the sultanate and the caliphate. However, by 1924 the sultanate and 
caliphate had been abolished, a republican regime had been proclaimed, and the 
Treaty of Laussane had been signed. This indicated a bureaucratic disengagement 
from an Islamic definition of Turkishness. The republican regime desired to establish 
a Western-type secular state and nation. A lot of strict implementations were 
promulgated against Turkish traditions and religion in order to achieve this desire. 
Kemalist elites did not want to content themselves with institutional and 
bureaucratic secularization. They also want the society to westernize, because 
modernization meant Westernization for these elites. The state religion was 
abolished and the Arabo-Farsi alphabet was replaced with a Latin-based alphabet in 
1928. These two developments represented a strict turn away from the legitimizing 
role of religion. The Kemalist regime was obliged to create a common bond, a strong 
identity in order to fight with religious legitimation and to replace religious identity, 
because a newly constructed identity would help the regime to direct the society into 
an easy adoption of new policies. 
 
By 1929, the Kemalist regime conducted investigations on Turkish history. Lots of 
books were published and conferences were conducted. The aim was to prove the 
greatness of the Turkish race in history. However, the real aim was to erase recent 
history and the period after the Turks converted Islam. Thus, they would be able to 
create a new ethnically based Turkish identity. All these efforts and products were 
called the Turkish history thesis. Mustafa Kemal started investigations for language 
in parallel with the history thesis. Heidegger says that language is the house of being. 
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And the being is directly related with thought. That is to say, language reflects 
thought. Thus, language was a strong impediment to the realization of Kemalist ideas, 
because the Turkish language was heavy with Islamic terminology. To destroy this, 
neologisms were produced from pre-Islamic Turkish language as equivalents for 
conventionally used terms. The TDK managed these implementations relating to 
language. 
 
Language policies and history were instrumentalized for the aim of nation building. 
All efforts aimed at creating a nation. However, the term nation also took its share 
from these implementations. The translation of the term nation was millet in Turkish. 
This term had a long history and an Islamic connotation. The Kemalist regime created 
the term ulus as a replacement for millet. The history of the term ulus was quite 
curious. It had variously had a geographical, political, and communal meaning. I 
scrutinized the history of ulus from its etymology to its reproduction in the 1930s. I 
also explained process of its adoption into the Turkish language. It was in a 
competition with the term budun for a length of time. 
 
There were different views on the term ulus and millet at that time and now as well. 
This is a discussion about contents of Turkish identity. The social response, and how 
intellectuals, literary people, politicians, and ideologists used this term will be the 
topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ULUS IN CONTEMPORARY USAGE 
 
 
The previous chapter explained and analyzed the transition of Turkish identity from 
the end of the World War I to the first third of the twentieth century. I read this 
historical process through the relation between language policies and nation 
building. Language nationalism played a dominant role in nation building in Turkey, 
especially with the history thesis beginning from the late 1920s. One of the main 
catalysts of nation building is oblivion culture. In such a culture, recent history and 
items reminiscent of that recent history and culture are forgotten or society is made 
to forget, as a result of the implementations of various policies. This is the most 
effective way to construct a new identity and existence independent from the fetters 
of the past. The distant past is chosen as the source of creating the new identity with 
the thought that many factions of society can more easily agree on it in comparison 
with the current time. Language policies in Turkey under the guidance of the Turkish 
history thesis were clear examples of this process. 
 
The name of the new identity was naturally influenced by these implementations, 
and this gives us information about the character of the newly created social bond. It 
was a race between the terms millet and ulus. However, it was not just about 
renaming an outmoded term but rather fulfilling an aim. I explained and discussed 
the building process of this conceptual differentiation and historical adventure of 
concepts in the context of political and religious life in the previous chapter. After the 
concept was introduced into the Turkish language, it became an ideological indicator 
in Turkish politics. Using ulus instead of millet as the equivalent for the term “nation” 
did not mean that millet sank into oblivion. Both concepts maintained their existence 
in language and political terminology. And the concept has become a sort of 
ideological symbol. Although both terms mean “nation” and its derivations, their 
range and the form of nationalism they indicate are different. This creates a 
conceptual confusion for Turkish political terminology. This confusion is actually a 
mirror of identity chaos in Turkey. In this chapter, I will focus on comparing and 
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discussing how derivations of these terms are used in Turkish politics and how a 
conceptual chaos appears. Firstly, I will discuss the motto hakimiyet bila kaydu şart 
milletindir and its transition to egemenlik ulusundur (sovereignty belongs to the 
nation). Then I will investigate the struggle between ulus, millet, and budun. Thirdly, 
I will focus on milliyetçilik and Milli Görüş. And lastly, I will discuss ulusalcılık ideology. 
These examples will contribute to the conceptual study. 
 
The way that the Ulus newspaper reported the news of Atatürk’s death is quite 
interesting for the theme of this thesis. Atatürk died on 10 November 1938 and on 
the next day one of the propaganda organs of the regime and the CHP reported this 
news from headline as follows: “Kurtarıcını ve en büyük evladını kaybettin Türk milleti 
sen sağ ol,” which means, “You have lost your savior and greatest child, oh Turkish 
nation, be strong” (Ulus Gazetesi, 1938). As I explained before, Ulus was a media 
organ of the Kemalist regime. When new words were created instead of Arabic and 
Farsi words as part of the language reform under the TDK, Ulus used them 
immediately in its news texts. Therefore, the newspaper was a means of spreading 
the usage of new words and providing their socialization. This was an important role 
and Ulus was attentive to it. However, the news report on Atatürk’s death shows a 
concession from this mission. A newspaper whose name had been changed a few 
years previouly from Hakimiyet-i Milliye to Ulus used millet as “nation”. This is 
conceptually important for this thesis, as it serves as an indicator that language 
policies were not strictly implemented anymore. 
 
It is actually possible to see the first instances of this transition period as early as 
1935. The CHP conducted its fourth party congress in May 1935. The vocabulary of 
the party regulations and program was definitely different from first three programs. 
Atatürk’s party prepared the text of party regulations and program with öz Türkçe 
words as if to show the success of the language reform. I compared the 1931 and 
1935 CHP party programs to trace the conceptual differences. The texts of these two 
programs are structurally similar. They explain similar issues. However, their 
vocabulary is different. The 1935 program contains coined phrases, allegedly öz 
Türkçe, which are not used in current Turkish. The term ulus was dominantly and 
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frequently used in the 1935 text. It is not possible to see the term millet in any 
sentence of the text (CHP Programı, 1935). This shows the resolution of the regime 
on the new term. That is to say that, there was not any hesitation or reluctance on 
using the term ulus. However, the situation started changing in late 1935. Atatürk 
delivered the opening speech of the parliament on 1 November 1935 by using both 
the terms millet and ulus to refer to the nation (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, 1935). Other 
derivations and examples of these words in this speech were as follows: Atatürk used 
arsıulusal—currently uluslararası—for the word “international”, and saylav for 
deputy. Milletvekili was the previous term for deputy and it is still used, but not 
saylav. It is seen from this speech that the consensus on using the term ulus had 
fractured late 1935. 
 
4.1. Being of Two Minds; Ulus, Millet, Budun 
Some of the Turkicized words within the scope of language reforms successfully 
found a place for themselves in the language and are still being used today. However, 
some words that had a long history in the language and culture retained their 
existence in spite of interventions. The concept of millet was one example of this 
group. Because ulus was given as the direct equivalent for millet, the regime tried to 
change every instance of millet to ulus. Considering the wide semantic field of millet 
and the semantic extension of ulus, some problems and anachronisms appear. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious example of this was the motto of the National 
Assembly which was hakimiyet bila kaydu şart millettindir (sovereignty 
unconditionally belongs to the nation) 
 
When the National Assembly was established in Ankara during the Milli Mücadele on 
23 April 1923, the parliament had a very pluralist structure. As I explained in the 
previous chapter, the aim of the parliament was not serving national ideas. The 
assembly did not consist any of pro-nationalist members. There were ethnical Turks, 
Kurds, Arabs, Lazs, and Circassians as well as sheikhs, clan leaders, and artisans. As a 
reflection of the Milli Mücadele, the National Assembly aimed to end the invasion of 
enemies in Anatolia and save the sultan-caliph and Istanbul. Turkish identity had 
religious borders in this period, and therefore had very different elements from those 
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in the process of nation building in the 1930s. The concept of millet was used in 
parliamentary speeches and Mustafa Kemal’s statements. However, the question of 
whether or not it had the same meaning as the present use of the word should be 
examined. 
 
The parliament that was established in this political and ideological conjuncture 
enacted the Teşkilat-ı Esasiye in 1921. The principle of hakimiyet bila kaydu şart 
milletindir passed in the first article of the law (Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu, 1921). It is 
necessary to discuss what the meaning and scope of the word millet was in this 
sentence. It is understood that when the term ulus was used, it meant directly 
“nation” in English. However, during the period in question the term millet still had a 
dominant historical meaning related to religion. Thus, considering the structure and 
aim of the parliament, and the layers of meaning of the term, a political vagueness 
appears. 
 
A Quranic verse (42:38) was hung on the wall of the first parliament building. The 
statement in the verse was “… their affairs by mutual Consultation…” (Ali, 1937, p. 
1317). This was located for deputies as a religious advice in the parliament. After the 
republic was proclaimed and a new parliament building constructed, the principle of 
hakimiyet milletindir (sovereignty belongs to millet)—by calligrapher Mehmet Hulusi 
Yazgan—was hung on the wall of the parliament (Serin, 2013). The same statement 
was written in the Latin script after the alphabet reform in 1928. With the language 
reform the principle was written as egemenlik ulusundur on the wall; this form is 
available among Atatürk’s pictures. On 10 January 1945, the text of the constitution 
was simplified. This was not a change of the constitution but a simplification of its 
language (Gözler, 2000, p. 73). The principle I discuss passed as egemenlik kayıtsız 
şartsız Milletindir in this version of the constitution. On the wall of the current 
parliament building, the principle was written in this form. 
 
The form that the principle took on the wall of parliament and in the constitution 
offer insight into the political situation in Turkey during the period. Kemal Gözler says 
it is accepted that there was only one constitution in Turkey from 1924 to 1960. 
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However, the change of words can mean the change of the constitution (2000, p. 73). 
I also advocate the same, namely that the principle hakimiyet bila kaydu şart 
milletindir also had different meanings over the course of it history. That is to say, the 
form of the principle in the 1921 constitution and from that was written on the wall 
of the parliament after the language reform were not similar and did not have similar 
connotations. Hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir and egemenlik ulusundur do not 
have same meaning. Meanings change when words change. These two sentences 
were discussed by Harun Şahin in Orkun Journal exactly in this way (Şahin, 2003). 
According to him, using proverbs and principles like this by changing their words is a 
type of infidelity. He also thinks that this implementation was made against Atatürk. 
Thinking the principle I discuss irrespective of millet-i hakime understanding may be 
lacking in 1921. However, considering the term ulus in 1934, it signified a constructed 
Western-type identity. Although ulus was used as the equivalent for millet in this 
process, ulus was used very strictly in the first session of this rename after 1934. The 
layers of meanings and historical adventures of these two simultaneously used words 
were disparate. The Kemalist one-party regime preferred using ulus frequently in 
media organs in order to establish the term in public language. However, millet was 
used again instead of ulus in the effort of simplification of the constitution in 1945. 
This was a signal that the term ulus could not be established in the language in spite 
of all efforts by the regime. 
 
It is possible to give other examples to show that the change of the term could not 
be established in the language. Mustafa Kemal found öz Türkçe equivalents for many 
words. There were political and military terms as well as geometrical ones. Turkish 
General Staff Press published Mustafa Kemal’s handwritings about language works. 
He offered öz Türkçe equivalents for old Arabic and Farsi terms. Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) was one of them. It is seen that Mustafa 
Kemal tried to find a different name for the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal offered Türkiye 
Büyük Ulus Otağı (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I , 2011, p. 235) and Türkiye Büyük Ulusal 
Toplantısı (Atatürk’ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 314) for the Grand National Assembly of 
Turkey. He suggested kayın/kayım ulus (Atatürk'ün Dil Yazıları I , 2011, p. 273) and 
ulusal toplantı (Atatürk’ün Dil Yazıları I, 2011, p. 314) for the term national assembly. 
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However, these recommendations were not implemented. Although millet was 
individually changed to ulus, millet in the name of basic institutions of Turkey were 
not changed to ulus. Names of Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) 
and Milli Savunma Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Defence) also were not affected by 
these conceptual changes. 
 
Leaving the term millet as such a possibility and the conceptual weakness of ulus vis- 
à-vis millet in the social memory were maybe reasons for conceptual discussions in 
the following decades. Some writers both from nationalist and leftist wings discussed 
this conceptual differentiation at various times. I have already mentioned above that 
the vocabulary is a sign of ideology. Different ideological factions reflect political 
standings by their choice of concepts. This is valid for the term used as the equivalent 
for “nation” in the Turkish language. I will attempt to show this differentiation by 
discussing the opinions of some nationalists and leftists. I discussed in the previous 
chapter how budun was an alternative to ulus in the effort of finding an equivalent to 
millet during the language reform. Budun was a term identifying the whole group of 
Turkic clans in the Orhun inscriptions. However, ulus had a geographical sense. Those 
who adhered to a more racial dimension of nationalism preferred using budun 
instead of ulus or millet. When they say Türk budunu, they imply a Turkish identity 
based on consanguinity. For instance, Turgay Tüfekçioğlu explained this issue in an 
essay in the Orkun, which was known for its nationalist stance. After explaining the 
meaning of ulus and budun in Orhun inscriptions, Tüfekçioğlu says using budun as 
nation is more suitable than using ulus that had a different meaning. Furthermore, 
he states that choosing ulus as the öz Türkçe equivalent for the “nation” was a 
mistake (Tüfekçioğlu, 2003). The same argument was advocated in a different essay 
in Orkun (Şahin, 2003). 
 
4.2. Two Types of Nationalisms: Ulusçuluk and Milliyetçilik 
Famous Turkish sociologist Niyazi Berkes had different classification for this 
conceptual discussion. In his book Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler by Yön 
Yayınları in 1965, he separates the ulusçuluk (nationalism) of Atatürk from milliyetçilik 
(nationalism).   He   claims   that   right-wing   nationalism   is   dilenci      milliyetçiliği 
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(nationalism of beggars). The term milliyetçilik has right wing and negative 
connotations. To stay out of this situation, leftist-Kemalists frequently used ulus and 
ulusçuluk in order to show their way of nationalism (Gürpınar, 2011, p. 37). To 
comprehend the reason Niyazi Berkes made such a distinction between milliyetçilik 
and ulusçuluk, it is necessary to look at his view of Turkish modernization. The 
concept of modernization has the same meaning as secularization for Berkes. Thus, 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization meant a secularization process for him. The ultimate 
aim was to establish a nation state and this aim was directly related to the 
modernization process. Furthermore, because modernization brought secularization, 
the term millet gained a secular meaning after the republic. Thus, secular Turkish 
nationalism (ulusçuluk) was established instead of the Islamic ummah (Ak, 2016, p. 
79). As is seen, according to Berkes, the concept of ulus represents a constructed 
secular and progressive identity as a sign of the ultimate aim of 
modernization/secularization. Therefore, Berkes prioritizes the term ulus, whereas 
millet and milliyetçilik have negative, reactionist, and religious connotations for him. 
This attitude of Niyazi Berkes is still valid for some Kemalists, and I will discuss them 
further in the following pages. 
 
Assuming the term milliyetçilik (nationalism) with a right-wing nationalism may be 
related due to institutional usage of the term and the main character of the Turkish 
nationalism also affected the idea that milliyetçilik and ulusçuluk are different type of 
nationalisms. To trace this conceptual difference, the character of the Turkish right 
and the main vein of Turkish nationalism after 1960 should be taken in consideration. 
The Turkish right comprised various mixes of nationalism, Islamism, and 
conservatism. The concise statement of these components was milliyetçi- 
maneviyatçı/mukaddesatçı (nationalist-spiritualist/ritualist) (Can, 2008, p. 664). 
Associations like Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student Union, MTTB) 
became the center, in which nationalist and religious movements were blended in 
this period (MTTB Tarihçe, 2016). Furthermore, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was one of the 
most important leader who combined milliyetçi and religious ideas. His ideas in the 
periodical Büyük Doğu were examples of the alliance of these ideologies (Koçak, 
2008, p. 611). When leftist movements arose in the late 60s all over the world, Turkish 
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nationalism strengthened its alliance with Islamism compared to the past. Turkish 
nationalists established a main-stream political party. Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet 
Partisi (Republican Villagers Nation Party, CKMP) was converted to Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP hereafter) in 1969 by Alparslan Türkeş. 
One of the strongest motivation of MHP was anti-communism. To strengthen this 
motivation religion was a powerful mortar for their milliyetçilik. When talked about 
Turkish nationalism with the term milliyetçilik, it had more or less a relation with 
religion. Thus, some secular or leftist nationalists abstained from being mentioned in 
the same category with these milliyetçi groups instead, they preferred ulus, to which 
they assigned a secular and sometimes leftist meaning. This situation caused an 
increase of sub-categories of Turkish nationalism. That is to say, there are many 
Turkish nationalisms. 
 
Another movement established in the same period is quite related to the conceptual 
discussion here. This movement is the Milli Görüş inspired by Necmettin Erbakan and 
founded in 1969. Milli Görüş means “national outlook” in English. However, it is 
possible to misunderstand the political standing of Milli Görüş when translated to 
English. The name national outlook has absolutely different connotation than Milli 
Görüş. Milli Görüş is a religio-political movement that settled in different countries 
and has a political party culture. Necmettin Erbakan was a politician who did politics 
towards religious teachings. The name of his social and political movement was Milli 
Görüş. As I mentioned above, the term milli in its name had religious connotation. 
The word milli can be used instead of ulusal in current Turkish language. However, an 
ulusal görüş would imply different from Milli Görüş. The online portal of Milli Görüş 
in the Netherlands also explains the milli in relation to millet-i Ibrahim (Ibrahim’s 
religion, path), as I explained in the previous chapter (Milli Görüş nedir?, 2016). And 
it says that the milli in Milli Görüş does not have a lexical relation with millet as ulus 
(nation). As is seen, the movement use the term millet in the traditional Islamic sense. 
The MHP and other milliyetçi groups used the term millet with the meaning that it 
gained in the late nineteenth century in the sense of nation. However, Milli Görüş 
used the derivation of millet in its Arabic meaning, which still available and frequently 
used until the twentieth century. The term ulus does not extend to these contexts. 
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The concepts of millet and milli were not used only by the right wing in Turkey. A 
socialist movement the name of Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic 
Revolution, MDD) appeared in the 1960s in Turkey. This was a nationalist-inclined 
socialist movement. This movement planned to construct a milli cephe (national 
front) among the Turkish left with an anti-imperialist and national attitude. The 
second congress of the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) had such recommendations in 
1966. Beside the name of the movement, it can be seen that they frequently used 
milli in their speeches and writings (Atalay, 2006). 
 
4.3. Ulusalcılık 
While the layers of meanings of millet and milliyetçilik followed this path in the 
twentieth century, the term ulus and its derivations had a different path. Some 
authors close to Bülent Ecevit such as Ali Gevgilli after 1973 frequently used ulusalcı 
in the sense of milliyetçi. However, ulusalcı gained new ideological meanings and 
became a name of a political stance after the 1990s. The nationalist left gradually lost 
its socialist tendency in the post-Cold War period. And they have begun to form a 
deep partnership with Kemalism. A new ideology named ulusalcılık and a new type 
of nationalism appeared from this partnership. In the foundation manifesto of the 
Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association, ADD), which is known as 
a Kemalist society, Atatürk was defined as follows: Atatürk“ creates a positive, 
constructive, and modern Turkish nationalism (ulusalcılık) and makes it one of the 
main principles of the state by objecting to racism along the National Pact (Misak-ı 
Milli)” (Grounds of Foundation, 2016). Using ulusalcılık the “nationalism” instead of 
milliyetçilik or ulusçuluk can be seen as a mumpsimus. A reference was given to 
Atatürk’s nationalism that is one CHP’s six arrows (Gürpınar, 2011). According to 
Doğan Gürpınar, using that kind of derivation was a product of öz Türkçe in Atatürkist 
texts and words became meaningless due to this concern (2011, p. 38). 
 
A concern to establish a national left front (ulusalcı sol) emerged after 1995. The SHP 
(Social Democratic Populist Party) of Murat Karayalçın and CHP of Deniz Baykal 
merged in 1995 and columns written in this time used the concept of ulusalcı to 
define the new type of ideology (Gürpınar, 2011, p. 39). The leftist Mümtaz Soysal 
99  
also supported and developed the concept of ulusalcı with his writings in this period. 
Especially his writings in the Hürriyet newspaper set light to the concept. As Niyazi 
Berkes had done in his writings, Soysal used the term milliyetçilik for the right wing 
and criticized it in many ways. He tried to rescue nationalist thought from the Turkish 
right and created an alternative form for the left as follows in his column in 1997: 
Türkiye'nin sağı, eskiden beri ulus sevgisine sahip çıkmaktan, hatta onu 
tekelinde tutup fiyakasını satmaktan pek hoşlanır. Hem de ne sağ? Irkçılıkla 
milliyetçiği karıştıran. Ümmetçiliğini ulusallık gerisinde saklayan. Bir yandan 
sınırlar ötesi sermayeyle işbirliği yapıp kendi halkını sömürürken, bir yandan 
da ulus sevgisini kimseye kaptırmaz görünen bir sağ… Ulusal davalara ve 
sorunlara, evrensel değerlerle çatışmadan, ama kendi halkının çıkarlarına ve 
kendi ülkesinin yaşamsal haklarına da ters düşmeden insanca çözümler 
bulmanın akıllıca yolları vardır. Bunları her şeyden önce akıl demek olan sol 
bulmayacak da kim bulacak? (Soysal, 1997) 
Mümtaz Soysal consciously used the term milliyetçilik to insult right-wing nationalism 
for being too religious and close to foreign capital. And he says that the left can be 
the alternative to this negative situation because it is more rational. Soysal extolls the 
rationalist character of the left. This is important to understand how ulusalcı groups 
differentiate themselves from milliyetçi people. According to ulusalcı people, a 
milliyetçi conceives of the nation in an emotional and mythical way. Ulusalcılık, in 
contrast, pays regard to national interests with its rational character (Gürpınar, 2011, 
p. 40). Mümtaz Soysal wrote in 1999 that if neo-liberal economic policies were 
accepted by right-and left-wing nationalist parties, it would mean that they lost their 
nationalism (ulusalcılık) (Ulusalcılık ve Ekonomi, 1999). Soysal showed that he 
adopted a connection between ulusalcılık and economic policies in his writings during 
the economic crises in 2001 (Ulusal, 2001: Ulusal Plan, 2001: Ulusal'ı Beklerken, 
2001). 
 
Doğan Gürpınar’s analyses on ulusalcılık and milliyetçilik in the 2000s are very 
important to understand the current situation. According to him, ulus and ulusal are 
normally two different words. For instance, a TV channel that makes an ulusal 
telecast does not make an ulusçu telecast. However, the differences between ulus 
and ulusal were gradually lost. Thus, a secular image of ulus remained its existence. 
On  the  other  hand,  ulusalcılık  lost  its  leftist  tendency  with  AKP  (Justice       and 
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Development Party) governments after 2002 and became a different word for 
nationalism. This is because, according to Gürpınar, ulusalcı groups gradually gained 
a purely nationalist character and lost thei leftist discourse (2011, pp. 40-42). 
 
The most prominent political actions of ulusalcı groups under the AKP government 
were the republic protests (Cumhuriyet mitingleri) in 2007. The president of Turkey 
was elected by the parliament before 2007, and the AKP had the majority in the 
parliament. Thus, the AKP candidate would be elected as the new president of 
Turkey. The CHP did not want parliament to elect a new president and instead 
wanted a new general election. However, the AKP declared Abdullah Gül as the 
candidate for presidency. The Ulusalcı faction perceived this situation as a threat to 
the secular structure of the state and to the republic and decided to conduct crowded 
rallies to protest the government and to protect the secular principles. The ulusalcı 
groups ADD and Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (ÇYDD) 
pioneered the rallies in big cities. Many politicians, authors, and journalists known for 
their Kemalist line attended the protests. Ulusalcı characters such as Tuncay Özkan, 
Birgül Ayman Güler, and Nur Serter remained in the forefront of rallies and made 
vehement speeches. While visiting Atatürk’s mausoleum in Anıtkabir, crowded 
masses shouted such slogans as “Çankaya is laic and will remain laic” (HaberTürk, 
2007). The presidential palace was in Çankaya. Therefore, this slogan was directly 
against the conservative government that would elect the president. 
 
I have already said that ulusalcılık is different from milliyetçilik. Ulusalcılık is seen as 
“white nationalism” and an activist secularism constitutes its central position. A 
secularist attitude is an upper and overarching umbrella for ulusalcı people 
(Bayramoğlu, 2011, p. 47). This attitude is fed on various internal and external 
enemies. Islam—irtica (reactionism) in their jargon—is one of the biggest internal 
enemies for ulusalcılık, as is separatism. This perception of Islamism as an enemy lent 
a holiness to secularism/laicism (Kabakcı, 2011, p. 102). The history of the Turkish 
republic mostly means the only Turkish history for ulusalcılık. The identity created in 
the early republican era, which I discussed in the previous chapter, constitutes the 
main  character  and  defense  of  ulusalcılık.   Ulusalcılık  perceives  other  threats to 
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Turkish politics as well. According to them, the republic is under constant threat from 
internal enemies and a countrywide purge should be carried out. Because of bad 
situation in Turkey, various associations, including the military, should intervene in 
politics. A second independence war is needed against internal and external enemies 
(Bayramoğlu, 2011, p. 46). The secularist attitude and the idea that Islamism is an 
internal enemy distinguish ulusalcılık from the main character of milliyetçilik in 
Turkey. 
 
These two concepts still maintain their ambiguity in common language. Because 
various ideological groups use these words differently, no terminology that everyone 
agree on how developed in public language. It is possible to show this problem with 
an example from TBMM discussions. While the right to speak in one’s mother tongue 
in court was being discussed in the TBMM on 23 January 2013, the discussion among 
deputies shows how there is a big conceptual chaos in people’s minds. I quote a part 
from the discussion: 
BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER (İzmir) – AKP’nin, Türk ulusunu tarihten silmeye, Türk 
vatandaşlığını tarihten silmeye dönük olan girişimlerinde BDP’yle nasıl iş birliği 
yaptıklarını onun konuşmasında gördük […] 
BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – “Ve biz bunu tarihten sileceğiz.” diyor. Burada büyük 
Türk milleti önünde yemin ettiniz, büyük Türk milleti önünde yemin ettiniz. 
MEHMET METİNER (Adıyaman) – Biz ulusalcı değiliz, biz ırkçı değiliz. 
BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – O büyük ulusa parti olarak, tek tek şahıs olarak ihanet 
ediyorsunuz […] 
BİRGÜL AYMAN GÜLER – Kürt milliyetçiliğini bana “ilericilik” ve “bağımsızcılık” 
diye yutturamazsınız. (CHP ve MHP sıralarından alkışlar) Türk ulusuyla Kürt 
milliyetini eşit, eş değerde gördüremezsiniz. 
İDRİS BALUKEN (Bingöl) – Biz asla milliyetçi değiliz, siz ulusalcısınız, 
ulusalcısınız! (TBMM Tutanak, 2013, p. 461) 
The complete conceptual confusion that prevails in this discussion need to be 
analyzed. Birgül Ayman Güler was professor of politics and a deputy of the CHP. She 
firstly equated the Turkish ulus and Turkish citizenship in this speech. This directs us 
to think that she adopted a French type nationalism. However, the discussion was 
about a linguitic issue. It is understandable from her column in Aydınlık in 2014 that 
she sees a direct relation between ulus and language (Güler, 2014). That is to say, 
ulus is a lingual entity according to Güler. She first used ulus and millet synonymously. 
The AKP deputy Mehmet Metiner equalized ulusalcılık and racism in his response to 
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her. Then, Güler said a statement which was discussed in further days: you cannot 
says the Kurdish milliyet (nationality) is equal and congruent to the Turkish ulus 
(nation). Güler made a difference between these two words and used milliyet in a 
derogatory meaning. According to her, ulus was a statement of development and a 
political unity. On the other hand, milliyet was a social and cultural structure. And she 
believed that there was a categorical differences between these two terms (Birgül 
Ayman Güler: Özür Bekliyorum, 2013). After Güler uttered this sentence in the 
parliament, Kurdish deputy İdris Baluken said, “we are not milliyetçi but you are 
ulusalcı.” This statement also support my discussion above that milliyetçilik and 
ulusalcılık are different nationalisms in Turkey. 
 
As can be understood from this short discussion in the parliament, there is still not a 
common agreement on the meanings of these terms. Some people insult others with 
the idea that an ulus can be built with a political maturity. While doing this, the other 
side was seen as a milliyet, with some derogatory implications. This political language 
is a consequence of not having correct information on the histories of these concepts 
and wrong argumentations. It must be decided more clearly which concept will be 
used for which meaning. 
 
The word millici is grammatically a synonym to the word ulusalcı. However, as I 
previously mentioned, ulusalcı has different ideological connotations. The word 
millici was used for those who supported the Ankara government during the Turkish 
War of Independence (Büyük Türkçe Sözlük, 2016). The word millici is not used in 
contemporary Turkish to identify any groups or ideology. As is seen, although 
derivations are same, they cannot be used instead of one another. There is a table 
below that shows the normative and derivations of terms ulus and millet. 
 
Table 4.1. Meanings of Terms Derived from Ulus and Millet 
 
 
Millet 
 
 
Nation 
The term meant religion 
and was used to define 
religious groups. In the 
late 19th century it was 
used as an equivalent for 
nation. 
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Table 4.1. (continued) 
 
 
Ulus 
 
 
Nation 
The term meant tribe, 
clan. However, after 1934 
it was used as equivalent 
for nation. 
Milli National Can be used as “religious” 
Ulusal National 
No other meaning than 
national 
 
Ulusçu 
 
Nationalist 
The true derivation from 
ulus for the term 
nationalist. 
Milliyetçi Nationalist  
 
Ulusalcı 
 
Nationalist 
A mumpsimus used for 
nationalist. However, it 
became a name of an 
ideology 
 
 
 
Millici 
 
 
Nationalist? Nationist? 
(not in use today) 
The term was derived in 
the same way as ulusalcı. 
It was used for people 
who supported the 
Ankara government 
during the War of 
Independence. 
 
I collected interchangeable words in the above table to offer a clear summary of the 
previous discussions. These words are derived from the terms millet and ulus. The 
words, which can be used interchangeably, have different layers of meanings and 
symbolic connotations. Concepts may be signs of political ideologies or social 
movements. I attempted to show and correlate policy making and Turkish history 
with these concepts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This history of concepts is related to politics and social life and reflects the political 
culture and traditional codes of a society. Investigating this correlation in the 
academic platform started in Germany. There were various projects that studied 
conceptual history in relation to the history of concepts, such as Archiv für 
Begriffsgeschichte (Archive for Conceptual History), Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie (the HWP, Historical Dictionary of Philosophy), and politisch-sozialer 
Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680-1820 (Handbuch, Handbook of Basic Political- 
Social Concepts in France). These projects focused on concepts in different fields. In 
addition to these, the biggest and the most comprehensive project on conceptual 
history was Geschichttliche Grundbegriffe (The GG, Basic Historical Concepts). In the 
GG project, Reinhart Koselleck and his colleagues investigated 120 concepts from 
various fields such as politics, law, economics, history, and philosophy. As I detailed 
in the first chapter, the project had a particular method in writing the history of a 
concept. A concept was investigated in three parts as follows: The first section 
detailed the historical process of the concept from the classical to early modern 
period. The second section explained the semantic change and development in the 
Sattelzeit. And the last section gave a summary and information about present day 
use (Richter, 1995). 
 
According to Reinhart Koselleck, the semantic fields of some political and social 
vocabularies used in German-speaking Europe underwent changes between 1750 
and 1850 due to structural changes in government, economics, and society. This 
semantic transition was also deeply related with modern political and social thought 
(Richter, 1995). This period constituted the main part of the articles and showed the 
main milestones in the evolution of concepts. Starting from this point of view, I saw 
a similarity with Turkish political and social culture. There were great changes 
between the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s death in 1938 in all 
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fields related to Turkish politics and tradition. The way of policy making, social life, 
and identities were strictly changed in this period in which modernization was 
implemented intensively. A nation state was established in Anatolia, in what 
remained of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Nation state and nationalization 
were the main characteristics of the period in Europe and spread to other parts of 
the world from there. This situation influenced Turkey and the Turkish society to a 
certain extent. As Koselleck said for Germany, I think this period can be named as a 
Turkish sattelzeit. All political, social, and economic changes with modernization 
influenced the language as well. While starting this thesis, I decided to investigate 
and trace the history of the concept of nation, which I see as characteristic of the 
period. 
 
In the thesis I have tried to examine this concept in coordination with political culture, 
tradition, and religion. Nationalization or nation building progressed in Turkey by 
creating a new identity based on an idea of the distant past. Thus, this occurred with 
the idea that a new common identity could be created with the most common 
consensus or minimal conflict. I attempted to scrutinize the concept of nation in 
parallel with both political developments and language policies. The issue of religion 
was included in many aspects of identity in Turkey. The historical adventure of the 
term millet also reflects this. The word millet, with its religious connotation, started 
being used as an equivalent for the term nation in the late Ottoman Empire. 
Transition from the term millet to ulus reflects the secularization in language as well 
as in politics and identity in Turkey. Tracing this process though concepts is possible. 
 
As Benedict Anderson (2006) says, with the spread of printing in Europe, works were 
published in vernacular languages to reach the masses and sell more copies. This 
pragmatic purpose nourished social changes related to language. Martin Luther 
wrote his translation of the Bible in the bureaucratic language used in Saxony in order 
to be understood by more people. This process made a great contribution to the rise 
of modern High German. A similar example was seen in Italy as well. With the 
unification of Italy, the Tuscan dialect was chosen as the standard Italian language. 
The most important determinant in selecting Tuscan instead of the Piedmont dialect, 
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which was the political center, was the influence of literature (Sadoğlu, 2003). 
Boccaccio, Dante, and Machiavelli wrote their books in the Tuscan dialect, and this 
situation paved the way for the Tuscan dialect to become the Italian standard. The 
standardization of languages for national purposes left other vernaculars to the fate 
of being sub-elements of the culture or linguistic mosaic. 
 
Language had an important role during the establishment of nation states and 
national identity. The French language had a big impact on centralization and the 
nation state as well as over vernaculars. I mentioned in the second chapter how the 
edict that François I declared made French superior in the territory. This was an 
example of status planning. The Académie française helped standardize the French 
language and became the center where language planning was determined and 
implemented in the state over time. The situation was different in Germany. German 
philosopher and poet Herder was the first person who established a bond between 
language and national identity. Fichte and some other philosophers also thought and 
wrote in a similar vein. According to them, language was the determinant of the 
boundaries of a nation. That is to say, all territories where the German language was 
spoken belonged to Germans. This was a different description of the nation state and 
nationalism than the French one. German nationalism had more cultural and ethnic 
tendencies than a nationalism and nation state identified with citizenship and 
territory. The Turkish nation state theoretically described Turkish identity in terms of 
citizenship and territory. However, implementations such as the Turkish history 
thesis and language reform resembled a German type nationalism. It is possible to 
see examples of ethnic and linguistic nationalism in this period. 
 
Starting with the language-planning experiences in the Ottoman Empire, I discussed 
how national identity was described in the 1920s and how the ethno-secular 
boundaries of Turkish identity were established after 1929 in Turkey. The name of 
the identity was also changed in this period. This change was from millet to ulus. I 
traced back the layers of meanings of these concepts and discussed the process by 
which they came to be equivalents for the term “nation”. These adventures meant 
more than simply finding a correspondence. They had a deep relation with  religion, 
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tradition, the way of policy making, modernization, and nation building in Turkey. I 
have attempted to reveal these relations in this thesis. This work which can be 
evaluated as an introduction to the field of conceptual history will be a guide for my 
further studies. I came to better understand the importance of conceptual history 
during my thesis-writing process. 
 
While researching the topics I discussed in these chapters I saw how concepts impose 
their historical accumulations on current events. Millet, for example, still has a wider 
meaning than the Turkish nation in a classical sense. However, the word ulus seems 
to give the desired meaning more precisely. This can be seen from discussions I made 
regarding hakimiyet bila kaydu şart milletindir, milli görüş, and milliyetçilik. I put the 
term ulusalcılık in a different place, as I discussed above. The word does not directly 
mean nationalism in terms of its derivation. However, ulusçuluk seems the most 
suitable equivalent for nationalism. It is possible to see that authors choose the word 
ulus for nation and ulusçuluk for nationalism in their writings to be more precise. 
Ahmet Yıldız’s and Hüseyin Sadoğlu’s books, which I used frequently in this thesis, 
state that they preferred to use ulus as equivalent for nation in order to avoid 
ambiguity. İlber Ortaylı also says that using ulus to correspond to the term “nation” 
would be right. Millet has a religious connotation and does not correspond to the 
meaning nation. According to him, the most proper usage of the term milli is Milli 
Görüş (2007, p. 62), a movement formed by religious people and with a religious 
vision. Although the term milli means “national,” Milli Görüş used it in a religiously 
connoted way. 
 
I discussed the struggle between the terms ulus, millet, and budun in the second and 
third chapter above. Ulus and budun were revived from old Turkish sources. For 
instance, budun was used in the Orkun inscriptions next to the term “Turk” to identify 
all clans. However, ulus had a geographical sense in the inscriptions. Ulus was chosen 
as the term nation in 1934. If budun had been used instead of ulus, it would have had 
a tendency to identify the nation along more ethnic lines. This could have caused 
more discussions and conflicts on Turkish identity, citizenship, and the state in 
Turkey. 
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Political ideologies, discourses, cultures, and, that is to say, social life are fluid in time. 
Thus, vocabulary and the way of mobilizing society change according to new 
conjunctures. The language of daily life is also influenced by these conjuncture 
changes. This situation precludes the history of concepts from becoming static. The 
history of concepts is alive and changeable, and it has a continuously evolving 
structure, as do human beings and society. Thus, writing a history of a concept always 
requires further revision. I experienced this need first hand during my thesis-writing 
process. There was a military coup attempt on 15 July 2016 in Turkey. A group of 
soldiers in the armed forces attempted a coup against the elected government. The 
attempt failed, but this sequence of events did create a new political language in 
Turkey. If we accept the 15 July coup attempt as a milestone for Turkish political life 
and discourse, we should add a new page for the conceptual history of the term 
“nation” in Turkey. The way the word millet was used in the aftermath of the failed 
coup shows this clearly. In President Erdoğan’s political language, the word millet 
gained again its religious connotation. This can be seen in all his conferences, rallies, 
and interview speeches. The term millet started to imply a group of believers who 
respect religious and traditional values rather than the idea of a modern nation. The 
term ulus was never used to define people during this process. Thus, ulus lost its 
existence in political language. This term and it derivations were frequently used in 
Kemalist discourse in earlier periods. However, the post-15 July period revived the 
usage of the term millet. This constantly usage of the term tacitly contained its 
religious connotation as well. On the other hand, as I mentioned above, academic 
literature over the past few decades started preferring the term ulus to 
unambiguously designate the idea of nation. As is seen, usage frequency, the ranking 
of words, and their connotations change according to conjuncture. This shows that 
the history of concepts may need to be updated from time to time. 
 
Before writing this thesis, my aims were as follows: 
1) Understanding the role of language in discussions of nationalism. 
How effective is language in determining the boundaries of nation in a 
country? How does language affect the development of nationalism in a 
country? 
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2) Understanding the role of language in the search for identity in the late 
Ottoman Empire. 
To what extent did the importance of language change in the Ottoman 
Empire in the Tanzimat reform era and afterwards? What was the relation 
between efforts to simplify the Turkish language and modernization? Is it 
possible to read this history as similar to the French and German 
experiences? 
3) Understanding    the   path   of identity change from    the   War   of 
Independence to Atatürk’s death. 
Which elements constituted Turkish identity during the Turkish War of 
Independence and how did the change over time? To what extent did 
religion influence the identity? 
4) Understanding the role of language in the post-1929 era and in the 
establishment of a new Turkish identity. 
What kind of implementations were done to establish a nation state in 
Turkey? How were Turkish language and history instrumentalized to 
define the borders of the Turkish nation and nationalism? What were the 
reasons for the Turkish language reform and Turkish history thesis? 
5) Understanding the revival of the term ulus instead of millet and its effects 
on political discourse. 
What were the historical adventures of the terms millet and ulus? How 
were these terms received by society and institutions? To what extent 
and where exactly were they used? Why was the term ulus selected but 
not the term budun? Which term was used more frequently in political 
discourse and daily life? How political standings affect the selection of 
terms in political discourse? Which term is more suitable to use as the 
equivalent for the term “nation” today? 
These concerns were mine main concerns before writing this thesis. On the other 
hand, I did not want just to write a history of a concept, but I wanted to correlate it 
with Turkish nationalisms, language policies, and identity studies. Therefore, the 
thesis has several pillars. Undoubtedly, a master’s thesis cannot completely process 
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all these fields. The following are the achievements and shortcomings of this study 
that I intend to explore in my future research: 
1) I attempted to read Ottoman history from recent books about the topic. 
Therefore, I did not categorize late Ottoman history using the sharp 
division of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. I did not directly correlate 
the increasing usage of Turkish language and Turkism, because otherwise 
it would have been difficult to define the article 18 of the Kanun-i Esasi 
(1876) regarding the Turkish language. In this respect, this thesis 
distinguishes itself from older works on the same topic. For example, 
Hüseyin Sadoğlu evaluates the late Ottoman history in three categories 
like Yusuf Akçura such as Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. Therefore, 
he correlates the increasing importance of the Turkish language in the 
Ottoman Empire with Turkism. However, recent studies evaluate this 
categorization more fluidly than the classical literature. I attempted to set 
the relation between this fluidity and the Turkish language according to 
this vision in the first chapter. 
2) I attempted to avoid writing my thesis according to Turkish official 
historiography, though without of digressing from the academic field. I 
read and cited books and articles written from a critical perspective in 
order to discuss topics clearly. I analyzed the primary sources with the 
help of these books and articles. Thus, I attempted to provide a strong 
critical standing in this thesis. This concern helped me to realize that the 
religion factor had more importance on mobilizing society in the early 
Republican era than official history books explain. Thus, it helped to me 
to understand the strict change of identity from religious boundaries to a 
secular and ethnic frame. 
3) I traced the conceptual history of the term ulus by means of classical 
Turkish books, inscriptions, sagas, dictionaries, and etymological 
dictionaries. I discussed the different explanations of the term’s origins 
and I presented them objectively in the thesis. In future however, to write 
a stronger conceptual history of this term, books in various languages 
written in the Central Asia between the 13th  and 17th  centuries could be 
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scanned, which would strengthen the argumentation and sampling of the 
thesis. Dictionaries give certain meanings, but if it is possible to see the 
word in a book or saga, it is more likely to understand the semantic layers 
of the term. It is possible regarding the term ulus to say that if these books 
can be scanned, we will have a clearer idea about the reason of the 
selection of the term ulus instead of budun as the equivalent for the term 
“nation.” 
4) Although I gave a brief account of the historical course of the term millet 
in the thesis, I only investigated the essentials and milestones about the 
term. This thesis provided a parallel reading for both terms millet and 
ulus. A study of the term millet would be more difficult than this one on 
the term ulus, but this thesis could prove helpful to conceptual studies on 
the term millet in everal ways. I discussed the etymology and early usage 
of the tem millet in the second chapter above. The term has several layers 
of meaning as it was used in Islamic law and in the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, a difficult research process and advanced language skills are 
needed. Regarding this study, I collected many sources about the 
conceptual history of the term and I offer extensive account of another 
term with the same meaning. Thus, I hope it will help future researchers 
on the topic. 
5) I investigated the derivations of the term ulus as well in the thesis. 
Ulusalcılık and ulusçuluk were the main focuses in this respect. I tried to 
explain and discuss these terms in the light of some columns, books, and 
newspaper clippings. I investigated the essentials, but the contemporary 
usage and ideological framework of these terms can be strengthened and 
deepened with further investigations on primary sources. Various 
journals, periodicals, and newspapers can be scanned in depth and 
analyzed to better understand the creation and ideological 
argumentation of the term ulusalcılık. Speeches and texts of politicians 
and authors such as Niyazi Berkes and Doğu Perinçek can be investigated. 
These will help to more easily distinguish and build the political frames of 
the terms. 
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6) I focused on a topic that had not previously been comprehensively 
investigated in Turkey. The Turkish language presents a jungle for 
academic studies of conceptual history. The Turkish language had radical 
changes in the last century in the political system and daily life. Many 
concepts of several fields lost some of their layers of meanings and some 
other concepts gained new layers of meaning. Many words that were 
used in Ottoman political and daily life were integrated to the republican 
era. The situation provides rich sources for conceptual history studies. 
Unfortunately, studying the history of a concept is not common in Turkish 
academy. Yet, no conceptual history study is completely finished, and 
there a lot of discussion to do in this frame. Thus, I hope that this thesis 
will encourage other studies on the history of concepts that will 
contribute further to the development of the conceptual history of the 
term ulus. 
In this thesis, I explained the story of the re-extraction of the term ulus from dusty 
books by correlating and discussing it in the context of the modernization process of 
Turkey. On this path, I touched on types of language policies, types of nationalism, 
the Milli Mücadele period, secularism, religion, the Turkish history thesis, and the 
Turkish language reform. I attempted to analyze all these points in the conceptual 
history of the term ulus. The result I ultimately got was that although the layers of 
the meaning of the term ulus and its historical background did not direct us to declare 
it an equivalent for the term “nation,” the new meaning of the concept has been 
accepted to some extent by society. When compared to the term millet, the term 
ulus gives today a more precise meaning for the idea of nation. Therefore, the recent 
academic literature uses the term ulus more frequently to avoid ambiguity. 
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APPENDIX 
Some pictures and newspaper clippings that show the transition of terms in time. 
 
 
The motto “Hakimiyet Milletindir" on the wall of the first parliament 
 
 
Another picture showing the wall of parliament 
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The wall of parliament after the language reform 
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Ulus as equivalent for millet at Atatürk’s handwriting 
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Ulus the day after Atatürk’s death 
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